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This thesis aims at exploring different economic implications of international mi-
gration. It can be divided into two parts, according to the methodology used in
its different chapters. Part I comprises chapters 1 to 3, which raise issues studied
within a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model calibrated on the world
economy. Part II contains chapters 4 and 5 and builds on a theoretical analysis
via models that feature overlapping generations of individuals.
The following paragraphs summarize the research issues addressed in each
chapter of this thesis as well as our main ﬁndings. The analysis in Part I, labeled
“CGE analysis”, delivers solely numerical results.
Demographic projections for the 21st century indicate that population is ag-
ing all over the world, due to decreasing birth rates and increased life expectancy.
However the aging process is not synchronous across world regions and arises
at a different pace in the various regions. While developed countries, especially
Europe and Japan, will experience large increases in their old-age dependency ra-
tios, other regions of the world will be facing relatively low ratios and still rising
working-age populations. Since the world economy is more and more ﬁnancially
integrated and characterized by increasing capital mobility, this heterogeneity in
the aging process can induce inter-temporal trade, through international capital
ﬂows, mitigating the effects of aging compared to a situation of economic and
ﬁnancial autarky. Chapter 1 introduces an overlapping generations computable
general equilibrium model of the world economy, in which the countries of the
world are grouped into ten regions along geographical lines. The model is buildto
capture the effects of demographic differences between regions on international
capital mobility in a world with integrated capital markets. The population of
each region is therefore calibrated on the data of the United Nations’ World Pop-
ulation Prospects, which predict the evolution of the population by country until
the year 2050. Compared to similar models, an original feature of the model is
that agents are skill heterogeneous. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the
model’s structure and to present the calibration of the baseline scenario, which
over the next decades portrays the evolution of a world economy characterized by
global aging. Furthermore, to describe the model’s mechanisms, a population in-2 0. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
crease in one of the model’s regions is simulated. This simple scenario shows the
importance of taking into account international capital mobility as well as general
equilibrium effects. In fact, the consequences of such a scenario will differ if ana-
lyzed in a framework where capital is mobileor not, and whetherthemodel works
in a partial or in a general equilibrium setting. Lastly, since regions have distinct
characteristics, the implications on the world economy will also depend on the
region experiencing the population increase. The two following chapters analyze
the consequences of increased migration for migrants’ host regions (chapter 2)
and their regions of origin (chapter 3).
Chapter 2 analyzes the impact of immigration on the contribution rate in
North-America and Western Europe, when holding the generosity of the welfare
state constant at current levels. This issue is addressed within a calibrated over-
lapping generations model featuring integrated capital markets. The importance
of accounting for capital mobility was analyzed in the previous chapter and
may be summarized as follows. In a nutshell, a demographic transition raises
the capital-labor ratio and affects factor prices in an economy experiencing no
capital inﬂows. This impacts on a country’s economic performance since a fall
in wages reduces the saving rate of the youngest individuals, who are the highest
net savers and whose resources are essentially made of labor incomes. Capital
deepening may then partly alleviate the negative consequences of a demographic
transition by mitigating changes in factor prices. This chapter investigates the
implications of two immigration policies on pension systems: a selective one,
where the majority of migrants are high-skilled, and a non-selective one, with
a majority of low-skilled migrants. These policies are subsequently compared
with realistic changes in labor market characteristics. It is found that increased
immigration yields small ﬁscal gains and that both the selective and non-selective
immigration policies induce similar tax cuts. Results show that comparable ﬁscal
gains could be achieved as with the immigration policies, simply by postponing
the retirement age of low-skilled workers by 2 years from 2010 onwards in
Western Europe and by a gradual increase from 1% to 5% between 2010 and
2050 in skill-biased technical change in North-America.
Chapter 3, focuses on the implications of high-skilled emigration on mi-
grants’ sending regions.The literature on the brain drain puts forward several pos-
itive and negative effects of high-skilled emigration but there is no study identi-
fying the dominant and minor mechanisms at work. Another shortcoming is the
difﬁcultyto assess theglobal impactof thebrain drain on developingregions. The
paper aimsto addressconcerns ofbrain draindueto high-skillbiased immigration
policies. The potential impacts of South-North high-skilled migration are simu-
lated on GDP per capita, GNI capita, and the high-to-low skill income inequality3
at origin. A ten-region CGE-OLG model is built and dynamically calibrated so
as to match observations from the world economy. While our results reconﬁrm
the important role of remittances in subsidizing the income of those left behind,
they are also robust to different assumptionsas to whether the highly skilled remit
less or not. Furthermore, the paper assesses the signiﬁcance of several feedback
effects ignored in previous CGE works. First, it is shown that the high-skilled di-
aspora may greatly beneﬁt domestic production by reducing information-related
risks and bringing in more foreign direct investments. Second, the so-called
“brain gain" effect acts to reduce the income disparity between workers of dif-
ferent skills. These feedback effects may well outweigh losses of high-skill labor,
and they are especially pronounced for regions with small high-skilledemigration
rates. In contrast, brain drain indeed poses as a curse for regions already facing
severe high-skill outﬂows, including Eastern Europe, Latin America.
Part II, labeled “Theoretical analysis”, provides essentially theoretical results
on the economic implications of international migration.
Chapter 4 analyzes the link between climate change and international migra-
tion.Without doubt there is a growing concern over how and whether climate
change will affect international migration. Although the economic literature has
dealt with many aspects of migration, the treatment of the relationship between
climate change and migration has not yet been satisfactory. Our focus in this arti-
cle is to shed some light on the interaction between endogenous climate change,
international migration, optimal migratory policies and inequality. We employ a
two-country overlapping generations model with endogenous climate change, in
which the production in the North generates climate change which negatively af-
fects the productivity of the South. Our main ﬁndings are that climate change will
increase migration and that small impacts of climate change have signiﬁcant im-
pacts on the number of migrants. Moreover, a laxer immigration policy increases
long-run migration, reduces climate change, increases North-South inequality if
decreasing returns to scale in production are signiﬁcant.
Finally, in chapter 5 we study how high- and low- skilled migration affect
fertility and human capital in migrants’ origin countries.The early literature on
the brain drain stressed the negative impact that high-skilled migration might en-
tail for sending countries by depriving them from their most talented workers. In
contrast, the more recent literature claims that high-skilled emigration might en-
tail positiveside-effects for sending countries, which might possiblyoutweigh the
direct negative impact of a brain drain. The main body of the literature has how-
everneglected the impact of a high-skillexodus on fertility decisions at origin. As
put forward by the endogenous population literature, the quantity-quality trade-
off that parents face in terms of the number and education of their children has a
non-negligible impact on human capital formation and economic performance in4 0. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
developing countries. We therefore analyze the impact of high-skilled emigration
on fertility decisions at origin. An overlapping generations model is set forth in
which parents choose the number of high- and low-skilled children they would
like to have. Individuals migrate and remit to their parents with a certain proba-
bility. It is found that a brain drain induces parents to have more high- and less
low-educated children. Under speciﬁc conditions, fertility may either rise or de-
cline due to a brain drain. Low-skilled emigration leads to reversed results, while
the overall impact on human capital of either type of migration remains ambigu-
ous. An application of the model shows that increased high-skilled emigration
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1. MONALISA:
A MULTI-REGIONAL OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
WITH INTEGRATED CAPITAL MARKETS AND SKILL-HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS
1.1 Introduction
Demographic projections for the 21st century indicate that population is aging all
over the world, due to decreasing birth rates and increased life expectancy. As
public transfers are strongly ascending, such a demographic transition imposes a
strong pressure on the ﬁscal policy. Many dynamic and more speciﬁcally com-
putable general equilibrium models have been developed to analyze the sustain-
ability of the welfare state threatened by population aging. Most of these studies
were undertaken in a closed economy framework, see e.g. Auerbach & Kotlikoff
(1987).
There are however several reasons to adopt an open economy approach when
addressing multi-country issues. First of all, the world economy is increasingly
globalized, meaning that national economies integrate into the international econ-
omy. The world economy is thus characterized by larger trade, foreign direct in-
vestment, capital ﬂows, migration, and the spread of technology. For instance,
world trade has more than tripled since 1980. Building a model of the world
economy in which countries behave as closed economies would discard major
traits of the economic reality today. Another important observation regards the
aging process, whose pace and intensity are different across countries and world
regions (see for instance the United Nations’ World Population Prospects which
predict the evolution of the population by country until the year 2050). While
population aging is quite advanced in OECD countries, like in Europe and Japan,
other world regions will experience lower old-age dependency ratios and their
working-age population will still rise. This heterogeneous aging process can in-
duce reinforce intertemporal trade, through international capital ﬂows, mitigating
the effects of ageing compared to a situation of economic and ﬁnancial autarky.
Hence more recent works have adopted an open economy approach and more
speciﬁcally allowed for integrated capital markets. Large scale CGE models have
been built to examine the consequences of aging on international capital ﬂows.
Attanasio & Violante (2000) examine the impact of capital mobility on welfare
(GDP per capita growth)in a two-region model, with a Northern (US and Europe)
and a Southern region (Latin America). The implications of international capital
ﬂows on current accounts are investigatedby Feroli (2003) within a multi-country
(G-7)model, as wellas byBrooks(2003)andAgliettaet al.(2007)withinamulti-
regional world model. Other authors developed multi-country or multi-region
frameworks, built upon demographic projections, to analyze the consequences
of aging on pension systems when capital is mobile (Fehr et al., 2003; Börsch-
Supan et al., 2006;Ingenue,2005). Ourmodelbelongsto lastvainofstudiessince
it features pension systems. It is moreover closer to the world model developed
by the Ingenue (2005), because similarly to them the world is divided into ten
regions, according to similargeographical criteria and comprisingdevelopingand1.2. THE MODEL 9
developed regions. Compared to other models, which restrict their analysis to
developed regions (Fehr et al., 2003; Börsch-Supan et al., 2006), it allows to take
into account the non-synchronous aging process in a more global way by letting
the demographics of developing regions come into play. The aforementioned
models are characterized by a homogeneous agent framework. The main novelty
of our model is to differentiate households by their education level: agents are
either low- or high-skilled.
This paper pursues two main objectives. The ﬁrst aim is to present the mathe-
matical structure of the model, to describe the calibration process of the baseline
scenario and to examine the consequences of the demographic transition on the
world economy over the 21st century. We especially focus on the impact on the
world real interest rate, the annual growth rate of the world GDP, regional growth
rates, investment rates, saving rates and current accounts. The second objective
is to highlight the importance of modeling a world economy in which the differ-
ent regions are ﬁnancially integrated. More precisely, policy analysis can yield
different conclusions whether capital mobility and capital accumulation are en-
dogenized or not. For that purpose, we propose to investigate the implications of
a very simple scenario, in which there is a one-time increase in the population of
one region: Western Europe. First, the consequences of this scenario will differ
whether analysed in a framework where capital is mobile across regions or in one
in which each region is treated as a closed economy. Second, general equilibrium
effects prove to be signiﬁcant. The population increase will for instance have a
quite different impact on Western European GDP in a case where capital accu-
mulation is endogenous compared to a partial equilibrium framework where the
capital stock is ﬁxed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the mathematical
structure of the world model. The calibration process is explained in section
1.3. Section 1.4 depicts the evolution of the world economy under our baseline
scenario. The impact of the scenario of increased population is shown in section
1.5. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The Model
Thisstudybuildsupon amulti-regionoverlappinggenerations(OLG) computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model. The countries of the world are grouped into
10 regions. Individuals live for 8 periods, each of 10 years. Age classes go from
15-24 to 85-94 years, implying that individuals are “born" at the age of 15 and
die at the age of 95. However some individuals die before the age of 95, implying
that agents face a positive probability of being alive at each period.
The model features agent heterogeneity by skills: there are high- and low-10
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skilled individuals. “high-skilled individuals" identify individuals with an edu-
cation above high-school degree (tertiary education), whereas “low-skilled indi-
viduals" comprise individuals having an educational level less than high-school
(primary education) and with a high-school degree (secondary education). The
educational choice (e) and thus also the proportion of high-skilled individuals
among one generation (φ) are exogenously determined.
Furthermore, there is only one consumption good and its price is the nu-
meraire of the model. There is one leading economy (North-America), in the
sense that the technological progress of each region is expressed in terms of the
one of the leading economy, and the evolution of technology is exogenous.
The model is also characterized by full-employment. Finally, each economy
has three agents: households, a representative ﬁrm and a public sector. In the fol-
lowing subsections, we describe the regional decomposition of the world, agents’
behavior and the equilibrium of the model.
1.2.1 Regions
The model splits the countries of the world into 10 regions (or groups of coun-
tries). Three of them consist of developed countries: Japan (JAP), North Amer-
ica (NAM), which comprises the United States plus Canada, and Western Europe
(WEU), with Europe-15 as the major members.1 We also distinguishseven devel-
oping regions, Eastern Europe (EAS), Middle East and Northern Africa (MEN),
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the Former
Soviet Union (RUS), the Chinese world (CHI) and the Indian world (IND). See
table 1.1 for more details.
1.2.2 Demography
At each date, some individuals die and a new generation appears. Individuals
are aged from 15 to 94. Households reaching age 15 (labeled as age 0 in our
notations) at year t belong to generation t. The size of the young generation
increases over time at an exogenous growth rate:
N0,t = mt−1N0,t−1, (1.1)
where N0,t measures the initial size of generation t and mt−1 is one plus the
demographic growth rate, including both fertility and migration.
1This region also comprises Australia and New-Zealand, while Paciﬁc Islands are included in
the Indian world. In contrast, the Ingenue (2005) add Australia, New-Zealand and all the Paciﬁc
Islands to their ‘North America’ region.1.2. THE MODEL 11
Table 1.1: Deﬁnition of the different regions
REGION
CODE
REGION NAME COUNTRY LIST
NAM North America United States and Canada.
WEU Western Europe Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United
Kingdom.
JAP Japan Japan.
EAS Eastern Europe Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania,
Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia and Slovenia.
MEN Middle East and
North Africa
Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Is-
rael, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, Mo-
rocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syr-
ian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
LAC Latin America and
Caribbean
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela.
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo
Democratic Republic, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauri-
tius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swazi-
land, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
RUS Former Soviet Union Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and
Uzbekistan.
CHI Chinese World Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, East Timor, Hong Kong, Korea, Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Macau, Mongolia, Philippines, Singa-
pore, Thailand and Vietnam.
IND Indian World and Pa-
ciﬁc Islands
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tonga and Vanuatu.
Each household lives a maximum of 8 periods (a = 0,1,...,7) but faces a
cumulative survival probability which is decreasing with age. Thus the size of
each generation declines deterministically through time:
Na,t+a = Pa,t+aN0,t, (1.2)
where 0 ≤ Pa,t+a ≤ 1 is the fraction of generation t alive at age a (hence, at
period t + a). Obviously, P0,t = 1. Moreover, total population at time t amounts12
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to Nt =
 7










tN0,t = (1 − φt)N0,t
where φh
t equals φt and denotes the proportion of high-skilled (post-secondary
educated) individuals among the generation born in t.
1.2.3 Preferences
Each time an individual dies, her/his assets will be equally distributed among
individuals belonging to the same age class. This formalization avoids to increase
agent heterogeneity in the model. In fact if the wealth of an individual would
be redistributed to his/her children, the latter ones’ initial wealth would differ in
terms of assets compared to equally aged individuals. This annuity market allows
that individuals belonging to one generation differ only in terms of their type of
education.
As stated above, there is life uncertainty at the individual level since agents
have a positive probability to die during each period of life. Instead of allowing
for accidental bequests, we postulate the existence of an insurance mechanism à
la Yaari 1965 (or à la Arrow-Debreu) as in de la Croix & Docquier (2007) or in
the study by the Ingenue (2005), in which there is a perfect annuity market for
every contingent consumption. It is as if there exist insurance companies offering
competitive contracts and making zero proﬁts. At the beginning of his life, each
agent has the possibility to sign a contract with a company, which insures him-
self against uncertainty. At each period when an agent dies, his assets are seized
by the insurance company, which redistributes them equally among the individ-
uals belonging to the same age class and having survived. Hence, the problem
of agents born at time t is to choose a consumption contingent plan in order to
maximize their expected utility subject to their intertemporal budget constraint,
given the sequence of contingent wages and prices. This insurance mechanism
has also the interesting property of avoiding too much agent heterogeneity. In
fact, if we would assume unintended bequests, then some individuals would be
born with positive assets. This would add one more agent heterogeneity in terms
of initial wealth and would further complicate the computation of the staedy-state
in a model, where agents already differ in terms of age and education levels.
The expected utility function (U) of low- (upperscript l) and high-skilled (up-








a,t+a), j = h,l (1.3)1.2. THE MODEL 13
where c
j
a,t+a is the consumption of age class a at time t + a.2
The budget constraint of low- (l) and high-skilled (h) individuals requires
equality between the expected value of expenditures and the expected value of













































a,t+a is the labor participation rate for a j type individual of age class a,
w
j
t is labor income of a j type worker, R∗
t is one plus the international interest
rate, τc
t is consumption tax, τw




a are other welfare transfers received by an individual of type
j and are represented as a time-constant fraction of labor income, and ﬁnally ψt
is the generosity factor, which is the factor by which these other welfare transfers
are multiplied at time t. Moreover, education is exogenous and individuals spend
a fraction e
j
t of their total time (which is only positive in their ﬁrst period of life).
Individuals maximize their utility (1.3) subject to their intertemporal budget
constraint (1.4) with respect to the levels of consumption. The optimal (contin-








Equation (1.5) reveals that to know the optimal lifetime consumption (c0 to c7) of
a cohort born in t can be known once its consumption level at age 0 is identiﬁed.
The optimal level of consumption in the ﬁrst period of life can be determined by
substituting (1.5) in (1.4).
2It can be observed that there is no explicit time preference parameter in the utility function
(more precisely, it is set to 1). The discount rate impacts on households’ intertemporal con-
sumption choices. But as in de la Croix et al. (2007) and de la Croix & Docquier (2007), the
psychological discount factor is implicitly taken into account by the probabilities of being alive at
each. With such an assumption, as in these two studies, our model provides a good shape of asset
proﬁles per age. Hence, there is no need to suppose a pure time preference parameter on top of
the mortality rate. Moreover, in our model we obtain a long-run value for the annual world real
interest rate of 3.255%. This is compatible with the Ingenueworld model. While using a different
utility function, the discount factor is set close to one with a value of 0.99 and their long run path
is calibrated to seek a level for the annual world interest rate lying between 3 and 3.5% (Income
growth in the 21st century: Forecasts with an overlapping generations model, Agl).14
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Moreover, we can also deﬁne the implicit asset holdings of each age class.
We assume that individuals are born with no assets at time t, or in other words,
there are no bequests. At time t + a with a > 0, assets of high- and low-skilled
individuals (Z
j
a,t+a) depend on their assets in the previous period (Z
j
a,t+a−1) plus
an interest rate as well as on current expenditures (consumption) and incomes
(labor income, pension beneﬁts and other welfare transfers). Formally, at the
beginning of their ﬁrst period of life (when a = 0), Z
j
0,t = 0 for all t. For a > 0,































where Na,t+a represents the number of individuals of age class a living at time
t + a, φ
j
t is the proportion of individuals of skill type j among generation t.
1.2.4 Firms
At each period of time and in each region, a representative ﬁrm uses efﬁcient
labor (Lt) and physical capital (Kt) to produce a compositegood (Yt). We assume





where α measures the share of wage income in the national product, and At is an
exogenous process representing Harrod neutral technological progress.
Total efﬁcient labor force combines the demands of high-skill (Lh
t) and of
low-skill labor (Ll
t) according to the transformation function characterized by a









where υt is an exogenous skill-biased technological progress, and σ is deﬁned as
σ=1 −
1
ε, with ε being the elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-
skilllabor. In thepresent versionofthe model, σ is set to 1 meaningthat high-and
low-skill labor are perfect substitutes. In the labor markets labor is inelastically
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The proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms requires the equality of the marginal pro-
ductivity of each factor to its rate of return:
w
j















1−α − δ = Rt, (1.11)
where δ represents the depreciation rate of capital and Rt is the regional interest
factor, deﬁned in section 1.2.5.
1.2.5 Government
The government levies taxes on labor earnings (τw
t ) and consumption expendi-
tures (τc
t ) to ﬁnance general public consumption (c
g
t), pension beneﬁts (b
j
t) and
other welfare transfers (ζ
j
a+1). The government surplus (St) can be written as
























































t is a part of national income used to ﬁnance general public spending.
The government also issues bonds and pays interests on public debt. Thus the
government’s budget constraint may be written as:
dt+1Yt+1 = R
∗
tdtYt − St, (1.13)
where d represents the debt-to-GDP ratio, R∗ is one plus the international interest
rate and S is the government’s surplus. Equation (1.13) says that public debt in
t+1 depends on past debt in t and its interests, minus the government’ssurplus S.
The evolution of the public debt is exogenously given. Since transfers and taxes
on consumption are exogenous as well, the wage tax rate will adjust to satisfy the
government’s budget constraint (1.13).
Finally, in contrast to existing multi-regional models, the modeling of the
pension systems should account for the skill-heterogeneous agents feature of our16
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model. In fact, a social security system can be characterized not only by its gen-
erosity or size but also by its redistributiveness (Pestieau, 1999). In the following
equations, the ﬁrst characteristic is captured by the replacement rate χt and the
second one by the parameter ρ, with both parameters comprised between 0 and 1.
Pension beneﬁts for low- (bl
t) and high-skilled (bh

















A value for ρ close to 0 implies more redistributive pension systems, since low-
and high-skilled would receive similar amounts of beneﬁts when retired. If ρ is
close to 1, then pension systems are weakly redistributive with replacement rates
that are constant across income levels. This modeling allows regional pension
systems to be partly Bismarckian or Beveridgian.3
1.2.6 International capital market
In an economy with perfect capital mobility - up to a conﬁscation rate on the
returns to capital (see below) - the aggregate value of world assets equals the
















where X is the set containing each world region. Moreover, Kx
t is the sum of the
capital stock of region x at time t, Ω is the sum of the assets of all the cohorts of
region x, dx
tY x
t is the level of region x’s debt at time t.
An economy with capital mobility is also characterized by the arbitrage con-
dition of the returns to capital which requires the equality between the rates of
return to capital in each region. However, there are several reasons why capital
may not be perfectly mobile across regions. Transaction costs may reduce in-
ternational capital mobility, but cross-border investments may also be refrained
by investment risks induced by a region’s poor institutional quality. In fact, in-
vestors’ trust depends on the economic freedom within a region as well as on a
government’s capacity to enforce property rights and to restrain corruption. Thus
we assume that, in each region, returns to investments are subject to a conﬁsca-
tion rate or a rent-seeking rate by the government. This conﬁscation rate captures
3Bismarckian systems can be deﬁned as highly generous and poorly redistributive, while Bev-
eridgian pension are small-sized and more redistributive. This remains however a simplistic cate-
gorization (Pestieau, 1999).1.2. THE MODEL 17
transaction costs and various investment risks faced by international investors and
is modeled as a premium on the international rate of return to capital R∗. A re-
gion’s domestic interest factor R is then equal to the international interest factor
R∗ up to the region’s conﬁscation rate π,
Rt = R
∗
t(1 + π) (1.17)





where q is the risk classiﬁcation of a region as deﬁned by the OECD (2006a), qo
is the highest attainable risk rating and πo is the maximum conﬁscation rate. The
conﬁscation rate depends on the region’s risk classiﬁcation: the riskier the region,
the higher the premium. This means that in a region with a risk rating close to the
maximum qo, the conﬁscation rate will be close to the highest possible one πo.
The conﬁscation rate π is modeled here as a government tax on the returns to
capital. In a risky region, the conﬁscation rate is the part of an investor’s return
to capital levied by the government and used in general public spending i.e. it is
not redistributed to households or ﬁrms. A positive rent-seeking rate will induce
a regional interest rate that is larger than the international one and investment
in this region will be lower than in the absence of such rent-seeking. In North
America, Western Europe and Japan, investment risk is zero.
1.2.7 Equilibrium
Deﬁnition (Competitive Equilibrium) Given an initialstock ofcapital {Kt}t=0,
an exogenous demographic structure summarized by {Na,t}a=0..7,t≥0, an exoge-
nous distribution of high-skilled individuals {φ
j





a,t = 0}a=0,t≥0, a competitive
equilibrium in an economy with perfect capital mobility, up to a conﬁscation rate,
is
⋆ a vector of individual variables {c
j
a,t}a=0..7,t≥0,j=h,l that are the optimal so-
lutionsto the households’maximizationproblem, i.e. equation (1.3)subject
to (1.4);
⋆ a vector of the ﬁrm’s variables {Kt,L
j
t}t≥0,j=h,l that maximize the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts subject to technology (1.7);
⋆ a vector of income taxes {τw
t } balancing the budget of the government
(1.13);18
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⋆ a vector of wages {w
j
t}t≥0,j=h,l such that labor markets are in equilibrium
;
⋆ an interest factor {Rt}t≥0 satisfying the no arbitrage condition of the rates
of return to capital, i.e. equation (1.17) holds;
⋆ and ﬁnally, an international interest factor R∗
t satisfying the equality be-
tween the aggregate value of world assets and the market value of the
world-wide capital stock plus the sum of the debts of all regions, i.e. equa-
tion (1.16) holds.
The equilibrium on the goods market is achieved by Walras’ law.4 Table 1.2
summarizes the model’s structure by presenting its equations and endogenous
variables.
1.3 Calibration of the baseline scenario
In this section we describe the data and explain the calibration of the parameters,
the observed and unobserved exogenous variables. We also deﬁne the baseline
scenario and the assumptions on the future. Finally, we illustrate the population
aging process that occurs all over the world in the 21st century. Therefore, we
focus on the evolution of the support ratio, which is a general indicator of the
aging process. The support ratio is deﬁned as the number of people of working
age for one pensioner.
To forecast the economic consequences of an aging world population, we cal-
ibrate the model economies of ten world regions. This calibration is achieved by
ﬁxing someconstantparameters, usingdata forobserved exogenousvariables and
choosing (arbitrary) values to unobserved exogenous variables in order to match
a series of characteristics.
The baseline predictions are based on ofﬁcial demographic forecasts and ex-
trapolate the trends observed in the last decades (in terms of educational attain-
ment, productivity growth, public consumptions, public debt, generosity of wel-
fare programs, etc.). More precisely, the evolution of the population is based on
the United Nations Population Projections, which cover the period 1950 to 2050.
These forecasts are calibrated through the growth rate of the youngest cohort of
individuals. The projections on the age structure of the population are matched
4In an open economy, the goods market is in equilibrium when domestic output equals the
demand - both domestic and foreign - for domestic goods: Yt = Ct + It + Gt + Xt − Mt,
where Ct is total consumption, It is investment, Gt is government expenditure and Xt − Mt is
the trade balance, i.e. exports Xt minus imports purchases Mt. In terms of the model, It =
Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt and Gt = c
g
tYt.1.3. CALIBRATION OF THE BASELINE SCENARIO 19
Table 1.2: The model’s equations
ENDOGENOUS EQUATION EQUATION
VARIABLE NUMBER
N0 N0,t = mt−1N0,t−1 (1.1)









a,t+a, for a = 0,...,6 (1.5)
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Y Yt = Kα
t (AtLt)1−α (1.7)
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K Rt = 1 + α(Kt)α−1(AtLt)1−α − δ (1.11)20
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through each cohort’s probability of being alive at the next period. After 2050 the
growth rate of the ﬁrst cohort and the probabilities of being aliveare held constant
over time. Individuals live for 8 periods of 10 years, hence the population struc-
ture starts from an initial state in 1870 and reaches a ﬁnal steady state in 2130.
Our model uses the Dynare algorithm to solve for the perfect foresight general
equilibrium transition path of the economy.5
Before turning to the description of the calibration of observed and unob-
served variables, let us ﬁrst observe that two parameters δ and α are set a priori
and are assumed to be identical for all the regions. As Income growth in the 21st
century: Forecasts with an overlapping generations model (Agl) we argue that
there is no reason to think that these parameters should differ across regions. We
use an annual depreciation rate of capital of 5% like in Chojnicki et al. (2005)
and de la Croix & Docquier (2007), which implies that δ equals 0.4. The capital
share in output α is set to one third, 0.33, as estimated in the growth accounting
literature (see also GTAP, 2008).
1.3.1 Observed exogenous variables
Table 1.3 exhibits the values of the time-constant transfer proﬁles in percentage
of labor income, while other observed exogenous variables are displayed in table
1.4.
Social security transfer proﬁles ζj
a. The social security transfer proﬁles of each
educational group are assumed to be stable over time. The data for the social se-
curity transfer proﬁles (ζj
a) come from US and European generational accounting
studies (Chojnicki, 2005). For the US, he disaggregates the proﬁles in the ho-
mogeneous agent study of Gokhale et al. (2000) by individuals’ education level:
below high school, high school and above high school. These proﬁles are also
used in Chojnicki & Docquier (2007) and comprise eight types of transfers: old
age security, disability insurance, medicare and medicaid, unemployment insur-
ance, general welfare, aid to families with dependent children, food stamps and
ﬁnally, educational transfers. In our model we take the average proﬁles of the two
ﬁrst groups as the proﬁles of ‘low-skilled’ individuals for the North American
region. For the Western European region, we rely on the same types of transfers
by using the European data in Chojnicki (2005), which stem from Crettez et al.
(1999). The time-constant transfer proﬁles for Japan are assumed to be similar
than in Western Europe. For the developing regions data is hardly available and
since we believe transfers to be less generous in these regions than in Western
5The Dynare pre-processor consists of a collection of MATLAB or SCILAB routines and
applies a Newton-type algorithm to study the transitory dynamics of non-linear models. The
details of the algorithm used in Dynare can be found in Juillard (1996).1.3. CALIBRATION OF THE BASELINE SCENARIO 21
Europe, the proﬁles are set equal to the North American ones (see table 1.3).
Table 1.3: Time-constant transfer proﬁles ζ (% of labor income)
Age groups 15-24 25-64 65-74 +75
WEU and JAP
High-skilled 3% 6% 10% 15%
Low-skilled 10% 18% 20% 22%
NAM and other regions
High-skilled 0.5% 1% 6% 12%
Low-skilled 7% 12% 20% 25%
Source: Chojnicki (2005) and own computations.
Table 1.4: Values for observed exogenous variables
Region WEU NAM JAP EAS MEN LAC SSA RUS CHI IND
d2000 6.10% 6.62% 13.4% 0.35% 0.43% 0.41% 0.32% 0.30% 0.18% 0.25%
c
g
2000 19.6% 14.9% 16.5% 16.4% 15.4% 15.0% 15.0% 16.3% 12.5% 11.0%
q 0 0 0 3.40 3.95 5.19 6.40 6.17 3.18 4.89
φ2000 30% 55% 35% 20% 15% 15% 5% 25% 10% 10%
φ1990 28% 53% 32% 19% 13% 15% 4% 33% 7% 6%
Source: OECD (2006a,b), WDI (2007), Barro & Lee (2001a) and own computations.
Public debt, dt, and public spending, c
g
t. Public debt and public spending are
computed from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2007). Exceptions are
the public debt of Western Europe and Japan, which are obtained from the OECD
(2006b).
Share of high-skilled individuals, φt. The share of high-skilled individuals is
computed from the Barro and Lee data set (Barro & Lee, 2001a), which gives the
proportion of high-skilled individuals aged 25 to 74 for the years 1950 to 2000.
We have to disaggregate this data to obtain the share of high-skilled individuals
per age group. It is not unreasonable to think that at each period the proportion
of high-skilled is highest among the youngest age classes. In particular, we
assume that the share of high-skilled aged 65 to 74 corresponds to 80% of the
share of high-skilled aged 55 to 64, which in turn is equal to 80% of that of the
45-54, which ﬁnally corresponds to 80% of that of the 35-44, and which ﬁnally
equals 80% of the share of high-skilled aged 25-34. The share of post-secondary
educated individuals of the older age classes, 75-84 and 85-94, is also determined
by this “80%” assumption. The age speciﬁc proportions of high-skilled are then
a function of the proportion of the high-skilled aged 25-34, which is computed
in order to match the total share of high-skilled in 1950 given by the Barro-Lee22
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Dataset. We thus have all the age speciﬁc proportions of high-skilled for the year
1950. The next step is to report the values of the shares of high-skilled among
the 25-34 to 65-74 aged individuals to the following years. For example, the
proportion of high-skilled aged 35-44 in 1960 is equal to the share of high-skilled
aged 25-34 in 1950 (as we assume that the high- and low-skilled individuals
have the same probability to be alive at the beginning of each period). For all the
following years, the proportion of high-skilled aged 25-34 will again adjust to
match the aggregate values of Barro and Lee. Moreover, the share of high-skilled
aged 15 to 24 in 1950 is simply equal to the share of high-skilled aged 25-34 in
1960. Finally, for the years preceding 1950, we simply apply the shares of 1950
to the previous years e.g. the share of high-skilled aged 75-84 in 1940 correspond
to the proportion of high-skilled aged 85-94 in 1950.
Region speciﬁc risk q. We use the data available from the OECD (2006a) for
region speciﬁc risk q which rely upon the Knaepen Package methodology. The
Knaepen Package is a system for assessing country credit risk, which classiﬁes
countriesintoeight countryriskcategories (0 -7), fromno risk(0)to highrisk(7).
It basically measures the country credit risk, i.e. the likelihood that a country will
service its external debt. To compute the risk classiﬁcation per region, we take an
arithmetic mean of ratings of the available countries. For Western Europe, North
America and Japan the risk is nil, it corresponds to 3.4 for the Eastern Countries,
to 3.95 for the Mediterranean World, 5.19 for Latin America, to 6.40 for Sub-
Saharan Africa, to 6.17 for the Russian World, 3.18 for the Chinese World and to
4.89 for the Indian World.
Demography, Pa,t+a and mt. Population growth rates and probabilities of being
alive for the period 1870-2200 are obtained in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we
compute the probabilities of being alive and the population growth rates for the
period 1950 to 2050 directly from the dataset of the U.N. Population Division,
which predicts the population per age group from 1950 to 2050 for almost every
country in the world. By applying the probabilities of being alive of 1950 to the
years 1880 to 1940, we obtain the age groups 15-24 to 75-84 of 1940, the age
groups 15-24 to 65-74 of 1930, and so on until the 15-24 years old of 1880. Sub-
sequently, we derive the population growth rates until 1880. We hold the growth
rate of 1880 constant for the years before 1880 and apply the same probabilities
of being alive as in 1950. By proceeding like this, we can restore the age groups
25-34 to 85-94 of 1880, the groups 35-44 to 85-94 of 1890 until the 75 to 84 years
old of 1940. The age groups beyond the year 2050 are created by applying the
probabilities of being alive of 2050 to the years 2060-2130 and ﬁxing the popula-
tion growth rate to 1 from 2050 onwards. This implies that the population size as
well as its structure will be constant from 2130 onwards.1.3. CALIBRATION OF THE BASELINE SCENARIO 23
However, the probabilities of being alive, obtained in this ﬁrst step, appear to
be larger than 1 for some of the regions and for some age classes (i.e. mainly
the regions WEU, NAM and JAP). Probabilities of being alive that are larger than
1 in some regions, may only happen if people migrate. However if migration is
allowed in the model, it would generate further agent heterogeneity, because mi-
grants may have different characteristics than natives (e.g. differences in human
capital, assets etc). There should then be at each period and for each age class,
multiple human capital levels, different accumulated assets for natives and mi-
grants etc. This would complicate by much the computation of the steady-states
and the dynamic path of our baseline as we already have, in each region and at
each period, individuals that differ in terms of age (8 age classes) and in terms of
skills (2 skill types).
Hence in a second step, we exclude this implicit migration contained in the
data. We introduce these migrants (i.e. the “additional” individuals generated by
probabilities that are larger than 1) right from the start in the destination regions
by assuming that they have the same characteristics than natives. In other words,
individuals migrate at the age of 15 years and start to live directly in the region
of destination with total assimilation to natives. Thus no migration occurs during
people’slifeinthismodel. In fact, in ordernotto haveanyprobabilitiesto bealive
above1 at the ages 25-34 and 35-44, we replace in all the regions the probabilities
of being alive at the ages 25-34 and 35-44 by the world average probabilities. We
then recompute the ﬁrst two age classes according to the new probabilities. This
slightly changes the population of the ﬁrst two age classes in each period and for
each region, by keeping ﬁxed the total world population of these two age classes.
We also assume that no explicit migration will occur after 45 years. We put an
upper bound of 1 if a probability of being alive exceeds one for age groups above
45 (which happens just a few times). Our procedure implies that the populationof
age groups 15-24 and 25-34 is increased in migrants’ receiving regions, whereas
the one in origin regions reduced. Even though the size of these two age groups is
slightly changed, this calibration reproduces very accurately the structure of the
population of the original data.
1.3.2 Unobserved exogenous variables
Values for unobserved variables are presented in the tables 1.5 and 1.6.
Labor participation, λl
a,t and λh
a,t. The labor participation rates of high- and
low-skilled individuals (respectively λh
a,t and λl
a,t) are set to 1 for the age groups
15-24, 25-34, 35-44 and 45-54. Individuals work until 60 in all the regions, i.e.
participation rates for individuals aged 55-64 equal 0.5 (λ
j
5,t = 0.5), except high-
skilled individuals in North-America, Japan and Western Europe who work until
62 (λh
5,t = 0.7). The participation rate for the three last age groups equals 0 in all24
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Table 1.5: Values for unobserved exogenous variables
developed developing
regions regions
time spent in education (high-skilled) eh 0.6 0.6
time spent in education (low-skilled) el 0.2 0
participation rate of the 55-64 old (high-skilled) λh
5 0.7 0.5
participation rate of the 55-64 old (low-skilled) λl
5 0.5 0.5
generosity factor in 2000 ψ2000 1 1
GDP growth rate g 1.2 1.2
the regions.
Time spent in education, eh and el. Time spent in education is set to 0.6 for
high-skilled individuals, meaning that they obtain a secondary school diploma(or
above) and start working at the age of 21. For low-skilled individuals el equals
0.2 in North-America, Japan and Western Europe and 0 in developing regions,
indicating that they enter the labor force at 17 respectively 15.
Generosity factor of the social security transfers, ψt. This factor is set by
assuming that the generosity factor increased during the period 1950-2000. It is
thus set to 0.25 before 1960, to 0.4 in 1960, to 0.55 in 1970, to 0.7 in 1980, to
0.95 in 1990 and to 1 in 2000 and afterwards.
Replacement rate, χt and the time-invariant pension scheme parameter ρ.
We calibrate the replacement rate in order to match the share of public pension
spending to GDP of the year 1990. The data for this last variable come from
Table A.5 of Palacios (1996) and from the World Bank (1994). We assume that
the replacement rate of 1950 corresponds to 3/4 of the one of 1990. The replace-
ment rates of 1960, 1970 and 1980 are chosen in order to build an linear upward
trend between 1950 and 1990. The ones before 1950 are kept identically to the
value of 1950, whereas the replacement rates after 1990 correspond to the value
of 1990. The pension scheme parameter, ρ, captures the redistributiveness of
the pension system and is speciﬁc to each region. We can set ρ by relying on
the data on the size and redistributiveness of pension systems for several OECD
countries collected by Johnson (1998) and exposed in Pestieau (1999).6 Accord-
ing to this data, the ratio of replacement rates between the highest and lowest
income levels is 0.33 in Canada and 0.5 in the United States. To be precise, this
data reports replacement ratios for an average income level and for incomes that
are half or twice as large as the average level. We take the ratio of replacement
6Since data on the size of the pension systems in Johnson (1998) comprises only several de-
veloped countries, we prefer to use the more complete data of the World Bank to calibrate χ.1.3. CALIBRATION OF THE BASELINE SCENARIO 25
rates between the highest and lowest income levels as a rough approximation of
the ratios between high- and low-skilled wages. The ratio of replacement rates
for North-America will correspond to the weighted average of the Canadian and
US ratios (weighted by the population of both countries in 1990). By using the
formulas (1.14) and (1.15) we can write this ratio in the terms of our model as
[ρ + (1 − ρ)/H] where H ≡ wh/wl. Then ρ is set in order to match the ratio
of replacement rates between high- and low-skilled individuals (the value of H is
given below). We obtain a ρ of 0.2 for North America, and similarly ρ equals to
0.6 for Western Europe and to 0.8 for Japan.7 We assume the developing regions
of our model to be Beveridgian and set ρ equal to 0.
Table 1.6: Calibration of the replacement rate χ (year 2000)
WEU NAM JAP EAS MEN LAC SSA RUS CHI IND
Data:
PPE /GDP 9.2 6.5 5 8 2.8 2 0.5 7.1 2.6 0.6
Calibration:
χ 4.16 5.15 3.96 5.06 15.06 11.26 16.74 5.59 10.81 13.66
Source: Palacios (1996) and own computations. PPE stands for Public Pensions Expenditures.
1.3.3 Technology and skill-biased technical change
Growth in the leader’s Harrod neutral technical progress, gt=A∗
t+1/A∗
t. Based
on observations, the future growth rate of the North-American technical progress
is calibrated to 1.2, which means that the annual growth rate is equal to 1.84%.
Table 1.7: Calibration of labor-augmenting technical progress
(year 2000)
WEU NAM JAP EAS MEN LAC SSA RUS CHI IND
Data:
Y/Y NAM 0.74 1 0.77 0.28 0.17 0.21 0.05 0.16 0.13 0.07
Calibration:
A/ANAM 0.96 100 0.99 0.43 0.24 0.32 0.09 0.25 0.19 0.12
Source: WDI (2007) and own computations.
Labor-augmenting technical progress, At and the ratio of GDP’s,
Yt/Y NAM
t . To obtain technical progress (A), we use the distance of a region’s
7Pension systems differ quite a lot across Western European countries, with the largest coun-
tries as Italy, Germany and France being Bismarckian (i.e. with a large percentage of public
spending for social security systems to GDP and a less equal redistribution), while smaller coun-
tries as the Netherlands being Beveridgian. In contrast, Canada and the United States are clearly
more Beveridgian than Western Europe, with a smaller sized welfare system and a more egalitar-
ian distribution of pension beneﬁts across income levels.26
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GDP (Yt) from the leader’s GDP (Y NAM
t ) computed as a ratio of GDP’s, yt/¯ yt.
We proceed as in de la Croix & Docquier (2007), who use a backsolving iden-
tiﬁcation method to calibrate Harrod-neutral technical progress. It consists in
swapping the exogenous variable At for the endogenous variable Yt/Y NAM
t and
solving the identiﬁcation step with the Dynare algorithm Juillard (1996). The
ratio of GDP’s is computed by employing the data of the GDP per purchasing
power parity from the World Development Indicators for the three years 1980,
1990 and 2000. We hold the value of 1980 (respectively 2000) constant for the
years preceding 1980 (respectively following 2000).
Skill-biased technological progress, υt, skill premium H and σ. The pa-
rameter σ=1−
1
ε, with ε being the elasticity of substitution between high-skill and
low-skill labor. In the present version of the paper, σ equals 1 meaning that high-
and low-skill labor are perfect substitutes. Skill-biased technological progress is
set bythesamebacksolvingmethodas At, and matchesaskillpremiumH (≡
wh
wl )
of 2.35 in all regions. This indicates that the wage of a high-skilled individual is
supposed to be 2.35 times higher than the one of a low-skilled individual.
1.3.4 Baseline and assumptions on the future
The model is calibrated on real data until 2000 as described in the previous para-
graphs. From 2010 onwards the values of the exogenous variables are held con-
stant to the values of the year 2000. However there are some exceptions and some
points deserve a comment:
• Population structure: The main driving force of the model over the 21st
century is the evolution of the population structure, since the predictions
of the United Nations Population Projections last until 2050. Thus, as said
above, the growth rate of the ﬁrst cohort and the probabilities of being alive
are calibrated until 2050.
• Education: The proportion of high-skilled individuals among each new
generation is held constant from 2000 onwards. As young cohorts are more
educated thanoldercohorts(orin otherwords, cohortsbornbefore 2000are
less educated than those born in 2000 and after), it implies that the propor-
tion of educated workers continues to increase after 2000. In the long run,
the proportionof educated individualswill equal the proportionof educated
among the cohort born in 2000.
• Pension systems: In line with the policies conducted in many developed
countries, we consider that pension systems will be less generous in the
near future because of population aging. To represent these anticipated
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21st century accounts for two changes compared to the year 2000. First,
between 2000 and 2040, the retirement age is gradually postponed by 1/4
year for both low- and high-skilled individuals, meaning that the retirement
age for low- and high-skilled increases from respectively 60 and 62 in 2000
to respectively 61 and 63 in 2040. Formally, for the age group 55-64, λl
5
(respectively λh
5) passes steadily from 0.5 to 0.6 (respectively from 0.7 to
0.8) over the period 2000-2040 in Japan, Western Europe and North Amer-
ica. Second, the replacement rate of developed regions is reduced implying
lower pension beneﬁts in the next decades. Between 2000 and 2050, the re-
placement rate in North-America is gradually reduced from 41.5% to 36%,
theoneinWestern Europefrom42.5%to37%and oneinJapanfrom27.5%
to 22%.
• Harrod neutral technical progress: In the baseline scenario, the distance
of the Harrod neutral technical progress of each region to the technical
progress of the leading economy (A/ANAM) is assumed to be constant af-
ter 2000. Our baseline accounts however for a catch-up of China, India and
Eastern Europe to North America. This would be in line with the recent ac-
cession of the majority of the Eastern European countries to the European
Union and with the last years’ increased growth pace of India and China.
Likewise the assumptions of the Ingenue (2005), the Eastern Countries will
have increased their technology level by 25% in 2100 compared to North
America, while both the Chinese and Indian regions will have doubled it by
2100.
Technology
The path of the so obtained labor-augmenting technical progress is depicted
in ﬁgure 1.1. North America is the leader at the beginning of the second half of
the 20th century and is ahead all along the 21st century.8 The technology levels of
Japan and Western Europe are respectively at 99% and 96% of the one of North
America from 2000 onwards. The drop in the productivity level of the Russian
world after 1990 is explained by the fall of communism, while the Chinese and
Indian worlds see their technology improved. Moreover, due to our convergence
assumptions, the technology levels in the Eastern countries and in the Chinese
and Indian worlds continue to rise after 2000 while the ones of all the other
regions remain ﬁxed at their 2000 level.
Demographic evolution of each region
Figure 1.2 describes the evolution of the support ratio, deﬁned as the num-
ber of individuals of working age for one pensioner, over the period 1960-2050.
8Japan has a slightly higher technology level than North America in 1990.28
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This ratio decreases in the long-run for all the regions, but at a different pace for
each region, because the aging process is not synchronous among regions. Nev-
ertheless there are some similarities for some regions. For almost all of them, the
support ratio strongly declines between 1980 and 2050. The exception is Sub-
Saharan Africa where the support ratio only mildly diminishes between 1980 and
2020, then weakly recovers until 2040 and starts to drop at mid-century.
Figure 1.1: Evolution of labor-augmenting technical progress
Moreover, we can distinguish two groups of regions according to their aging
pattern. In the ﬁrst group, the Russian World, the Eastern Countries and the three
developed regions with North America, Western Europe and Japan reached a low
support ratio by the end of the 20th century, with less than 8 people of working
age for one pensioner in 1980. Due to a huge decline in fertility after World War
II, Japan is the fastest aging region and has the lowest number of working aged
relative to elderly from 2000 onwards. The second group of regions comprises
the other ﬁve regions and is aging at a slower pace than the ﬁrst group. These
regionsstartthe21st centurywithmorethan11individualsofworkingageforone
pensioner, but haveto copewithavery strongfallin theirsupportratios duringthe
21st century, which makes them slowly converge to the levels of the ﬁrst group.
Among these regions, the Chinese world will age most rapidly, as a consequence
of its ‘one child’ policy. From 2050 onwards, the size of the youngest cohort in
each region is assumed to be constant implying that support ratios stabilize after
2100.1.3. CALIBRATION OF THE BASELINE SCENARIO 29
Figure 1.2: Support ratio (ratio of working aged to pensioners)
Figure 1.3: Annual growth rate in the working age population (15-64)
Figure1.3depictstheannualgrowthrateintheworkingagepopulation,which
is declining by the end of the 20th century in all the regions. One exception30
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is the growth rate in the 15-64 age group of Sub-Saharan Africa, which rises
until 2010 and falls afterwards but at a slower pace than the one of other regions.
Moreover since its growth rate is always positive, the working age population in
Sub-Saharan Africa is increasing all along the 21st century. Besides Sub-Saharan
Africa, some other regions have see their working age population grow during the
ﬁrst half of the 21st century: the MiddleEast and North African region, the Indian
world, Latin America and North America. North America is the only developed
region that does not experience a reduction in its working age population, mainly
because of immigration. In 1990, the Chineseworld has thehighest growthrate in
the working age population after Sub-Saharan Africa, but afterwards the growth
rate in the 15 to 64 years old individuals declines and becomes negative in 2040.
In theother regions, i.e. Western Europe, the Russian world, the Eastern countries
and Japan, the working age population decreases during most of the ﬁrst half of
the 21st century. Finally, as the size of the youngest cohort is assumed to be stable
from 2050 onwards, thegrowthrates in theworking agepopulationofeach region
start converging in the second half of the 21st century and the size of the 15-64
age group becomes constant in each region from 2100 onwards.
1.4 The world economy under the baseline scenario
The above described calibration process delivers a dynamic equilibrium path for
the world economy. Population prospects are available until 2050, but gener-
ate population dynamics until 2130, since individuals live for (a maximum of) 8
periods of 10 years. Afterwards, populations become stationary. The world econ-
omy continues however to grow at a steady state annual growth rate of 1.84%.
Our period of interest is 2010-2100. In the following paragraphs we describe
the baseline scenario over this period in terms of the international capital market,
economic growth and current accounts.
The world interest rate is determined on the world capital market by equating
the world demand and the world supply of capital. In a context of global aging,
the world experiences a decline in the growth rate of its working age population
(potential labor force) and a rise in the capital to efﬁcient labor ratio. This is
translated by an increase in the marginal productivity of labor whereas marginal
productivity of capital decreases. The world interest rate falls to reach a low in
2040 (see ﬁgure 1.4). From 2050 onwards the interest rate slightly augments with
the recovering and stabilization of the world support ratio.
The annual growth rate in the world GDP follows a similar as the world in-
terest rate (see ﬁgure 1.5), by going through a huge decline at the beginning of
the 21st century due to strong population aging and stabilizing after 2060 around
an (exogenously imposed) 1.84% annual growth rate. Figure 1.6 reports a gen-1.4. THE WORLD ECONOMY UNDER THE BASELINE SCENARIO 31
Figure 1.4: Evolution of the annual world real interest rate
eral slow down in the GDP growth rates at the regional level. From mid-century
onwards, when the population structure begins stabilizing, the growth rates in the
regional GDP’s converge. Actually there are two driving forces behind the re-
gional GDPs’ growth rate: the dynamics of the working age population and the
evolution of technology. After 2000, the GDP growth rates of all the regions are
declining due to the demographic evolution and converge by the end of the cen-
tury when their population structure stabilizes. Regions with high growth rates in
their labor force maintain a more pronounced growth rates as e.g. Sub-Saharan
Africa, the Indian region and the Middle East and North African region. The
catch-up to the leader in terms of technology mitigates the decline in the GDP
growth rates of China, India and the Eastern Countries and induces a convergence
to the other regions’ GDP growth rate only in 2110.
On the supply side of capital, the evolution of the net saving rate, i.e. the ratio
of aggregatesavingsof all cohorts to GNI, is determined by demographicchanges
(ﬁgure 1.7). Regions facing serious aging of their population(strongly decreasing
supportratios)seetheirsavingrates declinesharplyduringtheﬁrst halfofthe21st
century. This is the case for the Eastern Countries, Russia, Japan and Western
Europe. While North America belongs to the regions with a low support ratio, its
saving rate is less affected, because it maintains a positive growth rate in its labor
force thanks to large immigration. Latin America, India and the Middle East and
North African region, have a similar aging pattern and experience a quite parallel32
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Figure 1.5: Annual world GDP growth rate
Figure 1.6: Annual growth rate of regional GDP’s
trajectory in their saving rate. Thanks to a quite strong increase in its labor force
and a high support ratio at the end of the 20th century, China is the region with the1.4. THE WORLD ECONOMY UNDER THE BASELINE SCENARIO 33
Figure 1.7: Regional saving rate (% of regional GNI)
Figure 1.8: Gross investment (% of regional GDP)
highest saving rate at the beginning of the 21st century. Afterwards, the growth in
its labor force slows downand its support ratio drops, leading to a fall in its saving34
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rate. Finally, being the region with highest share of working aged to pensioners
and with one the strongest growth in labor force, the Sub-Saharan Africa sees its
saving rate rise until 2070.
On the other hand, the demand side of capital, represented by the ratio of
gross investment to GDP, is characterized by a slightly decreasing trend over the
century, which is less strong than the one in the saving rate (ﬁgure 1.8). Thus as
in Aglietta et al. (2007), the world interest rate is mostly driven by the movement
on the supply side of capital. The reason is that on the demand side of capital, the
negative effect of a declining labor force on capital accumulation can be partly
offset by increases in capital intensity. In fact, gross investment is deﬁned as
It = Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt and depends thus on net capital accumulation and capital
replacement. In turn, capital stock rises with employment and with capital inten-
sity, which is increasing in technology and decreasing in the return to capital and
in the conﬁscation rate.9 We also observe that developed regions keep a perma-
nent higher investment rates than developing ones because of higher technology
and of the absence of rent-seeking. Among the developed regions, Japan and to a
lesser extent Western Europe undergo a marked decline in investment until 2050
due to their declining labor force, while the investment to GDP ratio in North
America is less affected by aging. In contrast, in regions where the population is
agingat a slowerpace, India, LatinAmericaand inparticularSub-Saharan Africa,
the investment to GDP ratio is even slightly increasing during the ﬁrst half of the
21st century.
In an open economy, internationaltrade is determined by the equality between
net exports and net capital outﬂows. In our model, as it is standard in this litera-
ture10, every region produces one consumption good and these goods are imper-
fectly substitutable. Thus we are confronted with a supply-side view of interna-
tional trade i.e. trade is driven by net capital outﬂows. Current account balances
are computed as thechange in net foreign assets (NFA) which are themselvesde-
ﬁned as total assets minus the sum of capital and debt NFAt = Ωt−(Kt+dtYt).
Current accountdeﬁcitsorsurplusesarisefromdifferences betweendomesticsav-
inganddomesticinvestment. Figures 1.9and1.10plottheevolutionofthecurrent
account balances as a shareofregional GDPrespectivelyas a shareof worldGDP.
Our results on current accounts are compatible with Brooks (2003). When baby
boomers dissaveduring retirement in the 21st century, ﬁgure 1.9 shows that North
America and Western Europe will depend on foreign capital. These demands for







10We refertothespeciﬁc strandoftheliteraturedealingwith internationalcapitalﬂowsinlarge-
scale multi-regional CGE models. One exception is the second version of the Ingenue model,
“Ingenue 2", which incorporates regional-speciﬁc intermediate goods which are perfectly substi-
tutable and implies imply the existence of real exchange rates between the different regions(see
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Figure 1.9: Current account balances (% of regional GDP)
Figure 1.10: Current account balances (% of world GDP)
capital are largely ﬁnanced by the regions of the Chinese World and Latin Amer-
ica and Caribbean. Moreover, the behavior of the current account of Sub-Saharan36
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Figure 1.11: Ownership ratio
Africa is also similar to Brooks (2003) and to the ‘J2’ region of Aglietta et al.
(2007), which groups high fertility regions and comprises the African continent.
We ﬁnd that Sub-Saharan Africa will import capital or have a very low current
account during the ﬁrst decades of the 21st century, because of high population
growth.
In the second half of the 21st century, disparities in current account balances
across regions are signiﬁcantly reduced (this can be seen more clearly from ﬁgure
1.10). By the end of the 21stcentury, Western Europe runs a deﬁcit representing
-0.53% of world GDP, which ﬁts with the -0.75% long run deﬁcit in Aglietta et al.
(2007). However in the latter study as well as in Ingenue (2005), North America
has a slightly positive current account. Our path of the world economy suggests
that three developed regions remain in deﬁcit during the whole century, but after
mid-century their current account balances improve when their population stabi-
lizes.
Ownership ratios indicate the net external position of a region and are deﬁned
as the ratio of assets to the sum of capital and debt. A region with an ownership
ratioabove(respectivelybelow1)isanetcreditor(respectivelyanetdebtor)tothe
rest of the world. North America, Western Europe and India are net debtors over
the whole 21st century (see ﬁgure 1.11), since they accumulate current account
deﬁcits over the whole period. Japan is a net creditor at the beginning of the
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balance goes into deﬁcit. This is comparable to the ﬁndings in Brooks (2003)
and to the slowly decreasing pattern in the Japanese current account in Ingenue
(2005). China’s external position goes the opposite direction. The large current
account surpluses at the beginning of the 21st century turn China into the main
creditor region with a current account balance converging to the ones of the other
developing regions after 2030.
1.5 An increased population scenario in Western
Europe
This section aims at demonstrating the importanceof endogenizing capital mobil-
ity and capital accumulation. To do so, we propose to investigatethe implications
of a very simple scenario, in which there is a fertility boom in Western Europe
in 2010. To show the importance of capital mobility, the consequences of this
scenario are analyzed in a framework where the regions are fully ﬁnancially in-
tegrated and in a closed economy environment, where the regions are completely
independent ofeach other. Besides, general equilibriumeffects proveto besignif-
icant. The population shock arising in a framework where capital accumulation is
endogenous is compared with one happening in a partial equilibrium framework
where the capital stock is ﬁxed.
The considered scenario assumes that 100 million additional individuals are
born in 2010 in Western Europe. These additional individuals are assumed to
have the same reproduction rate and probabilities to be alive at each period as in-
dividuals living in Western Europe in the baseline. As a consequence, population
will be permanently increased compared to the baseline. The number of 15 to 24
years old in Western Europe will augment by 177% leading to a 27% increase
in the Western European population in 2010 compared to the baseline (see ﬁgure
1.13.a). At the world level, population increases by 1% in 2010 and by 4.3% in
the long run.
Even if our scenario consists of enlarging the size of the 15-24 age group
only in 2010, the support ratio (ratio of individuals of working age to pensioners)
will be improved over a longer time period (see ﬁgure 1.12.b). In fact the 100
million persons added in Western Europe in 2010 will augment the population in
successive periods since they procreate. Thus Western Europe will face a steady
increase in its labor force during the ﬁrst half of the 21st without experiencing a
rise in the number of pensioners. The augmentation in the support ratio will be
highest in 2050 with a 177% increase compared to the baseline After 2050, the
new-born individuals retire and the support ratio will eventually come back to its
baseline value in 2080.38
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Figure 1.12: Demographic impact of an increased population scenario (% change
from the baseline)
a. Population b. Support ratio and Labor force
1.5.1 Capital mobility versus no capital mobility
Under our framework, capital is mobile between regions up to a region speciﬁc
conﬁscation rate on the returns to capital (π). In the following analysis we com-
pare the effects of an increased populationin Western Europe under the MONAL-
ISA framework, labeled ‘open economy’, and under no capital mobility, labeled
‘closed economy’. We show that the increased population scenario yields distinct
outcomes whether performed in a closed or open economy setting. This conﬁrm
the ﬁndings of Aglietta et al. (2007) despite the fact that the scenarios they con-
sidered are linked to pension reforms. Lastly we also show that consequences on
world variables (world GDP and interest rate) may differ depending on the region
in which the population increases.
Increased population will lead to a rise in the labor force. Since compared to
the baseline the additional-born individuals of 2010 spend time education in their
ﬁrst period of life, the growth rate in the labor force will be highest in 2020 when
they fully add to the labor force (ﬁgure 1.13.a). From 2030 to 2070, the labor
force still continues to increase but at a lower pace.
This boost in the labor force will reduce the capital to labor ratio and raise the
marginal productivityof capital. The Western European interest rate will increase
under the two frameworks, as shown in ﬁgure 1.13.c. Under the MONALISA
framework, capital markets are fully integrated and the interest rate of Western
Europe is equal to the world interest rate. The effects of an increased labor force
are diluted on the international capital market and the interest rate reacts less than1.5. AN INCREASED POPULATION SCENARIO IN WESTERN EUROPE 39
Figure 1.13: Impact of an increased population scenario
a. Annual growth rate of the workforce b. Annual growth rate in GNI (% change)
c. Annual interest rate (% deviation) d. Wage rate (% change)
e. Savings to GNP (% change) f. Gross Investment to GDP (% change)40
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Figure 1.14: Impact on consumption proﬁles (% change from the baseline)
a. High-skilled aged 15-34 b. Low-skilled aged 15-34
c. High-skilled aged 35-64 d. Low-skilled aged 35-64
e. High-skilled aged 65-94 f. Low-skilled aged 65-941.5. AN INCREASED POPULATION SCENARIO IN WESTERN EUROPE 41
in the closed economy framework. In a closed economy, the effects of a rising la-
bor force are totally absorbed on the regional capital market inducing an increase
in the interest rate of 1.13 percentage points in 2020.11 After 2030, the augmenta-
tion in the interest rate decelerates and, in the closed economy setting, the interest
rate is even reduced compared to the baseline. The reasons are that the growth
in the labor force slows down after 2020 and that the additional individuals start
to retire after 2050. From 2070 onwards, the population structure stabilizes. In
the closed economy, the interest rate goes go back to its baseline value and there
will be no change in the long run, since the increased population scenario leads
simply to a rescaling of the Western European economy. In the open economy
setting, the scenario has a long term impact. Since population is increased in the
long term in Western European there will be a higher labor force in a relatively
moreproductiveregion. A higherlong term interest rate is establishedbecause re-
gions are interdependent and differ in terms of demography, productivity, pension
systems, skills.
Compared to the interest rate, the impact on the wage is reversed (ﬁgure
1.13.d).12 The increase in the workforce leads to a higher saving rate and thus
to a higher investment-to-GDP ratio (ﬁgures 1.13.e and 1.13.f). In a closed econ-
omy framework, the higher demand for capital is provided by domestic savings.
In the fully integrated world, the changes in the saving and investment rates are
not symmetric. In theﬁrst decades ofthe 21st century, therise inthelabor forceof
Western Europe leads to capital inﬂows and to strong increase in the investment
rate. Since the interest rate increases less than in the closed economy setting, the
change in the domestic saving rate is relatively small.13 This implies a reduction
in the current account balance compared to the baseline. The situation is reversed
after 2040 when the increase in the saving rate is more marked than the one in
the investment rate (leading to an improvement in the current account compared
to the baseline). From this period onwards, the increase in the saving rate is also
higher than in the closed economy case because of a higher the interest rate.
The impact on the GNI growth rate is similar under both frameworks ﬁgure
1.13.b. In fact, in the closed economy the rise in the labor force leads to higher
rise in the interest rate than in an open economy but to also to a higher decrease
in wages. Thus changes in the prices of inputs compensate each other.
However, this diverse impact on the returns to production inputs under the
two frameworks will affect in a distinct way the consumption proﬁles of the var-
ious age groups (ﬁgure 1.14). Let us ﬁrst notice that average consumption is
11The annual interest rate is 5.11% compared to 3.98% in the baseline in 2020.
12In the current version of the model, high- and low-skill labor are perfect substitutes and
moreover the skill premium is held constant (see sections 1.2.4 and 1.3.2).
13The saving rate even decreases in 2010 because the population increase is due to individuals
aged 15 to 24 who have negative saving rates.42
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increased in general for every cohort. In the closed economy framework, average
consumption of the different age groups is enhanced with a maximum in 2050.
The consumption of the younger cohorts (i.e. the 15-34 years old) is however
decreased in 2010 (ﬁgures 1.14.a and 1.14.b). These individuals have few assets
and do not beneﬁt from the higher interest rate, but suffer from the drop in the
wage rate. This also explains the downward peak in the increase in their con-
sumption in 2030 when these individuals are 35-64 years old (ﬁgures 1.14.c and
1.14.d). At the time of the introduction of the 100 million additional individuals
in 2010, the individuals beneﬁting most are the pensioners, since they see their
wealth enhanced by the higher interest rate (ﬁgures 1.14.e and 1.14.f).
In contrast to the closed economy setting, the maximum in the average con-
sumption of the different age groups arises at different moments in time in the
open economy framework: the highest increases in consumption happen in 2030
for the 15-34 years old, in 2050 for the 35-64 years old and in 2080 for the +65
years old. This means that the individuals beneﬁting most from the population in-
crease belong to the samecohort, i.e. the one born around 2030. This corresponds
to the period where the ﬁscal effect is largest: the number of contributors is con-
siderably enhanced while the replacement rates and the number of pensioners are
constant at the baseline level. In fact, in the fully integrated world, changes in the
returns to production inputs play a smaller role that in the closed economy setting
and the main force explaining the changes in consumption proﬁles is the ﬁscal
effect. Nevertheless, as in the closed economy case, the variation in consumption
of the cohort born at the time of the “arrival” of the 100 million indivuduals in
2010 experiences a downward peak. Again this can be explained by a lower wage
rate for this cohort and which leads to lower asset accumulation than cohort born
before or after 2010.
1.5.2 General versus partial equilibrium and geographical dif-
ferences
In this section we show that taking a general equilibrium approach is important to
quantify the exact response of variables that are crucial for policy analysis. Also,
the geographic location of a shock matters since regions differ in many aspects,
e.g. demography, productivity, welfare state, pension systems etc.
Under a partial equilibrium analysis, the capital stock is kept at its baseline
level and an augmentation by 100 million individuals in the population arising
in Western Europe leads to a 16% increase in its GDP in 2010 (ﬁgure 1.15.a).
In the general equilibrium analysis, the response of the GDP differs and output
rises by 24%, because the decisions of households and ﬁrms matter in terms of
capital accumulation. In 2060, output is increased by 98% in a partial equilibrium1.5. AN INCREASED POPULATION SCENARIO IN WESTERN EUROPE 43
Figure 1.15: Partial versus General equilibrium: GDP in WEU (% change from
the baseline)
a. Open Economy b. Closed Economy
setting and by 176% when general equilibriumeffects are taken into account. The
difference in output responses between a partial and general equilibrium analysis
is not only due to the full integration of the capital markets. In fact, the difference
would still subsist within a closed economy framework, showing that domestic
supply and demand of capital are important (ﬁgure 1.15.b): output is raised by
16% (partial equilibrium) and by 20% (general equilibrium) in 2010.
The consequences of a population increase on aggregate world variables de-
pends also on the region in which such a shock arises. We compare the impact of
a similar population increase in Western Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure
1.16.a shows that, except in 2010, the world population is not affected in a similar
way because reproduction rates differ across regions. Introducing 100 million in-
dividualsin Western Europerespectivelyin Sub-Saharan Africa in 2010 raises the
world populationby 8.6% respectivelyby 13.5% in 2100. The annual world inter-
est rate will augment in 2020 by 0.38 percentage points compared to the baseline
if population increases in Western Europe, but only by 0.01 percentage points if
population increases in Sub-Saharan Africa (ﬁgure 1.16.b). Since labor is rela-
tively less productive in Sub-Saharan Africa than in Western Europe, the demand
for capital will be lower explaining the smaller magnitude in the response of the
world interest rate to a population boom in Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, in
the long run, the world interest rate is enhanced (by 0.21 pp) if population rises in
Western Europe and slightlydepressed (by 0.03 pp) if Sub-Saharan Africa experi-
ences a population increase. The “arrival” of 100 million additional individualsin
aregionincreasesinitspopulationinthelongrunand givesahigherweightto this44
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Figure 1.16: Geographical differences: Comparing a population increase in WEU
and SSA
a. World population (% change) b. Interest rate (Open Economy, % deviation)
c. World GDP (Open Ec., % change) d. World GDP (Closed Economy, % change)
region on the international capital market. When population rises in Sub-Saharan
Africa, the world demand for capital is relatively less stimulated and the interest
rate is negatively impacted in the long run. It matters thus where the population
boom happens. Furthermore, the impact on the world aggregate GDP will also
differ. In an open economy setting, the world GDP rises by 30.1% in 2100 if pop-
ulation increases in Western Europe compared to 3.4% increase if Sub-Saharan
Africa experiences such a demographic shock (ﬁgure 1.16.c). In a closed econ-
omy variant, world GDP increases by 28.9% (shock in Western Europe) and by
3.4% (shock in Sub-Saharan Africa). The impact on world GDP would be dif-
ferent even in the ﬁrst period of the shock when the world population increases1.6. CONCLUSION 45
in the same proportion. In 2010, the world population increases by 2% whether
the 100 million individuals are introduced in Western Europe or in Sub-Saharan
Africa, but the world GDP will still rise more, increasing by 4.9% (demographic
shock arises in Western Europe) compared to 0.7% (demographic shock happens
in Sub-Saharan Africa).
1.6 Conclusion
This note introduces a multi-regional overlapping generations computable gen-
eral equilibrium model of the world economy that takes into account the skill
heterogeneity of agents. The model groups the countries of the world into ten re-
gions and their population is calibrated on the data of the United Nations’ World
Population Prospects, which predict the evolution of the population by country
until the year 2050. Based on these projections, the model describes a path of
the world economy over the 21st century, in which capital is internationally mo-
bile. In such a framework, differences in the forecasted demographic evolution
of each region affect international capital ﬂows. This paper also highlights the
importance of endogenizing capital mobility and capital accumulation. For this
purpose, the implications of a simple population shock in one region are ana-
lyzed. Concerning the integration of capital markets, the population shock leads
to different outcomes in a model where capital mobile or immobile between re-
gions. Moreover, the population increase will have a quite different impact when
capital accumulation is endogenous or when the capital stock is ﬁxed. Besides,
geographical characteristics matter for the implications of such a shock on the
world economy: the response of the world aggregate output or the international
interest rate will depend on the region in which the population increase arises.
Lastly, this paper validates a model of the world economy, which may serve
as the building block for future studiesexploitingthe ‘skill-heterogeneous agents’
feature of our framework. Issues that could be addressed comprise an exploration
of the consequences of skill-speciﬁc pension reforms on the sustainability of the
welfare state. The model can also be extended to examine the implications of
high skilled emigration on migrants’ origin regions.46
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Replacement migration, labor
market characteristics and pension
systems:
North-America versus Europe
Abstract. This paper analyzes the impact of immigration on the contribution rate
in North-America and Western Europe, when holding the generosity of the welfare
state constant at current levels. This issue is addressed within a calibrated overlapping
generations model featuring integrated capital markets. Two immigration policies are
considered: a selective one, where the majority of migrants are high-skilled, and a
non-selective one, with a majority of low-skilled migrants. It is found that increased
immigration yields small ﬁscal gains and that both the selective and non-selective
immigration policies induce similar tax cuts. Increasing immigration ﬂows by 25%
between 2010 and 2050, when the majority of the additional migrants are high-skilled
(low-skilled) results in a -2.13 (-1.83) percentage points reduction in the contribution
rate in Western Europe in 2050 and in a -1.79 (-1.56) percentage points tax cut in
North-America. Furthermore, these policies are compared with realistic changes in labor
market characteristics. Results show that similar ﬁscal gains could be achieved as with
the immigration policies, simply by postponing the retirement age of low-skilled workers
by 2 years from 2010 onwards in Western Europe and by a gradual increase from 1% to
5% between 2010 and 2050 in skill-biased technical change in North-America.
Key words: OLG-CGE Model, pension systems, replacement migration, labor market
characteristics.
JEL classiﬁcation: C68; H55; O30; J26; J6148
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2.1 Introduction
Population is aging all over the world due to rising life expectancy and declining
fertility. During the next 50 years, the number of people of working age for
one pensioner will strongly decrease in many countries. In the United States
and Europe-15, the average number of working-aged per retiree was equal to 5.2
respectively 4.2 in 2000; this number is expected to reach 2.7 respectively 1.9 in
2050.1 As public transfers are strongly ascending, such a demographic transition
imposes a strong pressure on the ﬁscal policy. In many developed countries, it
will be impossible to maintain current levels of taxes/pension beneﬁts and pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems are thus undergoing several reforms. In this
debate, replacement migration is sometimes seen as a possible tool to reduce the
burden of aging.
The debate on replacement migration was boosted by the popular report of
the United Nations (2007). At ﬁrst glance, such migration policies seem perti-
nent. Compared to policies that intend to raise the fertility rates in countries with
aprojecteddecliningpopulation,replacementmigrationhas theadvantageofaug-
menting immediately the population of working age. Hence, the United Nations
evaluated the size of replacement migration that is needed to offset population ag-
ing and/or the population decline in many industrialized countries between 1995
and 2050. In one scenario, they determined the number of migrants needed to
hold the support ratio (i.e. the number of people of working age for one pen-
sioner) constant at his 1995 level until 2050. The study ﬁnds that the numbers
of migrants that would be required are extraordinarily large. Thus replacement
migration cannot by itself solve the problem of population aging. At most, it can
be considered as a solution only together with other policies that act upon the age
of retirement, labor-force participation, pension beneﬁts and contributions to the
social security system. However, only relying on demographic variables, the UN
analysis suffers from major shortcomings. It completely abstracts from the skill
composition of additional migration ﬂows, from the cross-country differences in
welfare programs and labor market institutions, from a range feedback effects on
wages, taxes and interest rates, etc.
Hence, macroeconomic models are required to accurately assess the costs and
beneﬁts of such policies. Although the implications of globalization on trade,
outsourcing and foreign direct investment gave rise to a growing number of stud-
ies, the literature on replacement migration has been relatively forsaken. Four
strands of literature can be distinguished. The ﬁrst kind of studies relies upon
a generational accounting methodology; a second type of studies uses theoreti-
1Medium variant of the population prospects of the United Nations (2008) and own computa-
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cal OLG models; a third type of papers relies on single-country closed-economy
computable OLG models; and ﬁnally one uses multi-country computable OLG
models. As the last strand of studies, our analysis is based on an open-economy
multi-region CGE-OLG model.
Models using a generational accounting perspective analyze the impact of a
change in migration policy on the average ﬁscal burden endured by different co-
horts of individuals. The study of Auerbach & Oreopoulos (1999) for the United
States stresses that the net beneﬁt of immigration on the ﬁscal balance is small
relative to the size of the overall imbalance itself.2 On the other hand, Bonin et al.
(2000) for Germany and Collado et al. (2004) for Spain ﬁnd that immigration has
a positive impact on intertemporal public ﬁnance. Yet all these studies agree that
a policy that acts upon the structure of migration ﬂows (age, skill and gender) has
more beneﬁcial effects than one that simply increases the volume of these ﬂows.
The issue if immigration can be a solution to the viability of pension systems
in aging countries has also been addressed in theoretical OLG models. The most
cited is the two-period open-economy model of Razin & Sadka (1999). Their
model suggests that even though migrants may be low-skilled and net beneﬁcia-
ries of a pension system, they provide a net contribution to public ﬁnance in the
period they arrive. In addition, all age groups living at the time of the migrants’
arrival are better off. As the time horizon of the economy is inﬁnite, the cost
of a permanent openness to migration is postponed to the indeﬁnite future. In
the closed economy OLG model of Scholten & Thum (1996), migrants have a
negative effect on wages. Natives (i.e. the median voter) can choose the im-
migration policy, the outcome of which will depend upon the age of the natives.
Old individualswill choose a high immigration rate, because immigrantsimprove
the situation of the pension system. The younger individuals prefer a restrictive
immigration policy as immigrants have a negative impact on wages. In general,
the outcome is a too restrictive immigration policy and lifetime income could be
increased by ﬁxing a higher but steady immigration rate.
The impact of immigration in mitigating future tax hikes is quantiﬁed in com-
putable OLG models. One category of such models consists of closed-economy
computable OLG models. The well-known study of Storesletten (2000) explores
the case of the U.S. in a CGE model where agents differ in age, skills and legal
status (native, legal immigrant, or illegal immigrant). An important message of
this study is that selective immigration should be able to alleviate some of the
ﬁscal burden associated with the aging of the population. It might also provide an
alternative to a rise in taxes or a reduction in pension beneﬁts (in order to ﬁnance
ﬁscal deﬁcits).3
2Chojnicki (2005) arrives at the conclusion by performing a similar study for France.
3In a similar framework, Chojnicki (2005) compares the pension systems of the U.S. and of50
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The articles presented above were done for single countries in a closed-
economy setting. Our paper belongs to the last group of studies, which develop
multi-country open-economy CGE-OLG models. Such models have been devel-
oped to account for the effects of international capital mobility in mitigating the
effects of demographic transition, because capital mobility reduces factor price
responses to demographic shocks (see below). These models do not and are not
particularly suited to address issues concerning replacement, since they feature
skill-homogeneousagents.Oneexceptionisthemulti-regionalmodelofFehret al.
(2004), which distinguishes three income classes of agents. analyze the conse-
quences of skill-heterogeneous migration. They ﬁnd that “increased immigration
does very little to mitigate the ﬁscal stresses facing the developed world". Their
ﬁnding is similar to the one of Storesletten (2000): while increased immigration
does little to reduce the burden of aging in the United States, a rise in the number
of skilled immigrants may be beneﬁcial. But, they stress that increasing the num-
ber of immigrants is not unproblematic. If high-skilled immigrants come from
developed regions, it does not help the public ﬁnance of the developed world. If
they come from developing regions, it may worsen the brain drain "that is already
greatly depleting the human capital of developing regions".
Our analysis builds on a calibrated multi-region computable general equi-
librium (CGE) dynamic overlapping generations (OLG) model, with integrated
capital markets between the regions. Studies advocating the modeling of capi-
tal mobility claim that in a closed economy framework, a demographic transi-
tion strongly raises the capital-labor ratio and affects factor prices in a more pro-
nounced way. As a consequence, interest rates are strongly increased and wages
are strongly reduced. This reduces the saving rate since young people are the
highest net savers and rely mainly on labor income. Capital deepening may then
partly mitigate the negative consequences of a demographic transition (Aglietta
et al., 2007; Börsch-Supan et al., 2006; Storesletten, 2000, p315). Our model dif-
fers from the study of Storesletten (2000) and from Fehr et al. (2004) by different
aspects. While closer to the latter study, two differences can be highlightened and
may explain somehow different ﬁndings. First, our model comprises also devel-
oping regions, which are considered as migrants’ regions of origin, while in Fehr
et al. (2004), migrants to the developed world originate from outside the model.
France over the 21st century. In his CGE model, agents are either low-, or medium- or skilled.
He contrasts a scenario without any immigration at all and a situation with projected immigration
ﬂows. The ﬁnding is that, in both countries, immigration has only a slight impact on public
ﬁnance and cannot be considered as a solution to population aging. However, if a more selective
immigration policy would be applied, immigration could be beneﬁcial for the pensions systems
of both countries at least for the ﬁrst half of the century. After 2070, the positive effect on public
ﬁnance will be offset by the increase in the share of the pensions in the GDP as the immigrants
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Apart from being more realistic, this feature allows us to assess the impact of la-
bor mobility on migrants’ source regions.4 Moreover, it allows to consider capital
mobility between developing and developed regions, and also to account for the
non-synchronous aging process in a more global way by letting the demographics
of developing regions come into play. Second, compared to Fehr et al. (2004),
a more relevant difference for the issue addressed here, hinges on the modeling
based on skill-composition of agents. Agents are grouped into skill groups ac-
cording to existing data on education levels (Barro & Lee, 2001a) and are either
high-skilled (post-secondary education) or low-skilled (below secondary educa-
tion). In Fehr et al. (2004) agents are categorized into three income groups: low-,
medium- and high-income according to an arbitrary rule (30%/60%/10%). Thus
there is no difference in the skill composition across regions, as it is actually
observed between North-America and Western Europe. Moreover in Fehr et al.
(2004), agents fromthethreeincomegroupsare perfect substitutesas in Storeslet-
ten (2000) implying ﬁxed skill premia. However, according to Acemoglu (2002),
low- and high-skilled workers are rather imperfect substitutes in production. We
account for this by introducing a constant elasticity ofsubstitution(CES) function
for efﬁcient labor.5
Our study addresses two main issues. First, is increased immigration be a
solution for paying the pensions of the elderly in developed countries? More pre-
cisely, building on the immigration forecasts of the United Nations (U.N.) Popu-
lation Division, we consider two immigration variants in which migration ﬂows
to developed countries are doubled between 2000 and 2060 for North-America
and for Western Europe. In the ﬁrst variant, the majority of newcomers are high-
skilled; in the second one, the majority of them are low-skilled. We examine
the implications of an increase of 25% in immigration ﬂows between the 2010
to 2050 in mitigating the pressure on the contribution rate in both regions in
North-America (Canada and the US) and in Western Europe (EU-15) when cur-
rent generosity of the welfare state is held constant. Two immigration policies are
studied: a selective immigration policy and a non-selective immigration policy.
In the former 70% of the additional migrants are high-skilled and in the latter
70% are low-skilled. A second objective is to compare the immigration policies
to “potential” changes in labor market characteristics. These potential alternative
remedies to aging suggested in this study, as well as the considered immigration
policies, can be thought of being “realistic" i.e. the magnitude of these policy
changes is not excessive. Such policies comprise a postponement of 2 years in
the retirement age of either high- or low-skilled workers, a gradual acceleration
4This issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but will be addressed in a further study.
5Another interesting difference, linked to the skill-type of workers, is the modeling of pension
systems that differ in their redistributiveness across regions.52
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of skill-biased technical change (SBTC) from 1% in 2010 to 5% in 2050 and a
10 percentage points increase in the share of high-educated people. It can be
relevant to analyze such policy changes since, in the United States (US) and in
many European countries governments plan to or have already delayed manda-
tory retirement age. Moreover, retirement regimes vary across countries, but also
within countries since mandatory retirement age may for example differ across
sectors or professions. In fact, high educated workers spend more time in school
than low-skill workers and have thus shorter periods of contributions. But when
they enter the labor force, they usually contribute by higher amounts to (and also
beneﬁt less from) welfare systems. Furthermore, another important labor market
characteristic is the demand for skills. In fact, the last decades have been char-
acterized by an increase in skill complementary technologies causing a rise in
wage inequality (between high- and low-skill workers) and in overall inequalities
Acemoglu (2002, 2003a). An acceleration of SBTC may also have implications
for ﬁscal policy through changes in the wage differential between higher and less
educated workers. A modiﬁcation in the skill premium will affect the tax base
and thus the contribution to the welfare state. Lastly, as high-educated workers
are contributingrelativelymore to the welfare in net terms, it could be worthwhile
to see how an increase in the proportion of high-skilled affects ﬁscal pressure. In
particular, as the supply of skills is relatively high in the US compared to Europe,
it would also be interesting to investigate how pension systems in Europe would
be affected when education levels of the European population approach the ones
in the US.6
Obviously, part of our results is driven by the model assumptions. Three
main assumptions characterize the current version of the model. First, the world
economy is characterized by free capital mobility. Second, low- and high-skilled
workers are imperfect substitutes and policy changes will thus affect skill premia.
Within the limits of these assumptions and as previous studies we ﬁnd that
immigration has only a small impact in mitigating future tax hikes. Another im-
portant ﬁnding is that of our study is that the impact of immigration in ﬁnancing
pension systems has a similar impact as the other potential remedies in terms of
magnitudes. In North-America, a selective (non-selective) immigration policy re-
duces the tax rate by -1.79 (-1.56) percentage points. A gradual acceleration in
skill-biased technical change from 1% in 2010 to 5% in 2050 would do a similar
job by cutting the tax rate by -1.78 percentage points in 2050. In Western Europe,
a postponementof the retirement age by 2 years from 2010 onwards decreases the
tax rate by -2.19 percentage points, while a selective (non-selective) immigration
6Following Cheeseman Day and Bauman (2000), who carry out projections of school atten-
dance for the US until 2028, we can consider that the proportion of high-skilled individuals in
North-America will not increase in the future, justifying why we do not carry out a simulation of
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policy entails a -2.13 (-1.83) reduction in the contribution rate. Moreover, both
increased immigration policies have a quantitatively similar effect in mitigating
the expected ﬁscal burden of population aging in developed countries. The ﬁnd-
ing, that a non-selectiveimmigrationpolicy can be beneﬁcial in ﬁnancing pension
systems contrasts with the literature and can only be partly explained by the fact
that we do not consider an extreme immigration policy with 100% of additional
migrants being low-skilled. Doing so would reduce the ﬁscal beneﬁts from a
non-selective immigration policy, but would not make them vanish. Another ex-
planation hinges on the fact that skill premia are affected by immigration, unlike
in Storesletten (2000) and Fehr et al. (2004). A non-selective immigration policy
increases skill premium and thus the contributions to the welfare made by main
net tax payers: high-skilled workers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the 10 regions of the
world and presents the model. The calibration of the baseline scenario is provided
in section 2.3. Section 2.4 explains the results of the different scenarios. Section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
This study builds upon a calibrated overlapping generations model where indi-
viduals live for 8 periods each of 10 years. We calibrate the economies of 2
regions: North-America and Western Europe.7 Age classes go from 15-24 to
85-94 years, implying that individuals are “born" at the age of 15 and die at the
age of 95. However there is a probability of being alive at each period, because
some individuals are assumed to die before the age of 95. There are moreover
two types of individuals, high- and low-skilled individuals. "high-skilled individ-
uals" identify individuals with an education above high-school degree (tertiary
education), whereas "low-skilled individuals" comprise individuals having an ed-
ucational level less than high-school (primary education) and with a high-school
degree (secondary education). The educational choice (e) and thus also the pro-
portion of highly educated individuals among one generation (φ) is exogenously
determined.
As in de la Croix & Docquier (2007), we postulate the existence of an insur-
ance mechanism à la Arrow-Debreu (or à la Yaari (1965)). Each time an individ-
ual dies, her/his assets will be equally distributed among individuals belonging to
the same age class. In other words, individuals do not leave any bequests to their
children (or to next generations). Furthermore, there is only one consumption
7North-America contains the United States and Canada, while Western Europe comprises
Europe-15 plus Australia and New-Zealand. There are 10 regions in the model, 3 developed
and 7 developing, see chapter 1.54
2. REPLACEMENT MIGRATION, LABOR MARKET CHARACTERISTICS AND PENSION SYSTEMS:
NORTH-AMERICA VERSUS EUROPE
good and its price is the numeraire of the model. There is one leading economy
(North-America), in the sense that the technological progress (TP) of each region
is expressed in terms of the TP of the leading economy. The leader is always
ahead in terms of TP compared to the other regions. Besides, the evolution of the
TP is exogenous.
The model introduces skill heterogeneity among individuals. A constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) function for efﬁcient labor is used to deﬁne the
mix of high- and low-skilled labor forces in the production process. Moreover,
the model is characterized by full-employment. Finally, each economy has three
agents: households, a representative ﬁrm and a public sector. In the following
subsections, we describe the regional decomposition of the world, agents’
behavior and the equilibrium of the model.
Demography. At each date, some individuals die and a new generation appears.
A cohort of age a and born at time t is denoted by Na,t. Since we consider only
individuals aged from 15 to 94, households reaching age 15 (labeled as age 0 in
our notations) at year t belong to generation t. The size of the young generation
increases over time at an exogenous growth rate:
N0,t = mt−1N0,t−1, (2.1)
whereN0,t measurestheinitialsizeofgeneration tandmt−1 is oneplusthedemo-
graphic growth rate, including both fertility and migration. Each household lives
a maximum of 8 periods (a = 0,...,7) but faces a cumulative survival probabil-
ity decreasing with age.8 The size of each generation declines deterministically
through time.
Na,t+a = Pa,t+aN0,t, j = h,l (2.2)
where 0 ≤ Pa,t+a ≤ 1 is the fraction of generation t alive at age a (hence, at
period t + a). Moreover, P0,t = 1. Obviously, total population at time t amounts
to Nt =
 7










tN0,t = (1 − φt)N0,t
where φh
t equals φt and denotes the proportion of high-skilled (post-secondary
educated) individuals among the generation born in t.
8To avoid agent heterogeneity,migration ﬂows are allowed only among individuals of the ﬁrst
age class. Populationis calibratedto matchthe populationprospectsof the UnitedNations(2008).2.2. THE MODEL 55
Preferences. The expected utility function (U) of high- (upperscript h) and low-












a,t+a is the consumption of age class a at time t + a.
The budget constraint of low- (l) and high-skilled (h) individuals requires
equality between the expected value of expenditures and the expected value of













































a,t+a is the labor participation rate for a j type individual of age class a,
w
j
t is labor income of a j type worker, R∗
t is one plus the international interest
rate, τc
t is consumption tax, τw




a are other welfare transfers received by an individual of type
j and are represented as a time-constant fraction of labor income, and ﬁnally ψt
is the generosity factor, which is the factor by which these other welfare transfers
are multiplied at time t. Moreover, education is exogenous and individuals spend
a fraction e
j
t of their total time (which is only positive in their ﬁrst period of life).
Individuals maximize their utility (2.3) subject to their intertemporal budget
constraint (2.4) with respect to the levels of consumption. The optimal (contin-








Equation (2.5) reveals that to know the optimal lifetime consumption (c0 to c7) of
a cohort born in t can be known once its consumption level at age 0 is identiﬁed.
The optimal level of consumption in the ﬁrst period of life can be determined by
substituting (2.5) in (2.4).
Moreover, we can also deﬁne the implicit asset holdings of each age class.
We assume that individuals are born with no assets at time t, or in other words,
there are no bequests. At time t + a with a > 0, assets of high- and low-skilled56




a,t+a) depend on their assets in the previous period (Z
j
a,t+a−1) plus
an interest rate as well as on current expenditures (consumption) and incomes
(labor income, pension beneﬁts and other welfare transfers). Formally, at the
beginning of their ﬁrst period of life (when a = 0), Z
j
0,t = 0 for all t. For a > 0,































where Na,t+a represents the number of individuals of age class a living at time
t + a, φ
j
t is the proportion of individuals of skill type j among generation t.
Firms. At each period of time and in each region, a representative ﬁrm uses
efﬁcient labor (Lt) and physical capital (Kt) to produce a composite good (Yt).





where α measures the share of wage income in the national product, and At is an
exogenous process representing Harrod neutral technological progress.
Total efﬁcient labor force combines the demands of high-skilled (Lh
t) and of
low-skill labor (Ll
t) according to the transformation function characterized by a









where υt is an exogenous high-skilled biased technological progress (SBTC), and
σ is deﬁned as σ=1 − 1
ε, with ε being the elasticity of substitution between high-
and low-skill labor. The capital share in output α is set to one third, as estimated
in the growth accounting literature. We follow Acemoglu (2002) in ﬁxing the
elasticity of substitution ε to 1.4 and thus the parameter σ equals to 0.2857 in
the CES function. One of our scenarios analyzes the impact of an acceleration
in skill-biased technical change, which, in terms of the model, is translated by a
gradual increase in the parameter υ.
Government. The government levies taxes on labor earnings (τw
t ) and consump-
tion expenditures (τc





t) and other welfare transfers (ζ
j
a+1). The government surplus (St) can be2.2. THE MODEL 57
























































t is a part of national income used to ﬁnance general public spending.
The government also issues bonds and pays interests on public debt. Thus the
government’s budget constraint may be written as:
dt+1Yt+1 = R
∗
tdtYt − St, (2.10)
where d represents the debt-to-GDP ratio, R∗ is one plus the international interest
rate and S is the government’s surplus. Equation (2.10) says that public debt in
t+1 depends on past debt in t and its interests, minus the government’ssurplus S.
The evolution of the public debt is exogenously given. Since transfers and taxes
on consumption are exogenous as well, the wage tax rate will adjust to satisfy the
government’s budget constraint (2.10).
Finally, in contrast to existing multi-regional models, the modeling of the
pension systems should account for the skill-heterogeneous agents feature of our
model. In fact, a social security system can be characterized not only by its gen-
erosity or size but also by its redistributiveness (Pestieau, 1999). In the following
equations, the ﬁrst characteristic is captured by the replacement rate χt and the
second one by the parameter ρ, with both parameters comprised between 0 and 1.
Pension beneﬁts for low- (bl
t) and high-skilled (bh

















A value for ρ close to 0 implies more redistributive pension systems, since low-
and high-skilled would receive similar amounts of beneﬁts when retired. If ρ is
close to 1, then pension systems are weakly redistributive with replacement rates
that are constant across income levels. This modeling allows regional pension
systems to be partly Bismarckian or Beveridgian.9
9Bismarckian systems can be deﬁned as highly generous and poorly redistributive, while Bev-
eridgian pension systems are small-sized and more redistributive. This remains however a sim-
plistic categorization (Pestieau, 1999).58
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International capital markets. In an economy with perfect capital mobility, the
aggregate value of world assets equals the market value of the world-wide capital















where X is the set containing each world region. Moreover, Kx
t is the sum of the
capital stock of region x at time t, Ω is the sum of the assets of all the cohorts of
region x, dx
tY x
t is the level of region x’s debt at time t. An economy with perfect
capital mobility is also characterized by the arbitrage condition of the returns to
capital which requires the equality between the rates of return to capital in each
region.
Deﬁnition (Competitive Equilibrium) Given an initialstockofcapital {Kt}t=0,
an exogenous demographic structure summarized by {Na,t}a=0..7,t≥0, an exoge-
nous distribution of high-skilled individuals {φ
j





a,t = 0}a=0,t≥0, a competitive
equilibrium in an economy with perfect capital mobility, up to a conﬁscation rate,
is
⊲ a vector of individual variables {c
j
a,t}a=0..7,t≥0,j=h,l that are the optimal so-
lutionsto the households’maximizationproblem, i.e. equation (2.3)subject
to (2.4);
⊲ a vector of the ﬁrm’s variables {Kt,L
j
t}t≥0,j=h,l that maximize the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt subject to technology (2.7);
⊲ a vector of income taxes {τw
t } balancing the budget of the government
(2.10);
⊲ a vector of wages {w
j
t}t≥0,j=h,l such that labor markets are in equilibrium
;
⊲ an interest factor {Rt}t≥0 satisfying the no arbitrage condition of the rates
of return to capital;
⊲ and ﬁnally, an international interest factor R∗
t satisfying the equality be-
tween the aggregate value of world assets and the market value of the
world-wide capital stock plus the sum of the debts of all regions, i.e. equa-
tion (2.13) holds.
The equilibrium on the goods market is achieved by Walras’ law.2.3. PARAMETERIZATION OF THE MODEL ECONOMY 59
2.3 Parameterization of the model economy
In this section we explain the calibration of the parameters as well as of observed
and unobserved exogenous variables. We also deﬁne the baseline scenario and
the assumptions on the future. Finally we focus on the different scenarios char-
acterized by changes in the retirement age, skill-biased technical progress and
education levels.
The model is calibrated in such a way that it matches regional structures and
world disparities over the period 1950-2000. We start from an initial steady-state
in1870andwefocusonthetransitionalpathoftheworldeconomyuntilitreaches
the ﬁnal steady-state in 2200. Our period of interest is 2000-2100.
2.3.1 Parameters and exogenous variables
Table 2.1 gives an overview of the values for model’s parameter and exogenous
variables. The following lines explain the calibration process.10
Table 2.1: Overview of main calibrated parameters (for the year 2000)
φ λh
5 λl
5 υ A cg χ ρ τc
North-America 55% 0.7 0.5 48.1% 1 14.9% 41.5% 0.2 20%
Western Europe 30% 0.7 0.5 73.3% 0.74 19.57% 42.5% 0.6 20%
Various sources are used (see below) and own computations.
The table shows the values for the year 2000.
Population process and individual characteristics. In the baseline, we compute
Pa,t+a, the probability for an individual of generation t of being alive at time
t + a and the population growth rate mt for the period 1950 to 2050 from the
United Nations data of World Population Prospects, United Nations (2008). In
order to compute the share of high-skill individuals of a generation φt, we use
the Barro-Lee Dataset (2001), which provides data on the educational attainment
of individuals aged 25 to 74 for the years 1950 to 2000 per country.11 In the
10The model splits the countries of the word into 10 world regions. Here we focus on the
calibration of two of them: Western Europe and North America.
11We ﬁrstly aggregate this data set by region and then partition it to obtain shares of highly
skilled per age group. We proceed as follows in order to dis-aggregate the Barro-Lee data by age
group. First, it is reasonable to assume that, at each period, the share of highly skilled individuals
is higher for the younger age class. In particular, we assume that the share of highly skilled
individuals aged 85 to 94 corresponds arbitrarily to 80% of the share of highly skilled aged 75 to
84, which in turn is equal to 80% of that of the next younger age class, and so forth. As all the
shares of highly skilled per age class then depend on the share of highly skilled aged 25 to 34, we60
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future, we assume that the young cohorts are educated as the young one in 2000.
Labor participation rates of high- and low-skilled individuals (respectively λh
a,t
and λl
a,t) are set to 1 for the age groups 15-24, 25-34, 35-44 and 45-54. The
participation rate for the three last age groups equals 0. For the ﬁfth age group,
the labor participation is between 0 and 1. Low-skilled individuals work until 60,
i.e. the participation rate for individuals aged 55-64 equals 0.5 (λl
5,t = 0.5), and
high-skilled individuals until 62 (λh
5,t = 0.7). Time spent in education is set to
0.6 for high-skilled individuals (eh), meaning that they obtain a secondary school
diploma (or above) and enter the labor force at the age of 21. For low-skilled,
el equals 0.2. Finally, the introduction of migrants in the model is explained in
appendix.
Technology and skill-biased technical change. First of all, the two parameters
δ and α are assumed to be identical for across regions. As Aglietta et al. (2007)
we argue that there is no reason to think that these parameters should differ
across regions. We use an annual depreciation rate of capital of 5% like in
Chojnicki et al. (2005) and de la Croix & Docquier (2007), which implies that
δ equals 0.4. The capital share in output α is set to one third, as estimated
in the growth accounting literature (see also GTAP, 2008). In our baseline
scenario, we use a back-solving calibration method proposed in de la Croix &
Docquier (2007) that allows to exactly match the observed world disparities
between and within regions, i.e. the distance of a region’s GDP to the GDP of the
leader (North-America), and the wage differential between the two skill-types
of individuals. The method consists of swapping the exogenous variables At
for the endogenous variables Yt/Y ∗
t , where Y ∗ is North-American GDP, and
then solving the identiﬁcation step with the Dynare algorithm (Juillard, 1996).
Skill-biased technical change υt is calibrated in the same manner by targeting the
wage differential among skill-type of individuals, i.e. Ht (= wh
t /wl
t). The ratio
of GDP’s is computed by employing the data of the GDP per purchasing power
parity from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI, 2007) for the three
years 1980, 1990 and 2000.12 We hold the value of 1980 (respectively 2000)
constant for the years preceding 1980 (respectively following 2000). The skill
compute this share in order to matches the total share of highly skilled in 1950, as given by the
Barro-Lee Dataset. Second, we report the values of the shares of the age classes 25-34 to 65-74of
the following years. For example, the share of highly skilled aged 35 to 44 in 1960 is equal to the
share of highly skilled aged 25-34 in 1950, as we assume that the high- and low-skill individuals
have the same probability to be alive at the beginning of each period. Third, for all the following
years, we compute the share of highly skilled aged 25 to 34 in the same way as for the year 1950.
Lastly, the share of highly skilled aged 15 to 24 in 1950 is simply equal to the share of highly
skilled aged 25 to 34 in 1960.
12We take the 5-yearaverage value for the three time periods 1980,1990 and 2000: 1978-1982,
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premium Ht is ﬁxed at 2.3 for Western Europe and 3 for North-America for the
year 2000 and depicts the fact that skill premium is higher in the US than in
Europe. These two values reﬂect the pattern of the US college wage premium in
Acemoglu (2003a) during the period 1950-2000. We follow Acemoglu (2002)
in ﬁxing the elasticity of substitution ε to 1.4 and thus the parameter in the CES
labor demand function, σ, which corresponds to 1−
1
ε equals 0.2857. Finally, the
technical progress growth of the leader, i.e. North-America, gt=A∗
t+1/A∗
t, where
A∗ is the leader’s technical progress, is calibrated on observations and set to 1.2,
which means that the annual growth rate is equal to 1.84%.
Government, transfer proﬁles and pension systems. Public debt, dt, and public
spending, c
g
t are computed from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2007)
for North-America and from the OECD (2006b)for Western Europe. Social secu-
rity transfer proﬁles for each educational group, ζj
a, are assumed to be stable over
time. The data for the social security transfer proﬁles (ζj
a) come from US and
European generational accounting studies (Chojnicki, 2005). For the US, he dis-
aggregates the proﬁles in the homogeneous agent study of Gokhale et al. (2000)
by individuals’ education level: below high school, high school and above high
school. Theseproﬁlesarealsoused inChojnicki&Docquier(2007)andcomprise
eight types of transfers: old age security, disability insurance, medicare and med-
icaid, unemployment insurance, general welfare, aid to families with dependent
children, food stamps and ﬁnally, educational transfers. In our model we take the
average proﬁles of the two ﬁrst groups as the proﬁles of ‘low-skilled’ individuals
for the North American region. For the Western European region, we rely on Eu-
ropean data from Chojnicki (2005), which stem from Crettez et al. (1999). The
proﬁles for both regions are shownin table2.2. The generosity factor of the social
Table 2.2: Time-constant transfer proﬁles (ζ)
Age groups 15-24 25-64 65-74 +75
Western Europe
High-skilled 3% 6% 10% 15%
Low-skilled 10% 18% 20% 22%
North-America
High-skilled 0.5% 1% 6% 12%
Low-skilled 7% 12% 20% 25%
Source: Chojnicki (2005) and own computations
security transfers, ψt is increasing during the period 1950-2000 and normalized
to 1 from 2000 onwards. To parameterize pension systems, we need to set the
values of the replacement rate, χt and of the time-invariant pension scheme pa-62
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rameter ρ. We calibrate the replacement rate in order to match the share of public
pension spending to GDP of the year 1990. The data for this last variable come
from Table A.5 of Palacios (1996) and from the World Bank (1994). We assume
that the replacement rate of 1950 corresponds to 3/4 of the one of 1990. The
replacement rates of 1960, 1970 and 1980 are chosen in order to build an linear
upward trend between 1950 and 1990. The ones before 1950 are kept identically
to the value of 1950, whereas the replacement rates after 1990 correspond to the
value of 1990. The pension scheme parameter, ρ, captures the redistributiveness
of the pension system and is speciﬁc to each region. We can set ρ by relying on
the data on the size and redistributiveness of pension systems for several OECD
countries collected by Johnson (1998) and exposed in Pestieau (1999).13 Accord-
ing to this data, the ratio of replacement rates between the highest and lowest
income levels is 0.33 in Canada and 0.5 in the United States. To be precise, this
data reports replacement ratios for an average income level and for incomes that
are half or twice as large as the average level. We take the ratio of replacement
rates between the highest and lowest income levels as a rough approximation of
the ratios between high- and low-skilled wages. The ratio of replacement rates
for North-America will correspond to the weighted average of the Canadian and
US ratios (weighted by the population of both countries in 1990). By using the
formulas (2.11) and (2.12) we can write this ratio in the terms of our model as
[ρ + (1 − ρ)/H] where H ≡ wh/wl. Then ρ is set in order to match the ratio
of replacement rates between high- and low-skilled individuals (the value of H is
given below). We obtain a ρ of 0.2 for North America, and similarly ρ equals to
0.6 for Western Europe.14
2.3.2 Baseline and assumptions on the future
In the baseline scenario, the distance of the technical progress of each region to
the technical progress of the leading economy is assumed to be constant after
2000. Furthermore, like the policies conducted in many developing countries, the
baseline already features less generous pension systems in the near future because
of population aging, e.g. a postponement by 1 year of the retirement age of high-
and low-skilled individuals between 2000 and 2050. In addition, we hold the
13Since data on the size of the pension systems in Johnson (1998) comprises only several de-
veloped countries, we prefer to use the more complete data of the World Bank to calibrate χ.
14Pension systems differ quite a lot across Western European countries, with the largest coun-
tries as Italy, Germany and France being Bismarckian (i.e. with a large percentage of public
spending for social security systems to GDP and a less equal redistribution), while smaller coun-
tries as the Netherlands being Beveridgian. In contrast, Canada and the United States are clearly
more Beveridgian than Western Europe, with a smaller sized welfare system and a more egalitar-
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proportion of skilled individuals among each new generation constant from 2000
onwards.
• Population structure: The main driving force of the model over the 21st
century is the evolution of the population structure, since the predictions
of the United Nations Population Projections last until 2050. Thus, as said
above, the growth rate of the ﬁrst cohort and the probabilities of being alive
are calibrated until 2050.
• Education: The proportion of high-skilled individuals among each new
generation is held constant from 2000 onwards. As young cohorts are more
educated than older cohorts (or in other words, cohorts born before 2000
are less educated than those born born in 2000 and after), it implies that
the proportion of educated workers continues to increase after 2000. In the
long run, the proportion of educated individuals will equal the proportion
of educated among the cohort born in 2000.
• Pension systems: In line with the policies conducted in many developed
countries, we consider that pension systems will be less generous in the
near future because of population aging. To represent these anticipated
forthcoming pensions reforms, our baseline scenario for the ﬁrst half of the
21st century accounts for two changes compared to the year 2000. First, be-
tween 2000 and 2040, the retirement age is gradually postponed by 1/4 year
for both low- and high-skilled individuals, meaning that the retirement age
for low- and high-skilled increases from respectively 60 and 62 in 2000 to
respectively 61 and 63 in 2040. Formally, for the age group 55-64, λl
5 (re-
spectively λh
5) passes steadily from 0.5 to 0.6 (respectively from 0.7 to 0.8)
over the period 2000-2040 in North-America and Western Europe. Second,
the replacement rate is reduced implying lower pension beneﬁts in the next
decades. Between 2000 and 2050, the replacement rate in North-America
is gradually reduced from 41.5% to 36%, while the one in Western Europe
falls from 42.5% to 37%.
2.3.3 Scenarios on labor market characteristics
Table 2.3 presents the "realistic" changes in the various labor market characteris-
tics with the benchmark model. Five scenarios are considered for North-America
and six for Western Europe. In the ﬁrst scenario, retirement age of less educated
individuals is postponed by two years beyond the baseline level from 2010 on-
wards both in Western Europe and in North-America. In a second simulation,
the same scenario is run for the retirement age of skilled individuals. In scenario
three the ﬁrms augment their demand for skilled labor in the production process64
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scenario during the ﬁrst half of the 21st century. This scenario is characterized
by a continuous acceleration in skill-biased technical change with respect to the
baseline from 2010 to 2050: from a 1% augmentation in 2010 to reach a 5%
increment in 2050 compared to the baseline.15
In simulation four we assume that the proportion of educated individuals rises
during the ﬁrst half of the 21st century, but only in Western Europe. The pro-
portion of young educated people augments steadily from 2 percentage points
in 2010 to 10 percentage points in 2050 with respect to the baseline scenario.
There will be no scenario of increased supply of skills in North-America, be-
cause according to Cheeseman Day and Bauman (2000) the proportion of skilled
among young skilled individuals may not vary much in the near future in the
US. Finally, we consider two policies of increased immigration. We track mi-
gration ﬂows from the seven developing regions to North-America and Western
Europe.16 To avoid additional agent heterogeneity, we also assume that migrants
enter at the age of 15 when they have no assets (the integration of migration ﬂows
in the model is explained more in detail in appendix). In the two immigration
scenarios, 25% of additional immigrants (compared to the baseline scenario) ar-
rive to North-America and to Western Europe between 2010 and 2050. When the
non-selective immigration policy (scenario 5) is applied, 30% of these additional
migrants are highly skilled and 70% low-skilled whereas 70% of these migrants
have a higher education level and 30% a lower education level in the selective
immigration policy (scenario 6). Table 2.3 shows how the proportion of young
high-skilled individuals in the population changes according to these two policies
(details about the calibration of the migration scenario can be found in appendix).
The evolution of the parameters in the different scenarios can be justiﬁed in
the following way. We argue that a prolongation of the working life can be imple-
mented immediately via a public policy and thus the total augmentation in legal
retirementagehappensinoneperiod. Inthescenarios3and4thechanges arepro-
gressive(and occur over several periods), because the proportion of highly skilled
in a population and skill-biased technical change may not be radically inﬂuenced
over a short time period.
Moreover, instead of simulatingtwo radical policies of increased immigration
(e.g. an arrival of 100% of low-skilled versus 100% of high-skilled immigrants),
we prefer to compare the effects of two more "realistic" immigration policies:
70% of high-skilled / 30% of low-skilled versus 30% of high-skilled / 70% of
low-skilled migrants. We argue that when a country chooses to adopt a selective
15The values of all exogenous variables are ﬁxed after 2050 in each scenario, expect for νt,
which continues to vary slightly from 2050 to 2100 in the baseline case.
16We do not quantify migration ﬂows from the North (developed regions) to the South (devel-
oping regions) as well as North-North and South-South migrations, because they are implicitly
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immigration policy, it can never "attract" 100% of high-skilled migrants, because
a migrant may for example arrive with his family members, who are probably not
all highly skilled.
Table 2.3: Simulations for Western Europe and North-America
Scenario 1: Postponement of low-skilled retirement age (increase of 2 years from 2010 onwards)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Both regions: Baseline 60 60.2 60.4 60.6 60.8 61
Both regions: Scenario 1 60 62.2 62.4 62.6 62.8 63
Scenario 2: Postponement of high-skilled retirement age (increase of 2 years from 2010 onwards)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Both regions: Baseline 62 62.2 62.4 62.6 62.8 63
Both regions: Scenario 2 62 64.2 64.4 64.6 64.8 65
Scenario 3: Rise in SBTC υ (from a relative change of 1% in 2010 to 5% in 2050)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Western Europe: Baseline 48.1% 51.8% 54.2% 55.3% 55.5% 55.5%
Western Europe: Scenario 3 48.1% 52.4% 55.3% 57% 57.8% 58.2%
North-America: Baseline 73.3% 75.3% 76.2% 76.7% 76.9% 76.9%
North-America: Scenario 3 73.3% 76% 77.8% 79% 80% 80.8%
Scenario 4: Increase in the share of young skilled φ (from 2 percentage points in 2010 to 10 pp in 2050)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Western Europe: Baseline 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
Western Europe: Scenario 4 30% 32% 34% 36% 38% 40%
North-America: Baseline 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55%
North-America: No Scenario 4 —– —– —– —– —– —–
Scenario 5 and 6: Share of young skilled (φ) when the inﬂow of migrants increases by 25%
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
WEU: Baseline 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
WEU: Scenario 5 (Non-selective) 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
WEU: Scenario 6 (Selective) 30% 30.78% 30.82% 30.85% 30.86% 30.87%
NAM: Baseline 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55%
NAM: Scenario 5 (Non-selective) 55% 53.98% 54.04% 54.08% 54.11% 54.15%
NAM: Scenario 6 (Selective) 55% 55.61% 55.58% 55.55% 55.53% 55.51%
Source: Docquier & Marfouk (2006) for scenarios 5 & 6 and own computations; own calibration for scenarios 1-4. φ is
the proportion of high-skilled among individuals aged 15-24, ν is high-skilled biased technological change
Besides, unlike Ingenue (2005) and Fehr et al. (2004) who double immigra-
tion ﬂows to sending countries/regions, the immigration scenarios presented here
do only augment by 25% the migrants coming to Western Europe and to North-
America. The reason is that we prefer to follow again the aim of more "realistic"
changes on the labor supply. Table 2 shows how a prolongation (of two years) in
the working life of low- or high-skilled individuals and an increase (by 25%) in
high- or low-skilled migration inﬂows affects the labor supply compared to the
baseline. The rise in the labor supply (compared to the baseline) due to a post-
ponement of the legal retirement age is obviously relatively constant (because
it is a one-time change in labor supply), while immigration constantly increases66
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Table 2.4: Labor force increase under retirement age and immigration scenarios
Increase in the labor force compared to the BSL
Advanced Countries 2010 2030 2050 2060 2080 2100
Scenario 1: postponement of RA-h 0.64% 1.51% 1.47% 1.41% 1.36% 1.36%
Scenario 2: postponement of RA-l 3.69% 3.91% 3.43% 3.28% 3.17% 3.18%
Scenario 5: increase in IMMI-h 0.23% 2.23% 6.39% 8.48% 10.83% 11.15%
Scenario 6: increase in IMMI-l 0.30% 2.31% 6.44% 8.44% 10.79% 11.15%
North-America 2010 2030 2050 2060 2080 2100
Scenario 1: postponement of RA-h 1.94% 2.19% 2.49% 2.42% 2.49% 2.53%
Scenario 2: postponement of RA-l 2.20% 1.98% 2.03% 1.98% 2.03% 2.07%
Scenario 5: increase in IMMI-h 0.62% 4.98% 12.47% 16.08% 20.18% 20.81%
Scenario 6: increase in IMMI-l 0.81% 5.16% 12.56% 16.01% 20.11% 20.81%
Source: Docquier & Marfouk (2006) and own calculations
RA-l and RA-h stand for the postponement in retirement age of low- and high-skilled individuals
IMMI-l and IMMI-h represent the non-selective resp. selective immigration policy.
the labor supply as additional migrants arrive each period to their destination re-
gion until 2050. We see that the increase in the labor force due to any of the
two immigration policies is more than two (four) times higher than the increase
in the labor supply due to a prolongation of the working life in Western Europe
(North-America). Thus doubling immigration would have an excessive effect on
the labor supply.
2.4 Results
In this section we present the implications of the different potential remedies
for the tax-to-GDP ratio and GDP per capita in Western Europe and in North-
America. First, we investigate if any of the scenarios can mitigate the old age cri-
sis, by sustaining pension systems. But we will also analyze their consequences
on GDP per capita, as they are likely to have an impact on the economic perfor-
mance of these two regions.
2.4.1 Impact on the tax rate
As mentioned above, the labor income tax rate (or simply ‘tax rate’ hereafter)
balances the government budget. The main driving force of the model over the
21st century is the evolution of the population structure. In particular, aging will
put a strong pressure on pension systems which will be reﬂected by a rising labor
income tax rate. This can be clearly seen in ﬁgure 2.1. In both regions, the
evolution of the support ratio (the share of working age population to pensioners)
dictates the ﬁnancial pressure on pension systems.In Western Europe, the tax rate
needs to be multiplied by 1.3 between 2000 and 2050 to maintain the generosity2.4. RESULTS 67
of the welfare state as in 2000 (ﬁgure 2.1.c). In the long-run, the ﬁscal impact is
mainly explained by the progressive rise in life expectancy. The peak observed
between 2020 and 2060 is due to the graying of baby boom generations. During
the ﬁrst half of the century, North-Americais able to keep a youngerdemographic
structure and the demographic transition results in a more gradual increase in
the tax rate. North-America is more open to immigration and can thus avoid a
dramatic rise in the tax rate caused by the retirement of the baby boomers. Let us
observethatWestern Europehasthehighestsocialsecuritycontributionrateinthe
world. This is due to its relatively higher dependency ratio and to the relatively
high replacement ratio people enjoy at constant policy. In fact, public pension
spending to GDP ratio is largest in Western Europe (9.2% in WEU compared to
6.5% in NAM, see Palacios, 1996) and translates into a higher replacement rate.17
Figure 2.2 displays the impact of the different policy changes on the tax-
to-GDP ratio in percentage point changes with respect to the baseline. In the
following lines, we explain the impact of all the non-migratory policies (solid
lines in the graph), ﬁrst for Western Europe and then for North-America. The
effects of immigration (dashed lines) are described subsequently in a separate
paragraph.
Western Europe. Postponing retirement age of low-skilled individuals is the
most effective among all policy changes in reducing the ﬁscal pressure on
Western European pension systems. During the 20th century, younger cohorts
are more skilled than the previous generations and we assumed that future young
cohorts are educated like the 2000 young cohort (see section 2.3), implying that
share of high-skilled individuals will be increasing during the 21st century.18 De-
laying retirement of low-skilled induces a relative strong decrease in the tax rate
in the ﬁrst quarter of the 21st century, with a reduction of -1.89 percentage points
already in 2010. The reason is that there is still a relative large pool of low-skilled
middle aged individuals in the beginning of the century. In contrast, postponing
the retirement age of high-skilled individuals, has a smaller initial impact on
the tax rate, but becomes more signiﬁcant during the following decades as the
labor force becomes more skilled. Still, in the long run (end of the century), the
reduction in the tax rate amounts to -1.3 percentage points with a postponement
of low-skilled retirement age and only -0.86 with high-skilled retirement age.
17Our labor income tax rates passes from 45.73 in 2000 to 59.37% in 2050 in Western Europe
and from 20.10% to 26.10% in North-America. This is comparablewith Fehr et al. (2004), where
the combined social insurance payroll tax and wage tax rates rise from 40.70% to 69.20% in
Europe and from 23.50% to 39.40% in the United States.
18The share of high-skilled among a new born generation is 24% in 1980, 27.8% in 1990 and
30% from 2000 onwards. Thus the proportion of highly educated in the population rises steadily
in the 21st century and tends to 30% in the long run.68
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Figure 2.1: Support ratio and labor income tax rate in the baseline
a. Support ratio: Western Europe b. Support ratio: North-America
c. Tax rate (τw): Western Europe d. Tax rate (τw): North-America
The explanation is that the proportion of low-skill workers remains relatively
large enough to dominate the fact that a high-skill worker contributes marginally
more to the welfare system than a low-skill one. Nevertheless, because the share
of high-skilled individuals increases over the ﬁrst half of the 21st century, the
difference in the reduction of the tax-to-GDP ratio due to both retirement age
policies is lower. Our model supports also the magnitudes of the ﬁndings in
the skill-homogeneous agent model of Aglietta et al. (2007). They obtain that
a gradual increase in the retirement age from 60 to 65 years between 2000 and
2020 in Western Europe induces a relative change in the contribution rate of2.4. RESULTS 69
-22.67% in 2050 (-8.5 percentage points) and of -21.88% in the long run (-7
pp). Transposing their scenario in our framework implies a delay in retirement
of both skill groups19, which induces a relative decrease in the labor income tax
rate of 14.27% in 2050 (-8.47 percentage points) and of -15.15% in the long run
(-7.84pp). Finally, an acceleration in skill-biased technical change reduces taxes
by -0.55 percentage points in the long term (compared to the baseline), while a
rise in the proportion of high-skilled has an even smaller impact on taxes.
Figure 2.2: Impact of the different policy changes on the tax rate (τw)
(Percentage points change w.r.t. baseline)
a. Western Europe b. North-America
RA-l and RA-h stand for the postponement in retirement age of low- and high-skilled individuals
SBTC and EDU are respectively the scenarios in which skill-biased technical change and education levels increase
IMMI-l and IMMI-h represent the non-selective resp. selective immigration policy.
North-America. In North-America, an acceleration in skill-biased technical
change has a bigger impact on pension systems than delaying retirement age. In
the long run (from 2100 onwards), the cut in the tax rate corresponds to -1.98
percentage points (compared to the baseline). Postponing high-skilled retirement
age induces a slightly larger reduction in the tax rate than delaying retirement of
low-skilled. In North-America, the proportion of high-skilled leans to 55% in the
19To compare to Aglietta et al. (2007), we increase the retirement age for both skill-groups by
4% in 2010 and by 8% from 2020 onwards.70
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long term.20 There is thus a more equal number of low- and high-skilled individu-
als than in Western Europe. But then we could expect a larger gap in thereduction
of the tax rate between the two types of policies, since postponing high-skilled
retirement age increases the effective labor supply by increasing the number of
contributors and their “quality”: a high-skilled individual contributes more and
beneﬁts less from the welfare system. The explanation hinges on the impact
of both policies on the skill premium, which increases by 3.12% and drops by
-3.18% in 2050 when retirement age of low-skill respectively high-skill workers
is postponed. Since the contribution and the beneﬁts (pension beneﬁts and other
welfare transfers) of tax payers are a fraction of the labor income, delaying retire-
ment age of (low-) high-skill workers will (decrease)increase the net contribution
of a high-skill worker. As a consequence, there is no reason to advocate a longer
working timeof one skill-typeof workers compared to another in North-America.
Immigration. Finally, the impact of immigration in ﬁnancing pension systems
has a similar impact as the other potential “remedies" in terms of magnitudes. In
both regions the reduction in the tax rate is highest in the middle of the century,
more precisely in 2060 when the ﬁrst wave of migrants is fully retired and the
last wave fully joins the workforce. The beneﬁcial effect on taxes disappears by
the end of the century, when all the additional migrants are retired. This supports
the results of the two-period theoretical OLG model of Razin & Sadka (1999), in
which individualswork in the ﬁrst period of their life and are retired in the second
period. Razin & Sadka (1999) ﬁnd that an immigration policy is beneﬁcial to the
pension systems of the receiving countries in the period of the migrants’ arrival,
as they increase the labor force. We also ﬁnd that the positive effects of immigra-
tion last until the immigrants retire. In addition, because our individuals live for
eight periods, the beneﬁcial effects of immigration hold several periods after the
stop of the increased immigration policy. Even though the labor force remains
higher than in the baseline in the long run, the number of pensioners beneﬁting
from contributions will also be higher. Furthermore, in Razin & Sadka (1999),
also low-skilled immigrants may contribute to ﬁnance the pension systems of de-
veloped countries. This corroborates with our result, but contrasts with existing
generational accounting studies and with the outcome of Storesletten (2000), who
argues that only selective immigration policies may be used to reduce the ﬁscal
pressure on the welfare state. This is also one of the conclusions of Fehr et al.
(2004), where a doubling of low-skilled immigration leads to an increase in the
tax rate.21
20In 1980, 50% of the 15 to 24 years old are high-skilled. In 1990, there are 52.5% of the
high-skilled among the same age group and 55% from 2000 onwards.
21To be precise, in their model, low-skilled migrationleads both to a rise in the social insurance
tax rate and the wage tax rate.2.4. RESULTS 71
In fact, ﬁgure 2.2 shows that both immigration policies lead to similar cut in
the tax rate.22 Compared to the base case, a selective policy relieves the ﬁscal
pressure by -1.85 in North-America and by -2.23 percentage points in Western
Europe in 2060 while a non-selective one induces a decrease in the tax rate of
-1.62 in North-America and by -1.98 percentage points in Western Europe . What
explains this result? Compared to generational accounting studies, where wages
are exogenously given and which predict a negative impact of low-skilled mi-
gration in contributing to the welfare state, general equilibrium effects are into
play here. An inﬂow of workers will change the capital-labor ratio and impact
on factor prices by lowering wages and increasing the interest rate. However,
the frameworks of Storesletten (2000) and Fehr et al. (2004), which can be very
roughly deﬁned as an open economy version of the former model, comprise such
effects and deliver a pessimistic message concerning the impact of low-skilled
migration in sustaining the ﬁnancing of pension systems. Two reasons are put
forward. A ﬁrst explanation, is that unlike in the two aforementioned studies the
skill-composition of our proposed immigration policies is not a “radical” one, in
the sense that the selective policy is not composed of 100% of high-skilled mi-
grants, but of 70% of high-skilled and the non-selective one does not comprise
100% of low-skilled migrants, but only 70%. We argue that even if governments
wish to attract only high-skilled workers, they may fail to do so, for example be-
cause they can not impede that these workers come with their family members,
who are less likely to have a higher education level. Nevertheless, in order to con-
front our model with the aforementioned studies we simulate such the effects of
such extreme migration policies on the tax rate. The differential impact between
low- and high-skilled immigration would be indeed slightly increased.23
Another reason explaining the similar impact of both immigration policies is
that when the additional immigrants are high-skilled, the skill premium decreases
(a -0.81% relative change compared to the baseline in 2060) and this reduces the
average contribution of a high-skill worker in ﬁnancing pension systems. Con-
versely, when additional migrants are low-skilled, a high-skilled worker will pay
more taxes since the skill premium is enhanced (+2.71% relative change in 2050).




in the two scenarios of increased immigration. The government spends more public goods when
additional migrants arrive (because Yt will rise when the labor force increases). However, there
is no reason to believe that general public expenditure should change if the composition of these
migrants is different.
23A very selective migration policy, increasing migration ﬂows by 25% and comprising only
high-skilled migrants would reduce the tax rate by -2.41 and -2.01 percentage points in West-
ern Europe respectively North-America in 2060. Its counterpart, all additional immigrants are
low-skilled, would lead to a decrease of -1.78 and -1.43 in Western Europe respectively North-
America.72
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ers of different skill-types are perfect substitutes. Finally, we can also make a
very rough comparison with Fehr et al. (2004). They obtain that in the United
States a 1% increase in low-skilled immigration from 2000 onwards would result
in an rise of the combined tax rate by 0.12% in 2050, while a 1% increase in
high-skilled immigration would reduce it by -0.56%.24 Our results suggest that
a similar shock i.e. with a 1% increase in low- respectively high-skilled immi-
gration ﬂows between 2010 and 2050 would result in a reduction of the tax rate
by -0.21% and by -0.3% in 2050. These results are thus less optimistic with re-
spect to high-skilled immigration and less pessimistic with respect to low-skilled
immigration than the ﬁndings of Fehr et al. (2004).
Our ﬁndings suggest that realistic changes in labor market characteristics are
potentially as beneﬁcial in reducing the ﬁscal pressure on pension systems as
an increase in immigration: in North-America (a rise in skill-biased technical
change) and in Western Europe (a postponement of low-skilled retirement age).
Moreover, our results are less optimistic in advocating high-skilled immigration
and less pessimistic in recommending low-skilled immigration to mitigate future
tax hikes than the existing literature.
2.4.2 Income per capita
In Western Europe, a progressive increase in the share of high-skilled individuals,
up to a level of 40% in 2050, is the scenario that leads to the highest long term
increaseinpercapitaGDPof7% withrespectto thebaselinescenario (ﬁgure2.3).
Postponing retirement age of either high- or low-skilled individuals increases per
capita GDP by less than 2.5% compared to the reference case in the long run.
Higherskill-biasedtechnicalchangeleadstoalongtermdecreaseinpercapita
GDP of almost 2.5% compared to the baseline. In North-America, a delay in the
retirement age of high-skilled individuals produces the most important increase
in per capita GDP among all the scenarios: a 3.5% rise by the end of the 21st
century compared to the reference case. high-skilled biased technical change and
a delayed low-skilled retirement age increase per capita GDP by around 1%.
24These numbers originate from own computations based on the results exposed in Fehr et al.
(2004) and the impact on the tax rate is based on the combination between the social insurance
and the wage tax rate. The two skill-speciﬁc immigration policies they analyze are an yearly
increase from 100’000 to 200’000high-skilled migrants (10% increase in immigration ﬂows) and
an increase from1 to 2 million, where all the additional migrantsare low-skilled (this corresponds
to a doublingin total immigrationﬂows). While ourmodeldiffersin manyaspects fromthe oneof
Fehret al., it is morereasonableto compareourﬁndingstothemratherthantoStoresletten(2000).
In fact, they also assume that integrated capital markets between the regions of their model while
Storesletten employs a closed economymodel, implyinga larger responseof factor prices to labor
inﬂows.2.4. RESULTS 73
Figure 2.3: Impact of the different policy changes on GDP per capita
(Relative change w.r.t. baseline)
a. Western Europe b. North-America
RA-l and RA-h stand for the postponement in retirement age of low- and high-skilled individuals
SBTC and EDU are respectively the scenarios in which skill-biased technical change and education levels increase
IMMI-l and IMMI-h represent the non-selective resp. selective immigration policy.
We noticethatan increase inskill-biasedtechnicalchangehas differenteffects
on the economies of North-America and of Western Europe. It increases per
capita GDP in the former and decreases it in the latter. This is closely linked to
the different education levels in both regions and can be interpreted as follows. A
high supply in the high-skill labor force induces North-American ﬁrms to apply
more advanced technologies in the production process (Acemoglu, 2002, 2003a).
Following a reasoning à la Nelson & Phelps (1966a) or à la Benhabib & Spiegel
(2005) where a follower imitates the technology of the leader economy, we can
argue that the skill-complementary technologies developed in North-America are
adopted by Western Europe. Because of lower education levels, the production
process in Western Europe is not adapted to use the new technologies. They lead
to a higher skill premium and widen the per capita income gap between North-
America and Western Europe.
Lastly, immigration has a beneﬁcial impact on per capita GDP but again only
as long as the labor force is increased and as long as the number of pensioners
does not increase (by too much). In 2050, the increase in per capita GDP is by
51% higher in Western Europe and by 111% in North-America with a selective74
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immigration than with a non-selective immigration policy. The fact that the skill-
complementary production process is more important in North-America (higher
υ) can explain that a selective immigration policy has a more beneﬁcial effect in
North-America.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of immigration on the contribution rate in North-
America and Western Europe, when holding the generosity of the welfare state
constant at current levels. This question is addressed within a calibrated over-
lapping generations model featuring integrated capital markets. Two immigration
policies are considered: a selective one, where the majority of migrants are high-
skilled and a non-selectiveone with a majorityof low-skilledmigrants. It is found
that increased immigration yields small ﬁscal gains. Moreover, both the selective
and non-selective immigration policies result in similar tax cuts. Our ﬁndings
also suggest that realistic changes in labor market characteristics are potentially
as beneﬁcial in reducing the ﬁscal pressure on pension systems as an increase in
immigration: in North-America (a rise in skill-biased technical change) and in
Western Europe (a postponement of low-skilled retirement age). Moreover, our
results are less optimistic in advocating high-skilled immigration and less pes-
simistic in recommending low-skilled immigration to mitigate future tax hikes
than the existing literature.
Several extensions may undoubtedly enrich the analysis. It would be inter-
esting to see what would be the effects of such scenarios on developing regions.
Besides, endogenizing the educational choice (i.e. the time spent in education) of
the individuals,could add onemore feedback into the model: the formation of hu-
man capital. We could then see how the impact of various pension reforms affects
the tax rate via changes in the education level of the population. Finally, endo-
geneizing the labor supply would allow us to have a framework where individuals
choose when they want to retire. These issues are left for future research.
Appendix
Appendix A: Calibration of migration
Throughout the paper, migration refers to migrants from the developing regions
going or living in the North. In order to calibrate these migration stocks and ﬂows
for the baseline, we explicitly track migrants from the seven developing regions
into the North-America and Western Europe. North-to-North and South-to-South2.5. APPENDIX A: CALIBRATION OF MIGRATION 75
migrants are implicitly dealt with through the U.N. population data and forecasts.
To introduce migration ﬂows in the model, we make 3 assumptions. First, mi-
grants are directly assimilated to natives, i.e. they acquire the same characteris-
tics (e.g. productivity) as natives as soon as they enter the destination region. A
second assumption is that there is no return migration. Finally, all the migrants
arrive at the age of 15 (i.e. without any assets).25
Each of these two receiving regions experiences two different policies of in-
creased immigration between 2010 and 2050. Instead of simulating two radical
policies of increased immigration (e.g. an arrival of 100% of low-skilled versus
100% of high-skilled immigrants), we prefer to compare the effects of two more
"realistic" immigration policies: 70% of high-skilled / 30% of low-skilled versus
30% of high-skilled / 70% of low-skilled migrants. We argue that when a coun-
try chooses to adopt a selective immigration policy, it can never "attract" 100%
of high educated migrants, because for example a migrant may arrive with his
family members, who are probably not high-skilled.
Table 2.5: Additional Migrants to NAM and WEU by region of origin
Source region EAS MEN LAC JAP SSA RUS CHI IND
Host region
NAM 6.19% 5.03% 53.58% 0% 2.81% 2.97% 21.76% 7.66%
WEU 21.61% 33.10% 8.86% 0% 11.19% 2.90% 9.68% 12.66%
Source: Docquier & Marfouk (2006) and own calculations
Table 2.6: International migrants as a proportion of the population
Region and scenario 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090 2110 2130
WEU: Baseline 6.15% 7.36% 8.33% 9.07% 9.50% 9.66% 9.67%
WEU: +25% of migrants 6.43% 8.15% 9.67% 10.43% 10.44% 10.01% 9.67%
NAM: Baseline 12.39% 14.38% 15.68% 16.41% 16.48% 16.45% 16.45%
NAM: +25% of migrants 13.11% 16.07% 18.21% 18.70% 17.97% 16.99% 16.45%
Source: Docquier & Marfouk (2006) and own calculations
25These assumptions are necessary in order not to increase the heterogeneity of agents in the
model, which would further complicate the computation of the transitory path. In fact, in our
model we have individuals with 2 different educational attainments of 8 different age classes and
belonging to 10 different regions. If there was for example return migration in the model (no
permanent immigration), migrants would go back to their region(s) of origin after some periods
with different characteristics than the individuals that did not emigrate from their home region.
Agent heterogeneity in the region(s) of origin would then increase. For the same reason we have
to assume that migrants arrive at the age of 15 years. When migrants arrive later, they will come
with different characteristics than natives and the heterogeneity of households in the destination
country will also change.76
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In the following step we need to determine the "additional" number of mi-
grants arriving to North-America and to Western Europe between 2010 and 2050.
According to the projectionsofthe U.N. PopulationDivision,64’375 respectively
39’104 thousands of migrants will arrive to North-America respectively to West-
ern Europe between 2010 and 2050. From this number we subtract the number
of 0 to 14 years old migrants. In the United States, 8% of the immigrants are
aged between 0 to 14 years (U.S. Census Bureau). We apply this share also to the
migrants of Western Europe. Next, we only want to consider migrants from the
seven developing to North-America and Western Europe. Thus we subtract from
the migrants aged 15 and more, all the migrants coming from the countries be-
longing to these two developed regions and from Japan. Using the data available
in the World Bank sponsored study of Docquier & Marfouk (2006), we obtain
that 79.02% respectively 58.44% of the total immigrants in NAM respectively
WEU come from the 7 developing regions in 2000. We assume that in the periods
following 2000 the share of migrants coming from the seven developing regions
will be more and more important in NAM and WEU. We assume that the share of
migrants coming from the seven developing regions will increase progressively
from 79.02% in 2000 to 85% in 2050 in North-America and from 58.44% to
70.13% in Western Europe.26 To determine from which developing region the ad-
ditional migrants will arrive we assume that they will be split up according to the
region of origin of the 2000 stock of migrants in North-America and in Western
Europe again by making use of the data available in the World Bank sponsored
study of Docquier & Marfouk (2006). Table 2.5 indicates that the additional mi-
grants to North-America and Western Europe have quite different origins. While
most of the additional migrants to North-America originate from Latin America
and the Caribbean (54%) and from the Chinese World (22%), Western Europe
experiences most of their additional immigration from the Middle East and North
Africa (33%) and from the Eastern European Countries (22%).
Table2.6showstheevolutionintheproportionofinternationalmigrantsunder
different scenarios. The share of immigrants is much higher in North-America
than in Western Europe. When migration inﬂows are increased by 25%, there
are around 2.5% more migrants in North-America and almost 1.5% in Western
Europe in 2050.
26The value of 85% for North-America is ﬁxed arbitrarily and 70.13% corresponds to an arbi-
trary 20% increase in the value of 2000.Chapter 3
Brain Drain and the World
Economy:
Lessons from a General Equilibrium
Analysis
Abstract. The paper aims to address concerns of brain drain due to high-skill biased
immigration policies. The potential impacts of South-North high-skilled migration are
simulated on GDP per capita, GNI capita, and the high-to-low skill income inequality at
origin. A ten-region CGE-OLG model is built and dynamically calibrated so as to match
observations from the world economy. While our results reconﬁrm the important role of
remittances in subsidizing the income of those left behind, they are also robust to different
assumptions as to whether the highly skilled remit less or not. Furthermore, the paper
assesses the signiﬁcance of several feedback effects ignored in previous CGE works.
First, it is shown that the high-skilled diaspora may greatly beneﬁt domestic production
by reducing information-related risks and bringing in more foreign direct investments.
Second, the so-called “brain gain" effect acts to reduce the income disparity between
workers of different skills. These feedback effects may well outweigh losses of high-skill
labor, and they are especially pronounced for regions with low high-skilled emigration
rates. In contrast, brain drain indeed poses as a curse for regions already facing severe
high-skill outﬂows, including Eastern Europe, Latin America.
JEL Classiﬁcations: F22, J24, O15.
Keywords: Brain drain, Human capital, Remittances, Development.1
1joint with Frédéric Docquier, Elisabetta Lodigiani and I-ling Shen.
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3.1 Introduction
The South-North migration of talented workers is an important component of the
globalization process. Although the world proportion of international migrants
remained stable over the last decades, the immigration rate in high-income coun-
tries has, similarly to the trade-to-GDP ratio, tripled since 1960 and doubled since
1985. Thanks to new harmonized and original data sets on migration stocks and
rates by educational attainment, it is today possible to have a more accurate vi-
sion of the educational structure of international migration. For instance, Doc-
quier et al. (2009) show that the number of highly educated immigrants living in
the OECD countries has increased by 70 percent during the 1990s, against a 30
percent increase only for low-skilled immigrants. Two thirds are due to migration
from developing countries. Obviously, such a change partly reﬂects a general rise
in educational attainments in developing countries. It follows that, in proportion
of the highly skilled labor force at origin, brain drain rates were relatively stable
over time (see ?). Nevertheless, many developing countries exhibit brain drain
rates well above 40 percent, especially sub-Saharan African countries, Central
American countries and small states2. The brain drain is thus a major source of
concern in some developing regions and could become an increasingly impor-
tant issue if developed countries reinforce the selection of their immigrants (in
response to aging, occupational shortage, etc.).
In principle, international migration can generate substantial welfare gains for
many parties concerned. One of the most fundamental results in economics is the
Arrow-Debreu “ﬁrst welfare theorem” which states that, under some conditions,
a competitive market economy leads to a Pareto efﬁcient general equilibrium. As
far as the brain drain is concerned, it typically means that when highly skilled in-
dividualstake decisionsthat are goodfor them, an efﬁcient allocationofresources
is obtained. In particular, if high-skill workers are moving to rich countries, they
contribute to increasing the total amount of welfare at the world level: they work
in a more productive environment and potentially contribute to higher productiv-
ity improvements. The rest is a matter of redistribution.
With appropriate transfers, the brain drain could potentially lead to a Pareto-
improving situation in which origin and destination countries would gain. How-
ever, in the absence of redistributive transfers, the brain drain is usually consid-
ered as a curse for origin countries, especially for developing countries. Indeed, it
deprives poor countries of one of their scarcest resources, human capital. In turn,
it reduces their capacity to adopt recent technologies and induces a ﬁscal cost for
those left behind. Unsurprisingly, since the 1970s Bhagwati & Hamada (1974);
McCulloch & Yellen (1975, 1977), the traditional literature has delivered more or
2The high-skilled emigration rate exceeds 70 percent in a dozen countries.3.1. INTRODUCTION 79
less the following messages: i) the brain drain is a negative externality imposed
on thoseleft behind; ii)itis azero sumgame, with therich countriesgettingricher
and the poor countries getting poorer; and, iii) at a policy level, the international
communityshould implementa mechanism whereby international transfers could
compensatetheorigin countries forthe lossesincurred, forexamplein theform of
an income ‘tax on brains’ (or ‘Bhagwati Tax’) to be redistributed internationally.
Modern theories of endogenous growth have considerably renewed the analysis
of the relationships between education, migration and growth. The ﬁrst models
to address the issue of the brain drain in an endogenous growth framework also
emphasized its negative effects (Miyagiwa, 1991; Haque & jik Kim, 1995, for
example).
The recent literature is less pessimistic. While recognizing the importance
of human capital for economic development, it stresses a set of feedback effects
through which the brain drain positively affects sending economies. As a substi-
tute to ofﬁcial/public redistributive transfers, remittances constitute an important
channel through which the brain drain may generate positive effects for origin
countries. The new literature also puts forward a range of other “feedback ef-
fects” such as return migration after additional knowledge and skills have been
acquired abroad, the creation of business and trade networks facilitating foreign
direct investments and exports in the South, diaspora externalities on technology
diffusion or the effects of migration prospects on human capital formation. Many
elasticities have been estimated in the recent literature thanks to the new data sets
presented above.
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study in the litera-
ture that analyzes how all these direct and feedback effects interact. It is thus
almost impossible to ﬁgure out what are the dominant and minor mechanisms at
work. It is also difﬁcult to assess the global impact of the brain drain on devel-
oping regions. The objective of this paper is to combine the major results of the
empirical and theoretical literature in a uniﬁed general equilibrium model of the
world economy. We use an overlapping generations framework with low- and
high-skill workers. We divide the world in ten regions (three developed and seven
developing regions) and model the various interdependencies between them. In
our baseline scenario, we use an original back-solving calibration method that al-
lows to exactly match the observed world disparities between and within regions.
Increasing high-skilled migration has multiple effects on the equilibrium:
• ex-post (i.e. for a given numberof educated natives in the South), it reduces
human capital in origin regions. This affects their average productivity of
labor and capacity to adopt modern technologies;
• the emigration of young individualsdeteriorates the dependency ratio in the
South;80
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• high-skilled migration stimulates (resp. deteriorates) the marginal produc-
tivity of physical capital in the North (resp. in the South). This leads to a
reallocation of physical capital;
• high-skilled migrants abroad generate diaspora externalities in terms of for-
eign direct investments and diffusion of knowledge;
• new migrants remit a fraction of their income. Their propensity to remit
depends on their level of education;
• increased migration prospects for the highly skilled stimulate the expected
returns to schooling and generate more human capital formation ex-ante at
origin.
Accounting for all these factors, our general equilibrium model allows us to
provide a ﬁrst global evaluation of the brain drain impact on economic activity,
income, inequality in source and destination regions. It also allows us to disen-
tangle the relative impact of each speciﬁc mechanism and to conduct robustness
checks on key assumptions. This is important since there is still a lot of uncer-
tainty about the magnitudes of some feedback effects, an uncertainty arising from
the fact that causality is hard to establish using cross-section empirical studies.
A related study is Walmsley & Winters (2003) who used the World Bank’s
standard global general equilibrium model LINKAGE to estimate the gain from
international migration. They simulated the impact of a three percent increase in
South-North migration ﬂows between 2000 and 2025. Considering that 70 per-
cent of these new migrants are low skilled, the world real income would increase
by 1.19 percent in US$ (i.e. a 39 percent elasticity to migration). The gain would
be equal to 0.36 percent for natives in high-income countries (who beneﬁt from
the immigration surplus, reduced taxation). The gain would amount to 0.86 per-
cent for natives in developing countries, mainly due to remittances. The main
winners are new migrants who see their income multiplied by six in US$ and by
twoin PPP. Correcting forthechangeinthecost oflifeforthesenewmigrants, the
global increase on the world real income becomes 0.63 percent (i.e. a 20 percent
elasticity to migration). The only loss of income is experienced by old migrants.
The LINKAGE model leaves out many aspects of the brain drain debate. It does
notaccountfortheendogeneityofproductivityandthelinksbetween humancapi-
tal and technological changes at origin and destination. It disregards the potential
of migration to spur higher investments (through diaspora externalities or brain
gain effects). Except for remittances, it disregards the ties that migrants keep with
their origin countries. Finally, since remittances play a crucial role, nothing guar-
antees that the same “win-win” outcome would be obtained if additional migrants3.1. INTRODUCTION 81
would have higher skills (since high-skilled individuals are usually considered to
remit a lower proportion of their income to their home country).
By incorporating human capital-related externalities and accounting for the
various ties between migrants and their origin country, our model reﬁnes the
World bank study in many ways. Our main results are the following:
• The high-skilled diaspora may contribute greatly to domestic production in
the developing regions, as it decreases information-related risks and brings
in higher amounts of FDI. However, this positiveeffect is dominated by the
loss of labor force in regions where high-skilled emigration rates are high
and/or population aging is acute.
• Remittances receipts play an important role in subsidizing the income of
those left behind. Moreover, the magnitudes of their effect on GNI per
capita are robust to different assumptions as to whether highly skilled emi-
grants remit less or not.
• The incentive effect of human capital formation (or the “brain gain” effect)
is responsible for changes in the high-to-low skill income inequality. For
regionswherehigh-skilledemigrationratesarelow,whilemorehumancap-
ital is formed due to better migration prospect for the highly skilled, more
also remains at origin and helps to reduce the disparity between different
types of workers. Moreover, in these regions, this compensatory effect also
saves GDP per capita from a potentially large adverse impact due to high-
skilled emigration.
• If the diaspora externality is weaker (i.e. less FDI) or the incentive effect
is absent (i.e. less high-skilled and more low-skill workers), it is observed
that the domestic production is adversely affected, which results in more
pessimistic effects on GNI per capita. Furthermore, inequality also deteri-
orates when better migration prospects fail to induce more human capital
formation.
• While some empirical studies show that the high-skilled diaspora acceler-
ates technological progress in relatively backward countries, it is found that
this effect is rather negligible on domestic production.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes
the model and its calibration. The analysis of simulated results is presented in
Section 3.3. Robustness analyses are provided in Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5
concludes.82
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3.2 The model
We introduce international migration with skill heterogeneity into a general equi-
librium model with overlapping generations of individuals. The world is divided
into ten regions similarly to Ingenue (2005). We distinguish three developed re-
gions, North America (NAM), Japan (JAP) and other high-income OECD coun-
tries (ADV). The latter group is essentially made up of European Union countries
but also comprises Australia and New Zealand. We distinguish seven developing
regions, Eastern Europe (EAS), Middle East and Northern Africa (MEN), Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAC), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the Former Soviet
Union (RUS), the Chinese world (CHI) and the Indian world (IND).
Table 1: Regional characteristics in 2000 (in %)
Region Demog Human Average High-skilled Low-skilled Rem/Y
CHI 36.6 3.8 0.5 7.3 0.2 0.8
EAS 3.9 12.4 6.6 11.8 5.3 1.3
IND 30.3 4.5 0.4 5.2 0.2 1.8
LAC 10.2 11.8 4.3 11.0 3.1 2.0
MEN 6.2 8.5 3.5 8.5 2.8 2.8
RUS 3.0 18.9 2.0 2.6 1.8 0.6
SSA 9.7 2.8 0.8 12.9 0.4 2.6
Source: Docquier et al. (2009) and IMF.
Our analysis focuses on developing regions. Table 1 characterizes the de-
mographic patterns of these regions, i.e. their demographic share in the popula-
tion aged 25+ of the developing world (Demog), the proportion of highly skilled
in the resident population (Human), their average emigration rate towards the
OECD members (Average), the emigration rates of high- and low-skill workers
(High-skilled and Low-skilled) and the ratio of remittances to GDP (Rem/Y). Re-
garding remittances, the amounts presented in Table 1 are taken from the IMF
database and are usually seen as underestimating the reality since many transfers
are channeled through the informal sector. It is a priori difﬁcult to estimate the
region-speciﬁc bias. Thus, we will only consider the ofﬁcial IMF numbers in our
analysis.
Each region has three types of agents: households, ﬁrms and the public sector.
The adult population is divided into 8 overlapping generations, from age 15-24
to age 85-94. Age is denoted by a=0, ... ,7. Individuals have uncertain lifetime
and can die at the end of every period. In each generation, we have time-varying
proportions of low-skilled and high-skilled individuals. Due to data availability
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Migration occurs at the ﬁrst period of life and is permanent. This is a realistic
assumption since we focus here on the migration of high-skill workers, who are
most likely to emigrate on a more permanent basis with their family members.
We only track migrants from the South to the North. Other international migrants
are included in the demographic forecasts.
The model has two main blocks with a recursive structure. In order to account
for the empirical elasticities estimated in the literature, we build an ‘upstream
block’, calibrated outside the core of the model using data and empirical studies.
This block predicts the evolution of demographic variables, human capital and
the magnitude of diaspora externalities. Then, these predictions are introduced in
a ‘micro-founded general equilibrium block’ which generates predictions for the
world output, prices, remittances, asset accumulation, the geographical allocation
of assets, the international ﬂows of capital income and many other endogenous
variables. In fact, one may have the feeling that the non-micro founded block is
less coherent than the micro-founded one, where variables are generated through
the optimization behavior of households and ﬁrms. Usually CGE works are crit-
icized because the parameters used are calibrated to match observed values of
speciﬁc indicators at a given moment and are thus disconnected from the empir-
ical evidence. In the present work, we believe that the non-micro founded block
is an improvement upon such criticism since we calibrate some parameters using
existing estimations. In the next sub-sections, we describe the structure of these
two blocks.
3.2.1 The upstream block
The upstream block is used to predict the evolution of demographic variables, the
effect of migration on human capital accumulation and the magnitude of diaspora
externalities. Starting from the U.N. forecasts, our shock involves a 10% increase
in the ﬂows of emigrants originating from each region between 2000 and 2050.
These additional migrants are assumed to be highly skilled. Their allocation by
destination region is assumed to be identical to the one observed in 2000. Such
a change could be due to increasingly selective immigration policies at destina-
tion. Figures 3.3 to 3.6 display the evolution of six indicators/variables under
the baseline (left panel, labeled “a”) and under the various shocks accompanying
high-skilled emigration (right panel, labeled “b”). Each of these ﬁgures will be
commented successively in this section along with a description of the speciﬁc
shock corresponding to it.
Population. Individuals reaching age 0 at year t belong to the generation t. The
size of the young generation increases over time at an exogenous growth rate:
N0,t = mt−1N0,t−1,84
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where N0,t measures the initial size of generation t and mt−1 is one plus the
demographic growth rate, including both fertility and migration.
At every period, agents of the same age class (a = 0,1,...,7) face an identical
cumulative survival probability, which decreases with age. Hence, the size of
each generation declines deterministically over time:
Na,t+a = Pa,t+aN0,t
where 0 ≤ Pa,t+a ≤ 1 is the fraction of generation t aliveat age a (at period t+a).
Obviously, we have P0,t = 1.
Denoting by φt the proportion of highly skilled (post-secondary educated)
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Speciﬁcally, we assume full participation except for the following three groups.
First, young highly skilled spend a fraction of their time in obtaining education
and do not fully participate in the labor market (0 < λh
0,t < 1). Second, part of
the population aged 55 to 64 years old are retired (0 < λ
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individuals aged above 65 are retired (λ
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a,t = 0 for all a > 4).
Demographic changes affect the economic performances of the economy































In the baseline, we compute Pa,t+a, the probability for an individual of gen-
eration t of being alive at time t + a and the population growth rate mt for the
period 1950 to 2050 from the United Nations data of World Population Prospects,
the 2000 Revision. In order to compute the share of high-skilled individuals of a3.2. THE MODEL 85
generation φt, we use the Barro-Lee Dataset (2001), which provides data on the
educational attainment of individuals aged 25 to 74 for the years 1950 to 2000
per country.3 In the future, we assume that the young cohorts are educated as the
young one in 2000.
As shown in ﬁgure 3.3.a the Chinese world (CHI) and the Middle Eastern and
North African region (MEN) have the largest high-skilled diaspora, i.e. the num-
ber of highly skilled individuals living abroad. One aspect of the demographic
evolution in each region is described in ﬁgure 3.4.a. While the in some regions, in
the Indian world (IND), MEN and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), working age pop-
ulation (individuals aged 15 to 64) increases during the 21st century, it decreases
in some others as in CHI, the Eastern European countries (EAS) and the Russian
world (RUS). This reduction in the labor is one factor contributing to the aging
phenomena arising in most regions. The evolution of the support ratio (the pro-
portion of labor force to the total population) is an indicator of the aging pattern
of the population and its evolution in the baseline is depicted in ﬁgure 3.1.a. We
see that, according to the U.N. Population Projections, almost all the developing
regions of our model will be affected by the aging process of their populations
during the 21st century. The only exception, is Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) which
keeps having the highest proportion of young people among the developing re-
gions. In contrast, the Eastern European countries (EAS) will have to cope with
the oldest population among the seven regions.
In the baseline scenario, we assume that future young cohorts are educated
like the 2000 young cohort. Since cohorts born before 2000 are less educated
than the ones born from 2000 onwards, our assumption induces a progressive rise
in the average level of human capital depicted in Figure 3.2.a. The proportion of
highly skilled is lowest in SSA.
South-North migration. In order to calibrate migration stocks and ﬂows for the
3We ﬁrstly aggregate this data set by region and then partition it to obtain shares of highly
skilled per age group. We proceed as follows in order to dis-aggregate the Barro-Lee data by age
group. First, it is reasonable to assume that, at each period, the share of highly skilled individuals
is higher for the younger age class. In particular, we assume that the share of highly skilled
individuals aged 85 to 94 corresponds arbitrarily to 80% of the share of highly skilled aged 75 to
84, which in turn is equal to 80% of that of the next younger age class, and so forth. As all the
shares of highly skilled per age class then depend on the share of highly skilled aged 25 to 34, we
compute this share in order to matches the total share of highly skilled in 1950, as given by the
Barro-Lee Dataset. Second, we report the values of the shares of the age classes 25-34 to 65-74
of the following years. For example, the share of highly skilled aged 35 to 44 in 1960 is equal
to the share of highly skilled aged 25-34 in 1950, as we assume that the high- and low-skilled
individuals have the same probabilityto be alive at the beginningof each period. Third, for all the
following years, we compute the share of highly skilled aged 25 to 34 in the same way as for the
year 1950. Lastly, the share of highly skilled aged 15 to 24 in 1950 is simply equal to the share of
highly skilled aged 25 to 34 in 1960.86
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baseline, we explicitly track migrants from the seven developing regions into the
three developed regions. North-North and South-South migrants are implicitly
dealt with through the U.N. population data and forecasts. Our calibration strat-
egy is based on immigrant-to-population ratios, or the proportions of stock of
immigrants to total population observed in the three developed regions. To begin
with, we usepublishedstatisticson the number, age structure and education levels
of immigrants in 2000 (combining the U.N. and the Docquier-Marfouk datasets).
From thegross numberofimmigrantstock in each region, we subtract thenumber
of 0 to 14 years old migrants, and then we subtract all North-to-North migrants.
Based on the Docquier-Marfouk dataset, we calibrate the shares of immigrants
by education level and by region of origin. To construct the number of migrants
before 2000, we use survival probabilities as well as the growth rate of the immi-
grant population. For immigration forecasts, we start from the 2000 numbers and
let migrants die according to the survival probability forecasts. Assuming that
all future migrants are aged 15-24, we let the change in the stock of immigrants
follow the UN forecasts (from which we subtract the 0-14 years old and North-
to-North migrants using the 2000 proportions). We assume that future migrants
are distributed by educational level and by origin as in 2000.
As mentioned above, our shock involves a 10% increase in the ﬂows of em-
igrants originating from each region between 2000 and 2050. These additional
migrants are assumed to be highly skilled. Figure 3.3.b, depicts the change in the
high-skilled diaspora compared to the baseline. MEN and LAC will experience
the highest increase in their number of highly skilled abroad (>25% in 2050). In
all the regions, the increase will be largest in 2050 when all the ‘additional’ high-
skilled migrants left their region of origin.4 Figure 3.4.b represents the change
in the working age population due to the migratory shock (compared to the base-
line). Increasing emigration by ten percent will obviously reduce the number of
people aged 15 to 64, since only the individuals from the youngest cohort are
assumed to migrate. Similarly, increased migration will also depress the support
ratio as shown in ﬁgure 3.1.b. The most serious drops in the working age pop-
ulation and in the support ratio are expected for the Eastern Countries and Latin
America.
Brain drain versus brain gain. A recent wave of theoretical contributions
demonstrates that high-skilledmigration can raise the average of human capital in
the sending countries Mountford (1997a); Stark et al. (1997, 1998); Vidal (1998);
Beine et al. (2001a); Stark & Wang (2002). These papers assumethat thereturn to
education is higher abroad and that high-skill workers have a much higher proba-
bility to emigrate than low-skill workers (a hypothesis strongly supported by the
4The highest change in the number of high-skilled emigrants occurs at a later period for EAS,
because its high-skilled diaspora is expected to fall in the baseline after 2050.3.2. THE MODEL 87
data). Hence, migration prospects raise the expected return to human capital and
induce more people to invest in education at origin. Ex-ante, more people opt
for education. Ex-post, some of them will be leaving. Under certain conditions
detailed in these models, the incentive effect (or brain effect) dominates that of
actual emigration(or drain effect), which creates thepossibilityof a net brain gain
for the source country.
Beine et al. (2008) found evidence that the prospect of high-skilled migration
is positivelyassociated with gross or ex-ante (pre-migration) human capital levels
in cross-country regressions. They used a β-convergence empirical speciﬁcation:
∆ln(HC
a
t ) = α − β ln(HC
a






t ) is the growth rate of human capital between t and t + 1, HCa
t
denotes human capital measured as the proportion of highly skilled among na-
tives at time t (superscript a stands for natives, or human capital ex-ante, before
emigration occurs), mh
t is the high-skilled emigration rate, Xi,t is a vector of
other control variables, (α,β,γ,ηi) is a set of parameters. The long-run elastic-
ity of natives’ human capital to the high-skilled emigration rate is equal to
γ
β.
It amounts to 9.6 percent in the parsimonious IV model. To perform the above
estimation, Beine et al. (2008) use the data on human capital by Barro & Lee
(2001b) and on migration by Docquier & Marfouk (2006). Given the availability
on migration data by skills in the latter dataset, the growth rate of the ex ante
stock of human capital (i.e., including emigrants) is deﬁned between 1990 and
2000, ∆ln(HCa
t ) ≡ ln(HCa
2000) − ln(HCa
1990). Their sample comprises 127
developing countries excluding countries from the former USSR, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia (for consistency between the 1990 and the 2000 data points) as
well as high-income countries, since their study focuses on the brain drain im-
pact on developing countries. To evaluate the incentive hypothesis, they use a
β-convergence empirical model and regress the growth rate of the ex ante stock
of human capital (i.e., including emigrants) between 1990 and 2000.5
5Control variables include (i) the log of the initial level of ex ante human capital, ln(Ha
1990),
to capture potential catching-up effects: a negative sign for the coefﬁcient a1 would indicate
convergence in natives (residents plus emigrants) human capital among the countries sampled,
(ii) the log of the high-skilled migration rate at the beginning of the period, as a proxy for the
migration incentives faced by educated individuals, (iii) interaction terms of this initial high-
skilled emigration rate, with dummy variables for whether the country’s income per capita was
lower than a given threshold at the beginning of the period, (iv) population density in 1990, as
a proxy for the cost of acquiring education, (v) workers’ remittances as a share of GDP, ﬁrst
because they can relax credit constraints on human capital investment, and second, because in the
absenceofstatistics on returnmigration,theyprovideanindirectmeans ofcontrollingforpossible
returns in subsequentperiods, (vi) regionaldummiesfor sub-SaharanAfrican and Latin American
countries.88
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In our simulations, we build on Docquier et al. (2009)’s data and compute the
relative change in high-skilled emigration rates resulting from the rise in emigra-
tion ﬂows to the North. We assume that these relative changes are experienced
by all the countries belonging to the region. Using the above long-run elasticity,
we compute the change in human capital of natives and residents (natives minus
migrants). Assuming that the long-run level of human capital is reached in 2050,
we compute the proportion of highly skilled among remaining residents, denoted
by HCt. We ﬁrst do it country by country and then aggregate countries by region.
The convergence to the 2050 level of human capital level is linear. Finally, we
compute the change in φt required to obtain the desired levels of human capi-
tal. After 2060, the high-skilled emigration rates and the φt come back to their
baseline value.
The effect of increased high-skilled migration may either enhance or deterio-
rate the level of human capital, depending on the calibrated elasticities of natives’
human capital to the high-skilled emigration rate. Figure 3.2.b depicts the change
in human capital in percentage points. The brain drain deteriorates the human
capital level in SSA, EAS and LAC, while it turns out to be beneﬁcial for IND,
CHI and RUS. The effect on MEN is almost nil.
Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Regional output, Yt, is determined by a Cobb-
Douglas production function with two inputs, physical capital, Kt, and labor in
efﬁciency unit, AtLt. The number of efﬁciency units of labor that a worker sup-
plies depends on his/her level of education (captured in Lt) and on the aggregate





There is one leading regional economy, North America (NAM), in the sense
that the Harrod neutral technological progress of each region is a fraction of A∗
t,
namely that the leader is always ahead of other regions in terms of production
technology. Exogenous paths for the Harrod neutral technological progress At
and growth of the leading economy are unobservable and/or must be properly
calibrated.
To obtain At for non-leading regions, we use the observed paths of GDP ratio,
Yt/Y ∗
t , where Y ∗
t is the leader’s GDP. We proceed as in de la Croix & Docquier
(2007), who use a backsolvingidentiﬁcation method to calibrate Total Factor Pro-
ductivity. It consists of swapping the exogenous variables At for the endogenous
variables Yt/Y ∗
t and then solving the identiﬁcation step with the Dynare algo-
rithm Juillard (1996). The ratio of GDP’s is computed by employing the data
of the GDP per purchasing power parity from the World Development Indicators
(WDI) for the three years 1980, 1990 and 2000. We adopt the value of 1980 for
the years preceding 1980 and the value of 2000 for those following 2000. Finally,3.2. THE MODEL 89
the leader’s growth of Harrod neutral technological progress, is calibrated on real
observations, and for future years, the value is calibrated such that the annual
growth rate is equal to 1.84 percent.
Following Benhabib & Spiegel (2005), themselves building on Nelson &
Phelps (1966b), we consider an endogenous Harrod-neutral technical progress
of the neo Schumpeterian type. Technical changes are determined by the regional
capacity to innovate and to adopt modern technologies. Vandenbussche et al.
(2006), henceforth VAM, estimated a neo-Schumpeterian model using panel data
on OECD countries. More recently, Lodigiani (2008) has extended the frame-
work by adding a diaspora externality: high-skilled emigrants living in rich coun-
tries increase the capacity to adopt modern technologies. She re-estimated the
model for a larger sample of 92 countries, including high-, middle- as well as
low-income countries. Having 276 observations by using data for the years 1980,
1990 and 2000, she obtained the following speciﬁcation:























t ) + ǫt (3.1)
where ∆ln(At) is the rate of technical progress, A∗
t is the technological level of
the leader (typically, the NAM region), Mh
t is the stock of high-skilled emigrants
living in the leading economy and ǫt is an exogenous component.6 Conﬁrming
VAM,theinteractioneffect between proximityand theproportionofworkerswith
tertiary education is positive, meaning that high-skill workers are more important
for growth in economies closer to the frontier. On the contrary, the interaction
effect between proximity and the log of high-skilled emigrants is negative, imply-
ing that high-skilled emigration has a decreasing effect on growth when a country
approaches the frontier, or that migration is more important for countries far from
thefrontier. Backward countries, that rely moreon adoption, can beneﬁciate more
from the high-skilled diaspora as it facilitates technology and knowledge transfer
from abroad.
In thebaseline,weplugthehumancapitalandmigrationforecastsintheabove
equation to predict the evolution of the technology. On the period 1950-2000, we
calibrate ǫt so that our baseline simulationsperfectly match the GDP observations
6We transpose this equation also to high-skilled migration to the other two developed regions.
Thereby we assume that the diaspora in Japan and the Advanced Countries has a similar impact
on the TFP of migrants’ origin regions. This is not unreasonable since the total productivity level
in these two developed regions is close to the North-American one: the technology levels of the
Advanced Countries and of Japan are respectively 96% and 99% of the North-American one in
2000.90
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(as percentage of the leading economy). The calibrated path for ǫt is rather sta-
tionary and distributed around zero in all the regions except in the Indian world,
the Chinese world and Eastern Europe where a positive trend is observed.
In our baseline forecasts, we consider that ǫt is equal to zero everywhere ex-
cept in India, China and Eastern European countries where ǫt remains positive
until 2100. Our baseline accounts however for a catch-up of China, India and
Eastern Europe to North America. This would be in line with the recent acces-
sion of the majority of the Eastern European countries to the European Union
and with the last years’ increased growth pace of India and China. Likewise the
assumptions of Ingenue (2005), the Eastern Countries will have increased their
GDP per capita level by 25% compared to North America, while both the Chi-
nese and Indian worlds will have doubled it (compared to the leader) by 2100. It
is also assumed that 75% of this catch-up occurs between 2010 and 2050 while
the remaining 25% between 2050 and 2100. These catch-ups to North America
in the baseline are obtained by calibrating the productivity A of these regions
via the backsolving identiﬁcation approach described in previous paragraphs and
represented by the exogenous parameter ǫ in the above ‘technology’ equation.
Figure 3.5.a depicts the evolution of the technological distance to the frontier
in developingregionsin thebaseline. ForIND and CHI thetimepath isincreasing
and the regions are approaching to the frontier. For CHI this effect is particularly
strong. For EAS, the closest region to the frontier, the time path is ﬁrst increasing
and then slightly decreasing. For all these regions (IND, CHI and EAS), the path
isexogenouslyimposed. Foralltheotherregions(SSA, MEN,RUS andLAC) the
time path is quite stable. Since our shock modiﬁes human capital and the number
of high-skilled emigrants abroad, it affects the rate of technical progress as well.





t > 19.4%), i.e. the economy is not too far from the frontier. Moreover,
∆lnAt increases in Mh
t if ln At
A∗
t ≺ −1.67 ( At
A∗
t < 18.8%), i.e. when the economy
is far from the frontier.
Figure 3.5.b represents the effect of our migration shock on the level of tech-
nology. A positive change is observed for IND and MEN, regions far from the
technological frontier. However, albeit being the region farthest from the frontier,
SSA suffers from high-skilled emigration because its domestic human capital is
so low that technology adoption is very unlikely to occur even with an enlarged
high-skilled diaspora. Therefore, the loss of an already scarce high-skilled pop-
ulation imposes a negative effect on SSA’s technology. Given the mechanism
explained above, a negative effect is instead observed for LAC, CHI and EAS.
For RUS the effect is nil.
Conﬁscation rate. A large sociological literature emphasizes that the creation of3.2. THE MODEL 91
migrants’ networks facilitates the further movement of persons, the movement of
goods, factors, and ideas between the migrants’ host and home countries. Sev-
eral studies investigated whether FDI and migration are substitutes (as one would
expect) or complements. Using cross-section data, Docquier & Lodigiani (2009)
ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant network externalities in a dynamicempirical model of
FDI-funded capital accumulation. Their analysis conﬁrms that business networks
are mostly driven by high-skilled migration. Using bilateral FDI and migration
data, Kugler & Rapoport (2007) also found strong evidence of a complementarity
between FDI and high-skilled migration with a similar elasticity.
In ourmodel, weassumethat physicalcapital is mobileacross regions, the op-
timal marginal productivity of capital is equal to the international interest rates r∗
t
augmented of country-speciﬁc conﬁscation rate πt reﬂecting informational costs
or risks. The conﬁscation rate is endogenous and depends on the size of the high-
skilled diaspora abroad (Mh
t ). We have:
r
∗










where δ is the capital depreciation rate, π0,t is an exogenous variables used to
calibrate the baseline level of the conﬁscation rate and -ϕ is the elasticity of the
conﬁscation rate to the high-skilled diaspora size.
Using panel data, Docquier & Lodigiani (2009) have estimated that the long-
run elasticity of foreign direct investments to the high-skilled diaspora is equal to
0.75.More precisely, they use migration data contained in Defoort (2008), which
provides high-skilled emigration stocks and rates from 1975 to 2000 (one ob-
servation every 5 years). This data focuses on six major destination countries
representing 75 percent of the OECD total immigration stock. The study of Doc-
quier & Lodigiani (2009) is based on 83 countries for a total of 332 observations
in a balanced panel data set.7 Using the speciﬁcations above and relying on the
fact that foreign direct investments represent 12.5 percent of total investments in
developing countries, the calibrated value for ϕ is equal to 0.05.
In the year 2000, we calibrate π0,2000 in such a way that the regional conﬁs-
cation rate reﬂects country risk rating. The conﬁscation rate is modeled here as
governmental tax on investment. In a risky region, a part of an investor’s returns
7They compute the growth rate of FDI-funded capital stock per worker for 4 sub periods of
5 year each (1980-85, 1985-90, 1990-95, 1995-00) and regress it on (i) total lagged migration
stock, (ii) lagged share of high-skilled migrants, (iii) lagged FDI-funded capital (in logs), (iv)
lagged GDP per capita (in logs), (v) labor force growth rate, (vi) lagged democracy score, (vii)
dummy for high-income country, (viii) interaction term between lagged democracy score and the
high-income dummy, (ix) lagged trade costs (in logs, the distance to most important countries)
(x) interaction term between lagged trade costs and the high-incomedummy (xi) and ﬁnally some
time dummies.to capital is collected by the government, who uses it for non productivepurposes
(e.g. extra-goods consumed by corrupted civil servants). We use data available
from the OECD for region speciﬁc risk, which in turn rely upon the Knaepen
Package methodology. To compute the risk classiﬁcation per region, we take an
arithmetic mean of ratings of the available countries8.
In the baseline scenario, π0,t is adjusted to keep the regional conﬁscation rate
constant over time. Figure 3.6.a shows the ﬂat proﬁles for (1 + πt) in the base-
line. Then, as our shock increases the size of the high-skilled diaspora abroad, it
reduces the conﬁscation rate and stimulates ceteris paribus foreign direct invest-
ments at origin. The intuition is as follows. When there are more high-skilled
migrants abroad, the information costs or information-related risks will decrease,
migrants in fact can provide important information to foreign investors, which
may otherwisebe difﬁcult orcostly to obtain, and they can reduce communication
barriers. Therefore, the return to capital increases and so does FDI. Figure 3.6.b
shows how (1 + πt) varies over time. In particular, the largest change in π occurs
in MEN and in LAC. MEN and LAC have the largest increases in high-skilled
diaspora, which contributes to the large effect. In contrast, in relative terms, CHI
has a very small increase in diaspora, thus the change in π is very small too.
8The Knaepen Package is a system for assessing country credit risk and classiﬁes countries
into eight country risk categories (0 - 7), from no risk (0) to high risk (7). Basically, it measures
the credit risk of a country. In our calibration, there are no risks for the three developed regions
whereas the seven developing have risk classiﬁcations as follows: CHI (3.2), EAS (3.4), MEN















Figure 3.1: Support Ratio
a. Baseline value b. After Shocks (change compared to baseline)
Figure 3.2: Human Capital







































































Figure 3.3: High-skilled Diaspora (Number of high-skilled individuals living abroad)
a. Baseline value b. After Shocks (change compared to baseline)
Figure 3.4: Working age population (Individuals aged 15 to 64)














Figure 3.5: Technological Progress
a. Baseline value b. After Shocks (change compared to baseline)
Figure 3.6: Conﬁscation Rate
a. Baseline value b. After Shocks (change compared to baseline)96
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3.2.2 The micro-founded block
The global impact of the brain drain also depends on its effects on labor and
capital income (at destination and origin), on asset accumulation by region, on
the amounts remitted by emigrants and on the distribution of these remittances.
To simulate these effects, we use a micro-founded block depicting ﬁrms’, states’
and households’ behaviors.

















, j = h,l
where c
j
a,t+a represents expenditures of age class a at time t + a. For natives in
both developing and developed regions, c
j
a,t+a is equivalent to goods consump-
tion. However, for immigrants in the developed regions, c
j
a,t+a is a Cobb-Douglas











, j = h,l,
where γj is an age-invariant propensity to remit that determines the proportion of
expenditures a migrant in the skill group j sends as remittance to his region of
origin. This parameter varies with region of origin.9
Furthermore, following de la Croix & Docquier (2007), we postulate the ex-
istence of an insurance mechanism à la Arrow-Debreu. Each time after an in-
dividual dies, her/his assets are equally distributed among individuals belonging
to the same age class. Individuals thus maximize their expected utility subject
to a budget constraint requiring equality between the discounted expected value
of expenditures and the discounted expected value of income, which consists of
net labor income, pension beneﬁts, other welfare transfers and/or net remittances.
The household optimization problem determines the age proﬁles for consump-
tion, remittances, saving and asset accumulation.
Controversies on remittances. In the former optimization problem, the only
parameters to be calibrated are the propensities to remit of migrants, γj (j =
h,l). These parameters are assumed to vary by education level and region of
origin. Disregarding differences by education level, it would be easy to ﬁx γ so
as to perfectly match the remittances/GDP ratios observed in developing regions.
9We model remittances in this way so that migrants and natives have identical asset accumu-
lations. The age-invariance of propensity to remit comes from our assumption that there is no
remittances decay.3.2. THE MODEL 97
However, it is important to capture the potential heterogeneity in propensities to
remit since remittances constitute an important source of income for developing
countries (see Table 1).
Although little attention has been paid to the role of migrants’ skills, the em-
pirical literature on the determinants of remittances is ambiguous. Ratha (2003)
argued that educated migrants earn more and remit more, which suggests that the
cost of the brain drain can be offset by migrants’ transfers. Using aggregate data,
however, Faini(2007)challengedthisviewwithvery different results: theamount
of remittances increases in the number of migrants but decreases with their aver-
age educational attainment. One interpretation is that educated migrants tend to
come from better off families who rely less on remittances for their livelihood.
Another argument is that educated migrants are more likely to settle permanently
and to bring their close family members into the destination country; thus, they
have less incentives to remit. The shortcoming of such type of papers is that they
rely on cross-country data, and therefore, the causality put forward in their argu-
ments is extremely hard to establish, especially as some papers demonstrate that
remittances may alleviate liquidity constraints and allow people to obtain more
education in the origin countries (see Cox Edwards & Ureta (2003) and Duryea
et al. (2005)). Nimii et al. (2008) recently accounted for such endogeneity prob-
lems. Using Instrumental Variable (IV) regressions, they conﬁrm that remittances
are negatively correlated with the average level of schooling of migrants, i.e. the
highly skilled remits less.
In spiteofthisevidence, itdoes notimplythatremittancessent byhigh-skilled
migrants are negligible, particularly if the high-skilled proportion of temporary
migrants increases. For example, Kangasniemi et al. (2007) show that nearly half
of Indian medical doctors working in the United Kingdom send remittances back
to India and that these transfer on average represent 16 percent of the remitters’
income. In addition, cross-country regressions could suffer from a bias of omitted
variable. The average level of schooling of migrants is strongly correlated with
the level of schooling of residents: the more educated residents, the higher their
income and the less they need remittances.
Another source of uncertainty concerns the distributionaleffect of remittances
in therecipient region. Taylor& Wyatt(1996)ﬁnd that remittancesare distributed
rather evenly amongst the sampled income groups in rural Mexico. Moreover,
remittances have the highest shadow value for households at the lower end of
income distribution since the additional income helps to relax credit and risk con-
straints. Hence, they conclude that remittances have an equalizing effect on in-
come inequality at origin. In contrast, Barham & Boucher (1998) argue that the
equalizing effect is found mainly because remittances are treated as an exoge-
nous transfer. Instead, they construct counterfactuals with no migration and no98
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remittances in order to study how they affect income inequality in Blueﬁelds,
Nicaragua. After controlling for self-selection problems, it is found that the po-
tential home earnings of migrants have a more equalizing effect than remittances;
in other words, inequality is deepened with migration and remittances. In addi-
tion, severalstudies showthat therelationshipbetween remittances and inequality
exhibits a Kuznets curve. Stark et al. (1986) and McKenzie & Rapoport (2007)
suggest that the network effect lowers migration costs over time and thus gradu-
ally facilitates migration from the low-income households. Hence, in the begin-
ning when only the high-income households can afford migration costs, inequal-
ity is accentuated because remittances are received at the higher end of income
distribution.
Given the controversies above, we simulate our model with three variants of
remittances behavior, that will be explained in Section 3.4.
Firms. At each period of time and in each region, a representative and proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrm uses efﬁcient labor (Lt) and physical capital (Kt) to produce
a composite good (Yt). As stated in the previous section, we assume a Cobb-





where α measures the share of capital returns in the national product, and At
is an exogenous process representing the Harrod neutral technological progress.
Total efﬁcient labor force combines the demands of highly skilled (Lh
t) and of
low skilled labor (Ll
t) according to the transformation function characterized by a








1/σ, σ < 1 (3.3)
where υt is an exogenous high-skill biased technological progress, and σ is de-
ﬁned as σ=1 −
1
ε, with ε being the elasticity of substitution between high- and
low-skill labor. The capital share in output α is set to one third, as estimated in
the growth accounting literature. We follow Acemoglu (2002) in ﬁxing the elas-
ticity of substitution ε to 1.4 and thus the parameter σ equals to 0.2857 in the
CES function. Regarding the high-skill biased technological change, we apply
the same procedures as for TFP (At) by using skill wage premiums, ht = wh
t /wl
t.
The skill premiums for each region in year 2000 are arbitrarily ﬁxed.10 Then, we
let these values vary according to the pattern of the US college wage premium for
the period 1950-2000 in Acemoglu (2003b).
10h2000 are ﬁxed at 3 (NAM), 2.35 (ADV), 3 (EAS), 3 (MEN), 3.15 (LAC), 3 (JAP), 3.5 (SSA),
3.25 (RUS), 3.25 (CHI) and 3.25 (IND).3.3. INTERPRETATION OF SIMULATED RESULTS 99
Government. Thegovernmentleviestaxesonlaborearningsand onconsumption
expenditures in order to ﬁnance general public consumption, pension beneﬁts and
other welfare transfers. The government also issues bonds and pays interests on
public debt.
The pension system is modeled in a way as to allow for different pension
systems in each region. The regional pension systems are partly Bismarckian
(beneﬁts proportional to wages) and partly Beveridgian (lump-sum beneﬁts). We
usearegion-speciﬁcparametercapturingthewage-related fractionofbeneﬁt. The
government’s budget constraint is satisﬁed at each period by adjusting the wage
tax rate τW
t . Public debt dt is computed from the WDI Database. Exceptions are
the public debt of the ADV and the JAP regions, which are obtained from the
OECD data on Gross Financial Liabilities.
Equilibrium. A competitive equilibrium of the economy with perfect capital
mobility is characterized by (i) households’ and ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions, (ii)
market-clearing conditions on the goods and labor markets, (iii) budget balance
for each regional government, (iv) the equality between the aggregate quantity of
world assets and the quantity of the world capital stock plus the sum of public
debts of all regions, and ﬁnally (v) the arbitrage condition of the rates of return to
capital. The equilibrium on the goods market is achieved by Walras’ law.
3.3 Interpretation of simulated results
In thissection, weinterpretthesimulatedresultsofaselectiveimmigrationpolicy,
which in effect increases by ten percent the outﬂows of emigrants (all assumed
to be highly skilled) from each developing region into the developed world. Our
period of interest is 2000-2100, or the year before the ﬁrst wave of additional
migrantsinthedevelopedregionstotheyearwhenthelastwaveisentirelyretired.
We pay special attention to year 2060, or when the ﬁrst wave of migrants is fully
retired and the last wave fully joins the workforce. The development indicators in
question are deﬁned as follows.
• GDP per capita: total domesticproductiondivided by total population,
Yt
Nt.
• GNI per capita: GNI, composed of GDP minus consumption taxes plus
foreign aid, remittances receipts and net capital inﬂows, divided by total
population.11









3. BRAIN DRAIN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY:
LESSONS FROM A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
A selective immigration policy affects the indicators above through four dif-
ferent channels, including demography, human capital, technological progress,
and information costs/conﬁscation rate. We begin with the discussion with the
disentangled effects on GDP per capita, then we turn our analysis to total impacts
on GDP and GNI per capita, as well as on high-to-low skill inequality.
3.3.1 Disentangled effects on GDP per capita
The disentangled effects on GDP per capita are depicted in Figure 3.7.
Demography. Increased high-skilled emigration acts to reduce the size of the
youngest cohort at origin. While reducing the working age population at origin,
migrants settle in the North and add into the work force at destination.12 This re-
allocation of labor results in higher returns to capital in the technologically more
advanced North, and therefore, labor outﬂow is accompanied by a more than pro-
portional capital ﬂight to the developed regions. As a consequence, GDP per
capita is negatively impacted in the South (see Figure 3.7.a). It is observed that
EAS and LAC experience the largest negative impacts, mainly due to their very
high emigration rates. Although the shock is the same for each region (ten per-
cent increase in emigration ﬂows), additional outﬂows triggered by a selective
immigration policy result in huge losses in the labor force in regions that experi-
ence already large emigration rates. Moreover for EAS, its serious aging problem
further exacerbates the impact of losing working-age population.
Human capital. On the one hand, increased high-skilled emigration acts to re-
duce the average human capital of the youngest cohort, by changing its skill com-
position. On the other hand, however, it may induce more human capital forma-
tion throughthe so-called brain gain effect. Figure 3.7.b depictsthe isolatedeffect
of human capital on GDP per capita. For regions where this incentive effect more
than fully compensates for the loss of the high-skilled youngsters, a more skilled
working force contributes positively to GDP per capita. For instance in RUS,
the effect is always positive. For regions with signiﬁcant high-skilled emigration
rates, however, a selective immigration policy tends to worsen brain drain. EAS
experiences the worst impact, and it is closely followed by LAC and SSA.
Technological progress. The distance to the technology frontier is affected by
increased high-skilled emigration, as it modiﬁes human capital at origin and the
12When isolating the effect of mt, the total amount of remittances receipts are kept constant at
the baseline. This means that remittances receipts per capita change since the population at origin
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size of high-skilled diaspora abroad (and therefore the capacity of a region to
innovate or to adopt).
Given this mechanism, it is found that MEN and IND experience positive ef-
fects in terms of GDP per capita, thanks to technological progress through adop-
tion, that is enhanced by enlarged high-skilled diaspora. For more advanced re-
gions, however, an increase in the number of emigrants has negative effects on
technology, and consequently on GDP per capita, due to loss of high-skill work-
ers who are crucial in terms of innovation. For instance, CHI is close enough to
the frontier to experience a negative effect in terms of GDP per capita. In general,
for all the regions the effect is relatively small.
Transaction costs. Transactioncosts, orthe informationrelated conﬁscation rate,
πt, may be reduced by the high-skilled diaspora externality. As our shock in-
creases the size of the high-skilled diaspora abroad, it reduces the conﬁscation
rate and stimulates ceteris paribus foreign direct investments at origin for all the
regions. With more FDI, capital inputs are increased and, consequently, total do-
mestic production, thus contributing to positive effects on GDP per capita. The
effect is quite important for all the regions. In particular, the largest effects occur
in MEN and in LAC, regions with the largest change in high-skilled diaspora. In
contrast, as CHI has a small increase in diaspora in relative terms, the change in








































































Figure 3.7: Disentangling the change in GDP per capita
a. Through demography b. Through human capital
c. Through technological progress d. Through transaction costs3.3. INTERPRETATION OF SIMULATED RESULTS 103
3.3.2 Total impact
GDP per capita. The total impact of a selective immigration policy on GDP per
capita mainly results from the interplay between changes in demography and in
transaction costs. The overall effects are positive for MEN, SSA, IND, and RUS,
ranging from 0.22% to 0.67% in 2060 (see Figure 3.8.a). The major contributor
is the diaspora externality, for that it brings in more FDI due to lower informa-
tion costs. Moreover, these regions suffer only slightly in terms of working-age
population, either because they have a relatively low-skill labor force or their
high-skilled emigration rates are not very high. In contrast, despite a decreased
conﬁscation rate, the total effects are negative for EAS and LAC. This is because
both regions are encountered with signiﬁcant high-skill emigration rates, and as
already mentioned, there is a serious aging problem occurring in EAS; more-
over, LAC experiences very negative changes in terms of technology, which fur-
ther damage its domestic production. Lastly for CHI, the total impact is slightly
negative mainly due to the adverse effect of high-skill emigration on technology
innovation.
GNI per capita. In terms of GNI per capita, the channels at work are the same
as for GDP per capita, except that remittances also come into play and act to
alleviate the negative impact on GDP per capita. In fact, from the perspective of
migrant sending regions, the direct impact of an enlarged diaspora is to increase
the amount of remittances receipts, and the impact is rather sizable (see Figure
3.8.b). It is the largest in MEN, which is also the region with the largest increase
in remittances thanks to a selective immigration policy. Moreover, remittances
receipts have a very signiﬁcant poverty-reducing effect for poorer regions, such
as SSA, where even a very small amount of remittances can account for a large
part of national income.
The total impact is generally positive for all regions and at all periods after
the shock (see Figure 3.8.c). The optimistic overall effects mainly come from
two sources: i) increased GDP per capita through more FDI, and ii) remittances
receipts, with the former contributing more to enhancing GNI per capita. The
only exception is EAS in 2060, when it experiences the worse impact in terms
of domestic demographic structure. This negative demographic effect outweighs
its large increases in remittances receipts, which have a less pronounced effect in
EAS when compared to more impoverished regions.
Inequality. So faras thehigh-to-lowskillinequalityisconcerned, thetotalimpact
is mostly driven by the effect on skill composition of human capital, which leads
to changes in the skill premium. That is to say, inequality falls (rise) in regions
with net brain gain (drain).104
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In regions where the brain gain effect is absent, reductions in the size of
youngest cohort bring down the average skill level in the source economy since
younger cohorts in the model are more skilled than the previous generations (see
Section 3.2.1). Hence, when skilled labor becomes scarcer, the skill premium
goes up and skilled-to-unskilled income inequality worsens. This is especially
the case for SSA, for that it has a very low level of human capital to begin with.
MEN and LAC are the two exceptions, however, where remittances increase by
thehighestdegreeand contributethemostto inequalityreduction, underan equal-
sharing scenario for remittances.
Last yet not the least, it follows from Beine et al. (2008) that regions with the
largest high-skill emigration rates are those who do not beneﬁt from brain gain
but suffer brain drain. In the meantime, they are also the regions that are most
seriously impacted, in terms of demography, by the high-skill biased immigration
policy. Thus, when a region (e.g. EAS) ﬁnds its GDP per capita adversely im-
pacted mainly due to a strong demographic impact, it will also ﬁnd that it is its







































Figure 3.8: Total impact on GDP/GNI per capita and inequality
a. Total impact on GDP per capita b. Effect of remittances on GNI per capita
c. Total impact on GNI per capita d. Total impact on inequality106
3. BRAIN DRAIN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY:
LESSONS FROM A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
3.4 Robustness checks
In this section, several alternative assumptions are introduced as robustness
checks to our main results.
Alternative remittances behavior. We denote a migrant’s propensity to remit as
γj, j = h,l. We have 3 different alternative remittances behaviors. Scenarios 1
and 2 differ in the ratio of high-to-low skill migrants’ propensities to remit. Sce-
nario 1 assumesγl = γh and thus ﬁts Ratha (2003)where he argues that high-skill
migrants send more remittances due to higher earnings. Scenario 2 corresponds
to Faini (2007) and Nimii et al. (2008) and assumes γl > γh = 0.7γl: given other
things equal, high-skill migrants remit less. On the other hand, Scenarios 2 and
3 distinguish in the ways remittances are distributed. While variant 2 assumes an
income equalizing effect of remittances in the same spirit as in Taylor & Wyatt
(1996), Scenario 3 considers that (low-) high-skill only remit to (low-) high-skill
individuals and thus high-skill households are the major recipients of remittances
under brain drain.
Notice that, when calibrated to the ofﬁcial remittances data for the period
2000, it is apparently not viable that high-skill migrants have a much lower
propensity to remit when compared to the low skilled. Otherwise, remittances
from the low-skilledmigrants will have to account for an unreasonably high share
of total remittances receipts. It is unreasonable because low-skilled emigrants
then remit a very high fraction, even more than 100%, of their total income to
their regions of origin.
These alternative remitting behaviors lead to little changes in the impacts on
GDP and GNI per capita, while obviously, Scenario 3 strongly exacerbates in-
equality in each region.
No Remittances. The effects of a brain gain are also analyzed within a variant
where migration entails no money transfers back to origin regions. As observed
before, remittances do not affect GDP per capita and a brain gain leads to similar
results under the ‘no remittances’ variant as in the central variant when remit-
tances are present. However, the beneﬁcial effect of remittances in terms of GNI
per capita and inequality is lost in the ‘no remittances’ variant. Thus GNI per
capita is less improved and inequality less reduced by high-skill emigration. In
the case of Latin America, GNI per capita would even be reduced and inequality
increased.
Brain drain vs brain gain. In the brain drain (BD) scenario the incentive effect
for human capital formation is absent. Thus the impact on GDP per capita and
GNI per capita is more pessimistic for all the regions. We saw in the previous
section that, under the ‘brain gain’ scenario, human capital was not the most im-
portant factor in explaining the change in GDP per capita. The reason is that the3.4. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 107
externality of high-skill emigration on human capital formation is important to
prevent a huge drop in the level human capital and may even lead to higher level
after emigration. In fact, it can be observed that, in the absence of this side-effect
of high-skill emigration, GDP per capita is quite negatively impacted. Since the
high-to-lowskillinequalityis largelydetermined bytheskillpremium, changes in
the average skill level of the labor force are negatively associated with changes in
inequality. Therefore, in the brain drain scenario high-skill labor is more scarce,
inequality increases in all the regions.
Brain waste. Brain waste implies that additional high-skill migrants are em-
ployed as low skilled in the destination regions and impacts negatively all indica-
tors. GDP per capita is depressed since the new migrants do not increase the size
of the high-skill diaspora and do thus not contribute to reducing information costs
for foreign investors. Additionally, the total amounts of remittances are lower
than in the benchmark due to lower earnings of the new migrants. This further
depresses GNI per capita and brings about a lower inequality-reducing effect of
remittances.
Less optimistic network effects. In this alternative scenario the long-run elastic-
ity of the diaspora effect on the conﬁscation rate is lower than in the benchmark.13
Since FDI inﬂows brought by reduced information costs are very important for
GDP and GNIpercapita, predictionson both indicatorsare morepessimistic. The
change in inequality is negligible since it does not affect the skill premium.
Low skilled. The ‘low-skilled’ scenario considers that the additional emigrants
are all low skilled and that low-skilled migration entails no externalities on the
incentives to educate, technology diffusion and foreign direct investments. In-
creased low-skilledmigrationraisestheproportionofhighlyskilledinthesending
regions and has a similar negative impact on demography as high-skill migration.
The positive effect on human capital is however not sufﬁcient to compensate for
the demographic impact and for the fact that low-skilled migrants do stimulate
foreign direct investments. low-skilled migration leads thus to more pessimistic
results on GDP and GNI per capita. An exception is the Indian world, which
sees its GDP per capita enhanced even under low-skilled migration. The reason is
that this region suffers relatively little from the negative demographic effects, has
a relatively smaller emigration rate and beneﬁts relatively little from the exter-
nality of FDI to high-skill migration. Moreover, despite the fact that low-skilled
migrants have a higher propensity to remit than high-skill ones, the amounts of
remittances will be lower than under high-skill emigration and contribute thus to
13It is set to 0.53 as it is obtained from the cross-country regression in Docquier & Lodigiani
(2009), compared to scenario 1 where the long-run elasticity is set to 0.75 as it is obtained from
the panel regression.108
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further depress GNI per capita. Finally, inequality may either be exacerbated or
reduced compared to a ‘brain gain’ scenario. The harmful effect on inequality
due to lower amounts of remittances may be counterbalanced by a reduced skill























Figure 3.9: Robustness analysis on GDP
a. Alternative remittances scenarios b. Brain Gain c. Brain Waste








































































Figure 3.10: Robustness analysis on GNI per capita
a. Alternative remittances scenarios b. Brain Gain c. Brain Waste























Figure 3.11: Robustness analysis on inequality
a. Alternative remittances scenarios b. Brain Gain c. Brain Waste
d. Less optimistic network effects e. No Remittances f. Low-skilled emigration112
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
Brain drain has long been a major source of concerns, especially when it involves
South-North high-skill migration. By combining major results of existing theo-
retical and empirical literature in a general equilibrium framework of the world
economy, the major contribution of this paper is to provide a more thorough anal-
ysis regarding the total effects of high-skilled biased out-migration on the devel-
oping countries.
It is found that the empirically observed diaspora externality on FDI inﬂows
may have signiﬁcant contributions to domestic production at origin, and hence,
when this effect is ignored, the negative impacts of brain drain could be overes-
timated. Similarly, the incentive effect on human capital formation contributes
to alleviate the negative impact of a loss in the high-skill labor force on GDP
per capita, as it prevents huge drops in the level of human capital. Furthermore
it may help to reduce the high-to-low skill inequality in regions experiencing a
“brain gain”. Moreover, in spite of the concern expressed by many that a more
selective immigration policy in the North may do little to enhance the beneﬁts of
remittances to the South as some studies show that the highly skilled remit less,
it is found in our robustness checks that the total effects on GNI per capita do not
vary much with different propensities to remit for the high-skill migrants.
All in all, our paper highlights the signiﬁcance of the high-skill diaspora in
attracting FDI, which enhances GDP and GNI per capita and the importance of
the brain gain effect in reducing income inequality. Moreover, it reconﬁrms the
role of remittances in subsidizing the income of those left behind and shows that
the effects are robust to different remitting behaviors. However, it also dismisses
the relevance of some feedback effects that are argued to enhance domestic pro-
duction at origin, such as the diaspora externality that promotes technological
diffusion. Although our results present a more optimistic picture of brain drain,
its destructive impacts on domestic production are still overwhelming in regions
already facing large outﬂows of their highly skilled and talented. Finally, the de-







Abstract. We study climate change and international migration in a two-country over-
lapping generations model with endogenous climate change. Our main ﬁndings are that
climate change increases migration; small impacts of climate change have signiﬁcant
impacts on the number of migrants; a laxer immigration policy increases long-run mi-
gration, aggravates climate change, increases North-South inequality if climate change
impacts are not too small; a greener technology reduces long-run migration, provides a
double-dividend in favor of the environment, reduces inequality if the migrants’ impact
to overall climate change is large. The preference over the policies depends on whether
the policy maker targets inequality, wealth, the number of migrants or the environment.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F 22, J 61, O 13
Keywords: climate change, migration, North-South model.1
1This chapter is a joint work with Ingmar Schumacher.
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4. WHEN NATURE REBELS:
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, CLIMATE CHANGE AND INEQUALITY
4.1 Introduction
Without doubt there is a growing concern over how and whether climate change
will affect international migration. Although the economic literature has dealt
with many aspects of migration, the treatment of the relationship between climate
change and migration has not yet been satisfactory. Our focus in this article is to
shed some light on the interaction between endogenous climate change, interna-
tional migration, optimal migratory policies and inequality.
The recently published Stern review on climate change advances an unam-
biguous message: “An overwhelming body of scientiﬁc evidence now clearly
indicates that climate change is a serious and urgent issue. The Earth’s climate is
rapidly changing, mainly as a result of increases in greenhouse gases caused by
human activities” (Stern, 2007, p.3). This claim is without a doubt now a widely
accepted fact in the scientiﬁc community. Another commonly anticipated point is
that the “poorest countries will be especially hard hit by climate change, with mil-
lions potentially pushed deeper into poverty” (Stern, 2007, p.487). Possible and
predicted effects of climate change include land loss due to sea level rise, loss of
biodiversity, productivity declines, warmer and drier climates or wetter regions
and more extreme weather events, see IPCC (2007).
As some regions are proner to be affected by several of these adverse effects
thanothers, itseemslogicalthatinhabitantsoftheseregionswilltry toavoidthose
effects. However, many poor regions either lack ﬁnances to abate or they do not
emit enough to have any signiﬁcant impacts from abatement activity. Usually,
mitigation or adaptation are then proposed as the only possible ways of dealing
with these problems. As ought to be clear however, those regions that are already
extremely poor and vulnerable even before climate change impacts them, will be
unable to mitigateor adapt in the usual sense. Therefore, very often the only hope
left for people is to move away from the inhabitable area to one which might give
them better living conditions.
It is this particular setting which shall be investigated in this article. We shall
focus on the link from human activity over climate change to international migra-
tion. The main questions which we wish to explore are the following: What are
the environmental reasons for people to migrate? What are the welfare effects?
What could potentially be welfare-improving? Which are the effects of different
policies?
It is well-known that the effects of climate change are difﬁcult to measure.
The evident lack of strong data thus requires a more thorough theoretical analysis
of a kind which we intend to pursue here. The ﬁrst section shall give an overview
of the data which exist on international migration and climate change. We then
build upon a model similar of Galor (1986) and investigate, step-by-step, the key
issues driving migration in a two-country, overlapping generations world with4.2. CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: FACTS AND FUTURE 117
climate change and migration. As climate change is a long-term phenomenon we
shall mainly focus on the steady state perspective, but nevertheless allow for the
effects of short-run interactions.
Migration between two countries or regions has traditionally been analyzed
within the Harris-Todaro model (Harris & Todaro, 1970), see also Ghatak et al.
(1996) for a survey. The model of Harris and Todaro explains rural-urban migra-
tion in a general equilibrium model. However, the static framework of the Harris
and Todaro model may miss endogenous feedbacks or can only assume these ex-
ogenously. Models which are able to analyze these feedbacks are two country
models like Galor (1986). He analyzes the welfare effect of migration in a two-
country overlapping generations model where he allows for bilateral migration
where migration decisions are mainly driven by differences in preferences. Cret-
tez et al. (1996)extend Galor’s model to includeland as a third productionfactor.2
Here we shall focus on climate change as a possible driver behind migration de-
cisions.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows: (i) climate change will most likely increase
overall migration; (ii) even small impacts of climate change can have signiﬁcant
impacts on the number of migrants; (iii) taking responsibility for its externality
a laxer Northern immigration policy will increase world migration and worsen
climate change; (iv) North-South inequality may increase or decrease via appro-
priate green or immigration policy; Finally, the type of policy is crucial for the
preference over the one or the other, especially if the North tries to pursue several
targets simultaneously. The targets we look at are welfare, the policy’s implica-
tion for climate change on the effect on North-South inequality.
4.2 Climate change and migration: facts and future
This section is designated to provide an overview of important facts on climate
change and migration, as well as to present reasons for the particular assumptions
which we use later throughout the article. In the ﬁrst part we summarize key facts
on climatechangeand in thesecondpart we focus ontheenvironmentas aleading
cause of migration.
2The literature has also focused on the impact of migration on the economy of the destination
and origin countries. Migration can affect labor market outcomes such as wages (Borjas, 2003)or
unemployment (Bencivenga & Smith, 1997), pension systems (Razin & Sadka, 1999) or human
capital formation (Vidal, 1998) and growth (Beine et al., 2001b).118
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4.2.1 Climate change
The IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) concludes that the emission of green-
house gases from human production activity led to an increase in CO2 equivalent
concentrations from 290 ppm to 440 ppm during the course of the past 150 years.
The more greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere the more they will pre-
vent the infrared radiation emitted by the sun to escape the atmosphere of the
Earth. This then leads to a warming which is expected to lie anywhere between
2 ◦C and 6 ◦C for the next 100 years, depending on the path we humans choose
for economic development (see IPCC 2001 ). Most of these increases in green-
house gases must be attributed to the rich countries. For example, the estimates
provided by Enerdata in its Energy Statistics Yearbook suggest that the European
Union, North America and Japan together account for close to 60% of annual
world emissions, even though they host only 16% of the world population.
The main reason for this disparity is the use of the amount of primary energy
resources in production, which accounts for most of the CO2 emitted into the at-
mosphere. According to the International Energy Agency, in 2004 approx. 80%
of world total primary energy supply came from oil, coal and gas. The use of
these inputs differs drastically between the developed world and the less devel-
oped world. Estimates from the International Energy Annual 2004 suggest that
Northern America, Europe, Japan and China together account for roughly 65% of
the total world primary energy use. In comparison to this, the Least Developed
Countries use roughly 5% of total world primary energy (IEA, 2004). Therefore,
the developed world is the main emitter of CO2 and thus responsible for most of
the human-induced climate change.
The costs of climate change can vary drastically, depending on the size of the
change in temperature. Whereas the IPPC in various publications suggests that an
increase of 2◦C from pre-industrial levels may lead to economic costs in the range
of 2% to 5% of GWP per year, increases above that level may lead to potentially
catastrophic costs.
In addition, the distribution of the damages is extremely particular to regions.
It is expected that the less developed countries will have to face close to 80% of
the world damages from climate change. This is particularly troublesome for sev-
eral reasons. Mostofthedevelopingcountriesalreadyfacetheproblemofbinding
income constraints. It is estimated that in 2004 around 800 million people were
at risk of hunger (FAO 2004) and malnutrition accounts for approximately four
million deaths annually. It is believed that half of those deaths from malnutrition
arise in Africa alone. The current estimates suggest that a temperature increase
of 2-3◦C will potentially raise the number of people at risk of hunger by 30-200
million. If the temperature increases by more than 3◦C, which is a likely scenario
of the IPCC, then the number of people facing hunger could increase by an ad-4.2. CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: FACTS AND FUTURE 119
ditional 250-500 million. It is also believed that most of these will be observed
in Africa and Western Asia (Warren et al., 2006). The World Health Organiza-
tion even estimates that an additional one to three million people will then die
from malnutrition, diarrhea or malaria. For example, Swart et al. (1998) estimate
that temperate cereals might be faced by yield decreases of up to 22%, thereby
substantially increasing food shortages.
Another problem of the effects of climate change concerns the productive
capacity of countries. For example, the value added to GDP from agriculture
is around 33% for less developed countries, whereas for upper middle income
countries only 6.2% (WDI 2007). In addition, around 54% of the developing
world’s population works in the agricultural sector but only 7% of the developed
countries’ population. These numbers can be up to 90% high for someof the Sub-
Saharan Countries (FAO 2004). The temperature in those countries increased
on average by 3◦C during the past decade whereas the total amount of rainfall
decreased by roughly 4% between 1960 and 2000. Some countries even face
decreases up to 20% like Burundi or Rwanda. This suggests that overall these
countries have become drier. If they however face binding income constraints,
have a high share of agriculture in GDP and in addition if most of the population
is rural and works in the agricultural sectors, then these countries will face more
severe consequences from climate change than can initially be grasped.
Remark 1 Two preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the analysis
above:
(1) Developed countries are the main emitters and therefore the predominant
source of human induced climate change,
(2) Developing countries are likely to face the strongest impact of climate
change.
4.2.2 Migration
Here we wish to give a list of examples where migration occurred due to envi-
ronmental factors. We shall then proceed to investigate what several researchers
suggest will be the future of migration from climate change in particular.
Examples are, contrary to what some critics might suggest, in fact abundant.
A quick reading of the existing literature provides many cases. For example,
droughts in the US displaced more than 30,000 people in the 1930s (Rosenzweig
& Hillel, 1993); a tsunami in Indonesia in 2004 displaced 500,000 people (FIG
2006); droughts in Burkina Faso or Sudan from 1968-1973 displaced around
1,000,000 people (Afolayan & Adelekan, 1999; Hugo, 1996). For more exam-
ples, see e.g. McLeman (2006), Ezra (2001), Morris et al. (2002), Kaye (1994).
For a critical opinion see Black (2001).120
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Several of these cases deserve an additional remark. In Sudan it seems that
only a part of the household migrates (the male usually) and then returns after
the drought stops. Similar observations hold for Ethiopia where the young gen-
erations seem of migration when droughts occur (Afolayan & Adelekan, 1999).
This suggests two possibilities: either the costs to migrate are too high for ev-
eryone to bear such that only a part of the household is able to leave; or people
are particularly attached to their homes and expect better times to come again.
However, these droughts usually last a short period of time and are therefore only
transitory. One would expect that areas where irreversible changes in the climate
lead to a permanently higher level of aridity would not see return migration. This
is supported two-folded by Henry et al. (2004). Firstly, for the case of Burkina
Faso they show that people from arid regions are more likely to migrate (tem-
porarily and permanently) than those from wetter regions. Secondly they suggest
that long-run “migrations are likely to be more inﬂuenced by a slow-acting pro-
cess such as land degradationthan by episodiceventssuch as droughts.” A similar
conclusion is drawn by Chen et al. (2007), who suggest the population distribu-
tion in China depends mainly on the proportion of arable land. Therefore, if that
proportion changes due to environmental deterioration one must also expect a
change in the population distribution.
Apart from droughts one can observe that extreme weather events also lead
to permanent migration. For example, according to Morris et al. (2002), after a
strong hurricane in Honduras and Nicaragua in 1998 the amount of migrants to
the US and adjacent countries rose sharply. Clearly, economic deprivation thus
induces people to migrate, but it can also simply be in order to avoid the same
event happening in the future. For example, even one year after the Hurricane
Katrina had passed, Louisiana had a 4.87% lower population due to emigration
(Christie, 2006).
In Indonesia a tsunami in 2004 displaced around 500,000 people (Interna-
tional Federation of Surveyors (FIG 2006) internally, meaning they did not leave
the country. However, one can expect that they increased the economic and social
pressures in the areas they moved into and will therefore effect the migration de-
cisions in those places. Thus, people who were before on the brink of migrating
might now ﬁnally decide to move.
Remark 2 From this quick overview we can draw a particular conclusion:
Permanent migrationseems to occur because of irreversibleor long-lasting prob-
lems like desertiﬁcation or continuous environmental degradation which removes
the subsistence possibility of people; or simply because people expect further ex-
treme events in the future and try to avoid these.
These results therefore point toward a further analysis of the effects which
climate change has on the expected future migration decisions.4.2. CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: FACTS AND FUTURE 121
It is estimated that the amount of people affected by natural disasters has
tripled to a staggering number of 2 billion people over the course of one decade
only. Approximately 211 million people are believed to be affected each year.
Scientiﬁc evidence suggests that this amount is likely to increase the larger the
change in temperature from climate change, as this leads to more ﬂoods, extreme
weather events and desertiﬁcation (IPCC, Stern review).
Also, as approximately two billion people are living in arid, semi-arid and
sub-humid regions, one can expect that only small climatic changes will induce
particularly large damages there. For example, it is suggested that the resilience
of many arid regions is already weakened. Estimates conclude that up to 20 per-
cent of drylands are degraded, droughts seem to become more frequent ((Millen-
nium Ecosystem Assessment, MA 2003), groundwater depletion intensiﬁes and
groundwater quality deteriorates due to increased fertilizer use (Brown, 2000;
Brown et al., 1988). It is thus clear that if the temperature and the weather vari-
ability increase as is expected, then the resilience of the ecosystems will have
difﬁculties to support further stresses.
Many people will then only have the option to leave their homes in order to
ﬁnd a place which is able to support them. For example, the number of migrants
increases annually by approximately three million people, half of which come
from Africa. It is believed that most of these come from rural areas with severe
land degradation. Estimates suggest that more than 135 million people could be
at risk of needing to migrate due to desertiﬁcation alone (INCCCD, 1994), and
roughly 200 million due to sea-level rise (Myers, 1996). If desertiﬁcation and
land degradation thus continues as expected, then the number of migrants will
shoot up, too.
Anotherreason formigrationcan be theeffect of climatechange on health and
thus working ability. Flavin & Tunali (1998) inform that illnesses like cholera,
malaria and others are very likely to spread vastly due to increased temperatures
and higher humidity. They inform that an increase of around 3◦C can potentially
increase mosquito-transmitted diseases by up to two times in tropical regions and
by up to 10 times in areas like Europe. Higher water temperatures can increase
the production of algae, which again can increase the probability of cholera out-
breaks. It is estimated that around 3 million people die from malaria each year
with up to 500 million suffering near fatal consequences. Additionally, around
17.3 million deaths worldwide (around 33% of total) are believed to be caused
by infectious diseases. These deaths are thought to be caused due to shortages of
water which result in more use of contaminated water and lower cleanliness (see
WHO, 1996). The dark ﬁgures for lost working hours due to illness from infec-
tious diseases should by far exceed the deaths. If we use the same ratio as near
fatal consequences to fatalities for malaria (ratio of 170), this leads to a (certainly122
4. WHEN NATURE REBELS:
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, CLIMATE CHANGE AND INEQUALITY
too large) ﬁgure of 3 billion people losing some working hours. This however
can provide some estimate for lost working hours or reduction in productivity. If
this extrapolation is only marginally correct, then this presumes a strong effect of
climate change on productivity.
Faced withtheseﬁgures onecannot easily reject theneed to furtherinvestigate
the impact of climate change on migration and its feedbacks. We shall therefore
develop a theoretical model which incorporates these feedbacks. Through this
we expect to add to the understanding of the relationship between the economy,
migration and climate change.
4.3 The Model
Here we construct a two-country, general equilibrium, overlapping generations
model. As we wish to concentrate on analyzing international migration we shall
simply assume that ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizers in a perfectly competitive world
with international capital mobility. Generations however ﬁrst analyze how much
welfare they are likely to obtain at home and then compare this to the welfare
they might get from migrating to another region. In case migration is expected
to leave them better off, then they shall migrate. Our approach is designed to
understand, step-by-step, the welfare implications from migration when climate
change plays a signiﬁcant role for welfare. Most of the article will concern itself
with the steady-state perspective of our dynamic model. In terms of notation we
shall denote with small letters per capita, with large letters total population. The
ﬁrst subscript refers to the country, the second to the point in time. We write
subscript i to denote a solution which applies to both North and South, such that
i = N,S. Constant returns to scale will be abbreviated by CRTS, decreasing
returns to scale by DRTS and total factor productivity by TFP.
4.3.1 The ﬁrm’s problem
We assumethat in each region there existsa representativeﬁrm which produces in
a perfectly competitive market using capital and labor as inputs. The production
functionin each country isofa Cobb-Douglastypewhereweallowfor decreasing
returns to scale, such that Yit = AitKα
itL
β
it, and α + β < 1.
The discussion on whether production is subject to DRTS or CRTS has been
ongoing for quite some while. DRTS have also been used in theoretical models
by e.g. Facchini & Willmann (2005) and are empirically supported by the estima-
tions of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), see Badri Narayanan G. and
Terrie L. Walmsley, Editors (2008), as well as by other empirical studies (Basu &
Fernald, 1997). On the one hand, DRTS makes one vulnerable to the replication4.3. THE MODEL 123
argument, which is solely a theoretical argument suggesting that a ﬁrm producing
under DRTS can split in two and thereby increase overall output. On the other
hand, DRTS seems to be a realistic assumption given the empirical evidence that
has accumulated during the recent years (see GTAP dataset). We decided to give
up a slight amount of theoretical rigor in favor of what is the apparently more
realistic assumption. A partial reconciliation between the use of DRTS and the
replication argument is that allowing for DRTS can also imply that one views
other unpriced and roughly constant factors (like land or other externalities) as












i (see also Cigno, 1981, for a model with a three factor CRTS
production function and endogenous population).
TFP in the North is constant, ANt = AN, whereas the one in the South is
ASt = AS(Tt), where Tt is the change in temperature at time t from human in-
duced climate change. We view this as a proxy for the effect that climate change
bears on production. The assumption of climate change affecting TFP can be
rationalized by taking TFP as accounting for any residual factor of production
which is unpriced. Firstly, assume TFP accounts for the amount of land used in
production, then increases in the sea-level or desertiﬁcation reduce the amount
and productivity of land. Secondly, assume TFP captures health effects, then
one can argue that climate change is expected to increase the amount of malaria
which has signiﬁcant impacts on the health and thus productivity of workers. The
assumption that climate change only impacts the South derives from the observa-
tions presented in the previous section.
Assumption 1 We assume AS(T) ≥ AS(T), ∀T > T.
T denotes the level of temperate without human induced climate change. This
assumption allows us to compare the different scenarios with and without climate
change.










Following Hahn & Solow (1995) we assume that in the case of DRTS the excess
proﬁts are distributed to the investors, which is the young generation of the pre-
vious period, such that Πit = (1 − β)AitKα
itL
β
it, which gives a return to a unit of
capital of





In the case of CRTS, we would have 1 − β = α and there would not be excess
proﬁts.124
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4.3.2 The generation’s problem
Here we shall only analyze migration from the South to the North, in line with
empirical observations. The generations in the South choose according to a two-
step procedure. In the ﬁrst step they calculate their maximum utility at home (this
step is equivalently done by the North). In the second step they calculate whether
it is more proﬁtable for them to migrate or to stay in their home country.
In the ﬁrst step we thus have
max
sit
log(cit) + ρlog(dit+1) subject to (4.3)
wit = sit + cit, (4.4)
Rit+1sit = dit+1, (4.5)
for i = N,S, where wit refers to wages in region i at timet, log(cit)+ρlog(dit+1)
is the utility of consuming cit when young and dit+1 when old, ρ ∈ (0,1) is the
discount factor, sit are the savings and Rit+1 the return on the savings. This
gives sit = ρwit/(1 + ρ). Consumption will thus be cit = wit/(1 + ρ) and
dit+1 = ρwitRit+1/(1 + ρ). We write indirect utility in the steady state as











In the second step the agents from the South compare whether their lifetime util-
ity will be higher when migrating, and if this is the case then they migrate North.
If an agent wants to migrate, this will cost him an amount cNx and dNx, where
x ∈ (0,1) reﬂects adaptation costs in various forms. This gives a lifetime utility
of uNm = log(xwNt) + ρlog(xdNt+1) for agents that migrate North. We wish
to keep these migration costs as general as possible, allowing for both subjective
and ﬁnancial costs. Our preferred interpretation is subjective costs, which are re-
ﬂected in the ex ante probability of ﬁnding a job or in the welfare loss (expressed
in consumption units) of having to adopt to different cultures and circumstances.
In this sense, we avoid putting an explicit structure behind the level of migration
costs. Governmentpoliciesobviouslyalso affects migratorycosts. Whereas some
countries are rather liberal towards the amount of migrants they take, other coun-
tries restrict the inﬂow of migrants and regions like the EU even build migratory
camps in Africa to catch potential migrants even before they can attempt to cross
the boarder. When agents thus compare indirect utilities, then they calculate
∆ = ˜ uNm − ˜ uS, if ˜ uNm > ˜ uS,
= 0 if ˜ uNm ≤ ˜ uS.4.3. THE MODEL 125
If this difference is positive, then a proportion of the generation in the South will
migrate to the North.3
From this we obtain that an agent born in the South is in equilibrium indiffer-
















The population accumulates according to LNt+1 = LNt + mSt+1LSt and
LSt+1 = LSt − mSt+1LSt, where mSt ≥ 0 refers to the percent of people mi-
grating in that point of time. We denote the total population which has migrated
as
 t
τ=1 mτLτ−1 = Mt. In the steady state we then have LN = ¯ LN + M and
LS = ¯ LS − M, where M ≥ 0.
4.3.3 International capital market
In the framework presented here we can solve for both the case of no trade in cap-
ital and for the case of free trade. We assume that capital depreciates fully during
the course of one generation. This assumption for example ﬁnds support in de la
Croix & Michel (2002). No international capital mobility implies that savings sit
in one region become the capital kit = Kit/Lit of that region in the next period,
sit = kit+1. Free capital mobility requires that total world capital stock is equal to
total world savings, such that LNt+1kNt+1 +LSt+1kSt+1 = LNtsNt +LStsSt, and
perfect competition on the international capital market implies RN = RS, ∀t.
Henceforth we shall denote frictionless international capital markets as inte-
grated and the case of no international capital mobility shall be called autarky.
We already start with a ﬁrst important result which we provide in the subsequent
proposition.
Proposition 1 Given the optimization problem of the ﬁrm and the problem of the
generations, the long-run results of the integrated case are equivalent to those of
the autarky case.
Proof 1 In the autarky case the interest rate is given by Ri =
(1−β)(1+ρ)
βρ . As both
β and ρ are the same for North and South this implies that both interests rates are








 β  1
α−1
KN, which together with the clearing of the world capital
3Modeling migration decisions in this way is common in the literature and implies that a
decline in Southern income stimulates migration pressure. However it is important to have in
mindthat a decreasingincomein low-incomecountriesmayalso leadto a reductionin the number
of emigrants if liquidity constraints become more binding.126
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market implies that the long-run capital stock is the same in both the integrated
and autarky cases. 
This proposition therefore allows us to derive the results without having to subse-
quently compare both the integrated and the autarky case.4 We remind the reader
that this result only holds in the long-run at the steady state. Whether one allows
for autarky or integrated markets will nevertheless have a signiﬁcant impact on
the transition period with the main impact being on the speed of convergence. In
the following sections we therefore focus on the long-run steady state and assume
integrated markets.
4.3.4 The climate sector
The climate sector is as follows: The total stock of North’s capital drives the
amount of emissions of CO2 equivalent gases, denoted Et. CO2 equivalent con-
centrations Zt are increased by emissions and reduced by a natural decay. The
resulting temperature is non-linearly increased by CO2 equivalent concentrations.
Et =  KNt (4.8)
Zt = (1 − δ)Zt−1 + γEt,
∆Tt = g(Zt),
with g′(Z) > 0 and g′′(Z) < 0 and initial condition T0 = T. Then, the tem-
perature change from human production activities affects the productivity in the
South, such that ASt = AS(Tt). Our interpretation of the temperature change
is that it measures the deviation from the pre-industrial climate level caused by
productive activity.
As observed in the previous section, we assume that emissions from the South
are negligible. This assumption is even strengthened if we were to consider the
South as being composed of small developing countries only. We know that
large emerging economies like China or India represent 18.4% and 4.9% of the
world’s CO2 emissions in 2004, while Western Europe, United States, Canada
and Japan contribute together 46% of total emissions. African countries and other
developingcountries like Bangladesh or small Paciﬁc Islands represent negligible
amounts of the world’s CO2 emissions.
4It should be clear that this result only holds if preference and production parameters are the
same and in the absence of any taxation or subsidy.4.4. SOLVING THE MODEL 127
4.4 Solving the model





i , where AS = AS(KN) (4.9)
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KN, (4.11)


























LN + LS = ¯ LN + ¯ LS. (4.16)
To remind, we have AS = AS(T) with A′
S(T) < 0. At steady state we know that
temperature is a function of the capital stock in the North and with some abuse of
notation we shall denote AS(T) simply as AS(KN). Equation (4.9) gives wages
in each country, (4.10) the interest obtained on investinga unit of capital, (4.11) is
equality of interest rates on the international market, (4.12) is the market clearing
condition for capital due to international capital mobility, (4.13) gives optimal
savings in each country, (4.14) holds if no one from country i wants to migrate to
country j, and (4.15) is the steady state temperature, a proxy for climate change.
For the moment we shall not introduce any policy considerations yet.
Thefollowingassumptionisbasedonempiricalevidenceandhelpsustofocus
our analysis.
Assumption 2 Throughout the article we assume that AN0 > AS0, meaning that
TFP intheNorth is higher att = 0 thanin theSouth. Furthermore, inaccordance
with the data, we have ¯ LN < ¯ LS.
Though the model implicitly allows for two-way migration, the conditions given
in Assumption 2, which are easily veriﬁed through data, will imply that in the
long-run only one way migration will occur.
Proposition 2 summarizes the results in section 4.
Proposition 2 Given theproblemasdescribedinequations(4.9)to(4.16)weﬁnd
that endogenous climate change is a signiﬁcant propagator of world migration
and reduces per capita welfare in both the North and the South.128
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Due to the various feedbacks involved we shall derive these results step-by-step,
where we ﬁrstly allow for no feedbacks and then switch them on one after the
other.
4.4.1 Benchmark case
Firstly we assume no climate change effect on total factor productivity and
no labor mobility but international capital mobility. The steady state capi-











 αLα+β−1  1
1−α and Ri =
(1−β)(1+ρ)
βρ . We denote indirect utility in the
benchmark case by ˜ ua and it will be given by
˜ u
a

























. Given the utility and
production functions are the same, then in the case of CRTS the only difference
between indirect utility of the two countries comes from the TFP. By Assumption
2 we thus know that ˜ ua
N > ˜ ua
S. Under DRTS a larger Li implies a smaller ˜ ua
i.















The steady state change in temperature is increased by the productivity in the
North, i.e. the moreproductivetheNorth is themore it may produce and therefore
we would expect a stronger climate change. Similarly, the less patient agents are
(a lower ρ) the more they will consume when young and therefore the lower will
be the polluting capital stock, which reduces long-run climate change. The more
people live in the North the more they will produce overall and therefore the
stronger will be climate change. This also suggests that a larger migration to the
North should impact climate change, an intuition which we conﬁrm later. The
dirtier the production technology (higher  ) and the stronger emissions impact
CO2 concentrations (e.g. emissions made higher up, for example from airplanes,
impact CO2 stocks longer and worse than emissions on the ground) the higher
will be the long-run temperature.
4.4.2 Benchmark and migration
We now move to the case of benchmark with migration. The equilibrium condi-
tion for migration from the South to the North then implies xwN = wS. Rewrit-4.4. SOLVING THE MODEL 129







A steady state in migration from the South to the North then exists5, where we
denote the steady state level of M as Mam, if x1−αAN ¯ L
α+β−1
N > AS¯ L
α+β−1
S .
Intuitively, this condition requires that, at the initial point in time, agents from the
South have an incentive to migrate North. We can solve for the total amount of














A larger stock of population in the North reduces the incentives to migrate due
to the DRTS. On the other hand, the larger the population in the South the more
migrants would we expect since per capita welfare in the South is lower the larger
the population in the South. Moreover, if its productivity is enhanced (increase in




















Moreover, ifglobalization is associated with lower transportation, migrationcosts
would be reduced (i.e. a higher x) and more people will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to




















We denote indirect utility in this case by ˜ uam
i and it will be given by
˜ u
am






















5Proof: We check whether the equilibrium condition can exist by varying M along
its domain [0, ¯ LS]. We get limM→0 x1−αANL
α+β−1
N > limM→0 ASL
α+β−1
S > 0, and
limM→¯ LS x1−αANL
α+β−1
N < limM→¯ LS ASL
α+β−1
S . Since x1−αANL
α+β−1
N is a monoton-
ically decreasing function of M and since ASL
α+β−1
S is a monotonically increasing func-
tion of M from a positive number to inﬁnity we conclude that a unique steady state exists if
x1−αAN ¯ L
α+β−1
N > AS ¯ L
α+β−1
S .
6UnderCRTS nonon-trivialsteadystate exists sincex1−αAN = AS is a knife-edgecondition.
Thus, we have either no migration or complete migration.130
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Thus we obtain that if one allows for migration, then ˜ uam
S > ˜ ua
S, whereas ˜ uam
N <
˜ ua
N. Therefore, the South beneﬁts from international migration whereas the North
loses. This result is attributable to the decreasing returns in production. If the
North is initially better off, then people from the South migrate North until the
per capita utility in the North decreases to such a level that migration does not
pay any longer. Since fewer people in the South now share the same (or more)
capital, this raises the average wage in the South and therefore utility increases.















Since there are now more people living in the North which all pollute according
to the Northern living standards, this will unambiguously lead to an increase in
emissions and therefore long-run temperature. A current estimate by the UN of
the amount of migrants in the North is around 10%. Assuming that they lead the
same lifestyle as the Northern population, this may work as a signiﬁcant prop-
agator of climate change. By reducing migration costs and raising the number
of migrants, increased globalization would raise temperature. A rise in Northern
productivity would directly exacerbate climate change by increasing the produc-
tive capacity of the North, but also indirectly affect temperature by making the
North more attractive and leading to more migration.
4.4.3 Benchmark with climate
Here we shall assume that there is a climate change effect on total factor produc-
tivity in the South but no migration possibilities. We denote indirect utility by
˜ uac
i . In this case the North will grow to the same long-run level of capital as in the
benchmark case and end up with the same indirect utility, such that ˜ uac
N = ˜ ua
N.
The steady state capital stock of the South is however depending on the
amount of climate change induced by the production of the North. The pro-
























which implies that ˜ uac
S < ˜ ua
S < ˜ uac
N = ˜ ua
N. As expected, the externality imposed
by the North on the production capacity of the South reduces total welfare in the
South. Theindirect utilityin theSouth is a decreasing functionof emissionsin the
North (since A′
S(KN) < 0). The stronger the effect of climate change on TFP, i.e.4.4. SOLVING THE MODEL 131
the larger the slope of AS(KN) for a given KN, the lower will be indirect utility.
Conclusively, the worse the impact of climate change the less will each person
in the South produce which will lead to a lower average income. For example,
a likely scenario for temperature increases is 3◦C, which could imply an at least
doublingofmalariavictimsintheSouth(Flavin&Tunali,1998). Withcurrently3
milliondeathannuallyand500millionnearfatalities(and consequentlymanylost
working hours), the productivity decreases in the regions which see a doubling of
malaria victims can be enormous.
Since there are no migrants in this scenario and since the integrated case is
equivalent to the autarky case, we observe no change in production in the North,
and therefore no divergence from the total emissions in the benchmark case.
4.4.4 Benchmark with climate and migration
We now extend the previous case by allowing for migration. A steady state in
migration from the South to the North then exists7, where we denote the steady
state level of M as Macm, given that x1−αAN ¯ L
α+β−1
N > AS(KN)¯ L
α+β−1
S . This
requires that at some point in time, be it at t = 0 or when climate change has
sufﬁciently reduced TFP in the South, there exists an incentive to migrate North.
















∂M > 0. This implies more climate change and therefore TFP
in the South with migration is lower than if one does not allow for migration.
In terms of indirect utility we can then conclude that ˜ uacm
S < ˜ uam
S iff Macm ≥
Mam. The denominator of equation (4.25) is increasing when ∆AS < 0 and the
nominator is increasing when ∆AS < 0. This comes about because migration
implies two things: Firstly, more migration means more climate change which
reduces incomein theSouth; secondly, moremigrationimpliesahigherper capita
steadystateincomeintheSouth. Itis thiscumulativeeffect wheremoremigration
implies further climate change which leads to Macm > Mam. We can therefore
conclude that ˜ uacm
S < ˜ uam
S . Let us observe that increased globalization translated













7Proof: limM→0 LHS > limM→0 RHS > 0, and limM→¯ LS LHS < limM→¯ LS RHS.132
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The nominator is positive and the sign of the denominator is ambiguous because
∂Macm






∂LN < 1. This condition holds only if changes in AS have small
impacts on the number of migrants or if climate change has minimal impacts on
TFP in the South. Put differently, if the migration costs change, then the impacts
unfold subsequently as follows. Initially, more people wish to migrate since the
costs are lower, and thus the perceived beneﬁt of moving to the North is higher.
The secondary effect of this is, however, that more migrants pollute more and
therefore induce a further decrease in the productivity of the South. If migrants
have only a small impact on climate change, then Macm will be insigniﬁcantly
higher than Mam. However, if the impact of migrants on total climate change is
large enough and climate change impacts the migration decisions strongly, then
this could potentially lead to a corner solution: All inhabitants from the South
wish to migrate to the North. In any case we can conclude that dMacm/(dx) >
dMam/(dx).
Similarly, higher productivity in the North would now not only make the



















The nominator is positive while the a necessary condition for an interior solution





∂LN < 1. As for a change in x, this condition
is satisﬁed when changes inSouthern productivityhavesmalleffects on migration
or when climate change does not impact too much on Southern productivity. As
in the benchmark case with migration, an increase in Northern productivity will
raise Northern income per capita and make the North more attractive to migration
(ﬁrst term on the nominator). Moreover, a higher TFP in the North will raise its
productive capacity and induce a decrease in Southern productivity via climate
change (second term on the nominator). Increased migration will have an indirect
impact on climate change and further reduce Southern productivity (second term
in the denominator).















Therefore, T acm > T am. In this scenario therefore, not only the direct migration
incentives play a vital role, but also the cumulative effects of more migrants. If
8Infact,wehave ∂M
acm
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more migrants also increase emissions in the North and therefore further reduce
income in the South, this can imply a strengthening of the migrationincentiveand
will increase climatechangefurther. Since approximately10% ofall theNorthern
population is made up of migrants, this snowball effect may be substantial and
should not be neglected in policy decisions. An intensiﬁcation of globalization
or higher Northern productivity may in fact be the causes of a reinforcement of
climate change via the migration they induce.
4.4.5 A Data Experiment
Our objective is to give some numbers to these otherwise analytical results. This
is supposed to be viewed as a rough exercise which allows us to extrapolate some
numerical implications of the model. We take data from today, extrapolate into
the future (year 2050), and then use these estimates as an approximation for the
steady state values.
GTAP data suggests that World GDP in the year 2000 is 31.278 billion US $,
of which the US, Western Europe and Japan have 70%. We assume those will be
the migrants destination countries (North). The South is then composed of most
of the remaining countries of the world (we do not consider Australia and New-
Zealand in our calculations). Assuming a growth rate of 1% for the North and 2%
for the South, we calculate GDP in 2050 to be 36 bn for the North and 25 bn for
the South. Total world population is 6.6 billion, of which US, Western Europe,
Japan currently hold17%. In theyear 2050, theestimates ofthe World Population
Prospects of the United Nations (2008) are 1.1bn for Europe plus Northern Amer-
ica, and 8bn for the rest of the world. In the year 2000, 52.5 million migrants born
in the South live in the North (UN data and Docquier & Marfouk, 2006). We take
this as the baseline case with migration but without climate change. The average
sources of GDP worldwide are: skilled plus unskilled labor, giving β = 0.44, and
capital, giving α = 0.37, which suggests signiﬁcant decreasing returns.
Knowing Y , α, L, β, we can use our Cobb-Douglas functional form Y =
AKαLβ to calculate Ki as follows: take the interest rate ri = αAiK
α−1
i Lβ, then
divide by Y , gives r/Y = α/K. Solve for K, gives K = αY/r. We know α and
Y , assume r = 1.02, then we can calculate KN and KS. We then calculate Ai
from solving the income equation for A, giving A = Y/(KαLβ). Independent of
the scaling, the ratio σ ≡ AS/AN is always the same. Rewriting equation (4.25)
as x = σ1/(1−α)(LN/LS)(1−α−β)/(1−α), we obtain the x that matches the value of
migrants in 2000, namely x = 0.27.
Having now constructed the variables that we need, we proceed to calculate
the effects of climate change on steady state migration. Since there exists barely
any data or knowledge of the consequences of climate change on the productive
capacity, we take a shortcut and assume that climate change visualizes as a per-134
4. WHEN NATURE REBELS:
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, CLIMATE CHANGE AND INEQUALITY
centage decline in σ. Table 3 shows that the proportion of migrants in the North,
M/(¯ LN + M), will change from 9% to up to 35% if the ratio of productivity σ
(=AS/AN) drops by up to 5%. This suggests that even small impacts of climate
change can lead to signiﬁcant changes in the number of migrants.
Table 4.1: Effect of climate change on migration
decrease in σ 0 -1% -2% -3% -4% -5%
Migrants in 2050, (in millions) 98.77 150.95 205.80 263.45 324.02 387.64
change in migrants’ stock 0.00% 52.84% 108.38% 166.74% 228.07% 292.49%
share of migrants (North) 8.98% 13.72% 18.71% 23.95% 29.46% 35.24%
share of migrants (Sorth) 1.23% 1.89% 2.57% 3.29% 4.05% 4.85%
share of migrants (World) 1.50% 2.29% 3.12% 3.99% 4.91% 5.87%
Source: GTAP, UN Population Division and own computations
The results in this section immediately raise questions of various concerns:
Empirically, how can we differ between incentives for migration, namely purely
utilitarian incentives and forced migration? Ethically, what value do we give to
space and place (or origin) and is someone responsible for taking the migrants?
Politically, how are we to deal with possible migration of up to 35% of Northern
country’s population? Economically, what is the effect of various policies on the
number of migrants, on the inequality between North and South, as well as on the
amount of climate change?
Though each of the above questions poses challenging problems, we are only
going to deal with the economic ones here. In the subsequent section 4.5 we deal
with policies of the North.
4.5 Northern Policies
We shall now investigatethe effects of several possible policies undertaken by the
North. The ﬁrst policy is an immigration policy whereas the second one leads to
greener production. In the last part of this section we calibrate whether the US or
Europe would, in the long-run, invest more in green technology or immigration
policy. In the subsequent propositions, whenever we refer to ‘abstracting from
climate change’, we mean AS(Tt) = AS(T), ∀T.
The following analysis considers that policies are costly in the long-run. Let
τ be a production tax paid by ﬁrms in the North per unit of output produced and
let τx and τ  be amounts per unit of output produced invested by the government
in respectively border controls and green technology. Since the government taxes4.5. NORTHERN POLICIES 135
production, it adheres to the polluter pays principle. The government’s budget
constraint is then given by
τYN = (τx + τ )YN (4.28)
Let us observe that the following analysis would not lead to different implications
in terms of migration, climatechange and inequalityin case of long-run costliness
of these policies. The results would just be simpliﬁed by the fact that there is no
taxation and thus an absence of the impact of taxes on production.9 The only ef-
fect thatwe seeis aleveleffect, but nota qualitativechangein theresults. Wenow
assume that the immigration costs (x) and the impact of the Northern production
on emissions ( ) are both a function of government expenditure. We therefore
have that x(τxYN) and  (τ YN), where both functions are decreasing in their re-
spective arguments. In the previous analysis higher production had a negative
effect on climate change via the generated pollution and attracted more migrants
because of a higher North-South indirect utility gap. Through the mechanisms in
x(τxYN) and  (τ YN), higher production will also generate higher tax revenues
which strengthen immigrationcontrols and amplify the amounts invested in green
technologies. As a consequence, increased migration will not only have a nega-
tive feedback effect on climate change but also a positive feedback effect via an
increase in tax revenues.
In the presence of such a tax scheme, ﬁrms must solve the problem
max{Lit} Πit = (1−τ)AitKα
itL
β
it−witLit, for i = N,S, where optimal wages are
given by





Again excess proﬁts are distributed to the investors (the young generation of the
previous period) such that Πit = (1 − β)(1 − τ)AitKα
itL
β
it, which gives a return
to a unit of capital of













The steady state utility in the North is










9While policies may certainly bear costs at the time they are implemented, it could be argued
that these costs will be zero in the long-run. This could be the case if one considers for example
R&D expenditure in emission reductions: If a greener technology is developed once, then it is
clear that furtherR&D expenditureis not necessary in the long-run. Similarly, immigrationpolicy
whichleads to a higherprobabilityof obtaininga jobfor themigrantsonlyrequiresa discussionin
the parliament. The long-run costliness of policies will however not change the results. A formal
demonstration is available on request from the authors.136
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We now derive the direct impact of taxes on the stock of steady state migrants. It
is straightforward to calculate that dMam/dτ < 0. Since taxes reduce the total
capital stock in the North they provide less incentive for part of the Southern pop-
ulation to migrate North. Allowing for climate change to affect migration leads to
dMacm/dτ < 0 ifAS > −(1−τ)A′
S(KN)(∂KN/∂τ+∂KN/∂Macm∂Macm/∂τ).
If the number of migrants are very responsive to increases in taxes and if climate
change bears a signiﬁcant impact on the productivity in the South, then a small
increase in taxes has the potential to reduce the stock of migrants.
In the next two sections we analyze how the North should optimally allocate
its tax revenues between border controls and clean technologies.10 The govern-
ment maximizes (4.31) subject to τ = τj, where j = x, . From equation (4.31)
we know that the Northern government will raise taxes iff
LN < −(1 − α − β)(1 − τj)
dMi
dτj
j = x, , i = am,acm. (4.33)
A necessary condition is that dMi
dτj < 0. The intuition is that an increase in taxes,
which reduces per capita income in the North, has to lead to a sufﬁciently strong
reduction in migration to increase Northern utility. The following assumption
insures that the North sets positive taxes.
Assumption 3 In the subsequent analysis, we assume that condition (4.33) is
always satisﬁed.
4.5.1 Investment in border controls
We assume here that all the government’s tax revenues are invested in border
controls only. The following proposition summarizes the results of this section.
Proposition 3 Abstracting from climate change, a higher investment in border
controls leads to a reduction in the Southern utility and an increase in the North-
ern one; to a reduction in steady state temperature and to an increase in North-
South inequality. In presence of climate change, investments in border controls
will decrease further the long-run number of migrants, improve the environment
and decrease or increase North-South inequality.
10We neglect the fact that the government may wish to raise taxes but not invest everything in
bordercontrols respectively green technologies,an assumption equivalentto the no-Ponzi scheme
assumption.4.5. NORTHERN POLICIES 137




























For an interior solution in migration we require that the denominator of (4.34) is
positive. As ∂Mam
∂τx < 0 and ∂Mam
∂x > 0, the sign of dMam
dτx depends on the terms














Since immigration costs depend on the tax rate and on production, a higher tax
rate may either increase or decrease the amounts spend on border controls. In
fact, an increase in the tax rate implies an increase in the proportion of production
allocated to border controls (term on LHS) but also a reduction in steady state
production leading to a reduction in tax revenues.11 We can show that the former
effect will dominate the latter if taxes are not too high such that production is not
reduced too much.12 If the level of the tax rate is initially low, then an increase
will lead to higher tax revenues. On the contrary, if tax levels are already high
at the beginning, a further increase in the tax rate will decrease tax revenues. In
effect, this result points in the direction of a Laffer curve.
What happens in the South? If condition (4.35) holds, we know that the utility





1−α(1 − α − β) 1
LS
∂M
∂τx < 0. If we
assume that the government increases taxes only if it leads to an increase in the




dτx > 0, then North-South inequality will increase.




































The numerator is negative if condition (4.35) holds. The denominator is positive
for an interior Macm, which implies |
dMacm
dτx | > |
dMam
dτx |.13 Similar to section 4.4.4,
11It is straightforward to see that the direct impact of taxes on steady-state production is nega-
tive, since YN =








12Imagine the following functional form for the immigration costs x(τxYN): x = ¯ x
1+aτxYN ,
where a > 0 is a parameter and ¯ x are immigration costs without government intervention. Then
condition (4.35) drops down to τx < 1 − α. Thus the Northern government can improve the
welfare of its citizens if taxes on production are not larger than the share of non-capital revenues
in production.
13If we take the same functionalform as in footnote12 for the immigrationcosts, then it is easy
to show that a sufﬁcient condition for dM
acm
dτx < 0 is τx < 1 − α.138
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the denominator is positive if changes in AS have small impacts on the number
of migrants or if climate change has small impacts on TFP in the South. If the
deterioration of the climate impacts the migration decisions strongly, then this
could lead to a corner solution where no inhabitants of the South wish to migrate
to the North.
Condition (4.35) is also sufﬁcient for taxes to improve the environment. Tem-



















∂τx < 0 and
∂KN
∂LN > 0, the effect of taxes on temperature will depend on
dMacm
dτx , which one would expect to be negative given the previous analysis. Taxes
will improve TFP in the South not only by diminishing the productive capacity
in the North but also by reducing the number of migrants and thus their effect
on climate change (the second term inside the parentheses). In such a case the
indirect utility in the South might increase, if DRTS are dominated by the positive




























The ﬁrst term in equation (4.37) captures the effect of DRTS: a reduction in the
number of migrants implies that more people have to share the same pie. The
second term acts in the opposite direction: less migrants leads to less climate
change, then this allows for a higher per capita production in the South.
The effect on inequality is as follows. A reduction in inequality from the
































The ﬁrst term inside the square brackets is positive and represents DRTS. A de-
cline in migration lowers Southern utility because due to DRTS more people have
to share less wealth. The indirect effect of less migration on inequality is given
by the two other terms, which are negative. The second term inside the square
brackets shows that higher taxation has a (direct) negative impact on Northern
utility (˜ uN ↓ if τx ↑). The third term indicates that higher taxation also acts
upon the Southern productivity via a direct decrease on the Northern productive
capacity (
∂KN
∂τx < 0) and via an indirect decrease in KN through a reduction in




∂τx < 0). In short with-
out DRTS, higher taxation will reduce inequality provided condition (4.35) holds,4.5. NORTHERN POLICIES 139
while the two other effects work in favour of equality. We can therefore conclude
that North-South inequality will increase or diminish depending on which of the
terms is stronger.
Finally, it is certainly true that many Northern governments undertake immi-
gration policies in order to regulate the amount of migrants. Here one could also
imagine that the North is more concerned with aftercare measures e.g. by taking
responsibility for inducing climate change on the South and therefore takes care
of the forced migrants, then it might adopt a more relaxed immigration policy.
Such an aftercare policy would reverse the above results: a reduction of taxation
would increase the number of migrants (if it leads to lower tax revenues i.e. equa-
tion (4.35) is satisﬁed), worsen climate change and have an ambiguous effect on
North-South inequality. Alternatively, investing in greener technology may be
understood as a precautionary or preventive policy. Such a policy is analyzed in
the following section.
4.5.2 Investment in clean technologies
When the government decides to invest all its tax revenues in green technologies,
then we obtain the following.
Proposition 4 More taxes directed towards a greener technology will reduce the
number of migrants, improve the environment and either increase or decrease
North-South inequality.








































The ﬁrst term in the numerator is the direct effect of taxes: less income in
the North makes is less attractive to migrate from the South. The second part in
the numerator describes the marginal impact of climate change (brought about by
changes in taxes) on the motivation to migrate. These terms include the direct
effect of higher better green technology from higher taxes; the impact of lower
income due to higher taxes on climate change; the impact of a lower production
level due to higher taxes. The denominator in (4.38) is governed by two opposite
feedback effects of migrants on climate change. When higher taxation induces
less migration, then the tax base will be reduced and less resources will be allo-
cated to green technologies. The second term inside the brackets corresponds to
the ‘traditional’ feedback effect: more migration means more productive capacity140
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in the North and thus more pollution. Provided that the denominator is positive,
then a sufﬁcient condition for dMacm


































































The denominator is the same as the denominator in (4.38) and the same reason-
ing applies concerning its sign. If the ‘traditional’ feedback effect of migrants
on climate change is not too strong then the denominator is positive and we have
an interior solution for Aacm




dτ  > 0. Lower migration decreases pollution by decreasing Northern pro-
duction (direct effect) but may increase pollution via a reduction in tax revenues
(indirect effect). Since ∂M
∂τ  < 0 and ∂M
∂AS < 0, if the direct impact of migrants on
pollution is stronger than the indirect impact then this is a sufﬁcient condition for
dAacm
S
dτ  > 0.





















Higher investments in green technologies have a negative effect on utility in the
South due to DRTS (
dMacm




dτ  > 0). The effect of higher investments on Southern
utility will depend on which of the effects dominate.
The effect on inequality is as follows. A reduction in inequality from the


























If DRTS are not too strong then inequality decreases provided
dAacm
S
dτ  > 0.4.5. NORTHERN POLICIES 141
4.5.3 Investment in clean technologies or in border controls
Should a Northern government, that maximizes the utility of a Northern citizen,
invest in greener technology or in immigration controls? Assume the government
has a ﬁxed amount of resources τ = ¯ τ, then the budget constraint can be written
as τ  = ¯ τ − τx. The Northern government will choose the optimal share of











dτx will determine if the government should spend more on border
controlsormoreon green technologies. When
d˜ uN
dτx > 0, thegovernmentwillraise
τx and indirectly reduce τ  such that the tax rate remains ﬁxed at ¯ τ. The reverse
is true if
d˜ uN
dτx < 0. Since
∂uN
∂M < 0 the government’s decisions will depend on the
sign of ∂M
∂τx. Thus fora giventax rate ¯ τ, if dM
dτx < 0, then thegovernmentwillinvest
more in border controls while reducing its investments in green technologies. A


































The numerator of (4.42) depicts the impact of the policy mix. For a ﬁxed tax
rate, an increase in τx allocates more resources to border controls, which directly
reduce migration (ﬁrst term). At the same time, a rise in τx deprives the produc-
tion sector of subsidies for green technologies, which induces an exacerbation
of climate change and more migration (second term). The denominator shows
the multiple feedback effects of migration on climate change (second term) and
on the tax base (third and fourth terms). These different feedback effects have
different impacts on migration. The ﬁrst effect states that the migration induced
climate change will generate further migration, the two other terms suggest that
migration will increase production and thus the tax base, which allocates more re-
sources to the government to reduce migration indirectly via green technologies
or directly via border controls. A sufﬁcient condition to have an interior solution





∂M < 1. This condition holds only if changes in
AS have small impacts on the number of migrants or if climate change has min-
imal impacts on TFP in the South. Under this condition, the optimal policy mix
{τ∗
x;τ∗
 } will be determined by the following equation:
dM
dτx
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Condition (4.43) states that the optimal policy mix {τ∗
x;τ∗
 } is achieved when a
change in migration due to subsidies in border controls (LHS) is exactly com-
pensated by an opposite change in migration via foregone investments in green
technologies.
4.5.4 A numerical illustration
In the following we shall give a numerical illustration by comparing the situa-
tion of two developed regions. Consider the North to be either EU-15 (EU) or
North-America (NAM), which comprises United States and Canada. Will each
of these two regions should spend more on green technologies or on border con-
trols? In order to address this issue we do a similar extrapolation exercise as
before and choose the following functional forms: AS(KN) =
AS
1+ωT , T =  KN,
x = ¯ x
1+aτxYN,   =
¯  
1+bτ YN. Condition (4.43) can then be rewritten as
ω KN




1 + bτ YN
= 1 − α (4.44)
The aim of the following illustration is to ﬁnd a tax scheme {τx;τ } satisfying
condition (4.44). This exercise is performed twice, that is for the cases where the
North is represented by either Europe-15 or by North-America, and subsequently
we compare the so obtained tax schemes of either region.
Calibration of ¯ LN, ¯ LS, and AN. As in section 4.4.5, the structural parameters
α, β and ρ are respectively equal to 0.37, 0.44 and 0.9. The unknown parameters
ω, a and b are set (subject to subsequent sensivity analysis) respectively to
0.045, 0.01 and 0.5. In condition (4.44) the variables  , KN and YN, are
endogenous while the following variables need to be calibrated: ¯ LS, ¯ LN, ¯ LN,
¯ AS, ¯   and ¯ x. Table 4.5.4 summarizes the values for these variables, which
take on different values whether the North is considered as being Europe-15
(EU) or North-America (NAM). Knowing total population in the South and the
number of Southern migrants in Europe and North-America from the data of
Docquier & Marfouk (2006), it is easy to compute the population originating
from the South ¯ LS. According to Docquier & Marfouk (2006), the share of
migrants from developing countries in EU and NAM corresponds to 10.13%
and 4.9% in 2000. We can thus compute the number of migrants in Europe
and North-America as well as ¯ LEU and ¯ LNAM. Then, ¯ LS equals to around
5.75 bn in 2000 in both cases.The next step is to compute the technology level
in the North, AN. Using the data from the WDI (2007), GDP PPP equals
to YNAM = 10.43 and YEU = 9.27 thousands bn in 2000. Following the
procedures described in section 4.4.5, we obtain KNAM = 3.78 and KEU = 3.36,4.5. NORTHERN POLICIES 143
ANAM = 10.6 and AEU = 8.96 as well as the TFP in the South, which is
calculated in the same way, giving AS = 4.429. In the following we explain
the calibration of thelast parameters for Europeand North-America: ¯  , ¯ x and ¯ AS.
Calibration of ¯  , ¯ x and ¯ AS. First, we set ¯  NAM and ¯  EU equal to the observed
values for  . It can be observed that total emissions in North-America are twice
as much as in EU-15 with respectively ENAM = 6.32 compared to EEU = 3.06
thousand bn tons in 2000. Knowing from equation (4.8) that   = E
KN, we ob-
tain the emissions per productive capital ratio  NAM = 1.67 and  EU = 0.91 for
2000. The parameters ¯  NAM and ¯  EU are set equal to those values. We thereby
assume that these observed values for   correspond to a situation without taxes
on production (τ = 0). Our analysis will then consist in exploring how the in-
troduction of a tax rate of τ > 0 should be allocated between green technologies
and border controls.14 The observed values for   indicate that the production of
the EU-15 is much more emissions-saving than the one of NAM. The reason is
largely due to the North American climate policy. In fact, it is well-known that
the United States and Canada are ranked behind Western European countries in
terms of emissions to GDP ratio to carbon dioxide ratio, which is an indicator
that represents a very speciﬁc aspect of a composite environmental performance
index developed by the CIESIN center of the Yale university, see CIESIN (2006).
Second, knowing ¯ LN, ¯ LS, AN and M for Europe and North-America as well
as AS, we can compute migration costs as in section 4.4.5: xEU = 0.2197 and
xNAM = 0.1744. These values indicate that migrants face higher migration costs
when migrating to North America than to Europe. Again, considering that these
values correspond to a situation without taxes or where existing taxes are implic-
itly taken into account, we apply these values to ¯ xEU and ¯ xNAM. Finally, since
we have ω, ¯  , KN and AS, we can calculate ¯ AS for Europe and North-America.
Table 4.2: Calibration of exogenous variables
¯ LN ¯ LS AN ¯   ¯ x ¯ AS
North=Europe-15 0.39 5.74 8.69 0.91 0.2197 5.04
North=North-America 0.31 5.75 10.60 1.67 0.1744 5.69
Results. Given the proposed functional forms for x,   and AS, the calibrated
values for the parameters, and the equations of section 4.5 for the endogenous
variables KN, M, YN, the resulting steady-state of the model with a production
14Alternatively, imposing ¯  NAM and ¯  EU to be equal to what the data suggest for   could
be interpreted to reﬂect a situation where existing taxes on production are implicitly taken into
account in the data. Our analysis would then be to focus on how the introduction of an additional
tax rate on production should be allocated between border controls and clean technologies.144
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tax rate of 10% will give us the policy mix {τx;τ } satisfying condition (4.44)
for the Europe-15 and North-America. The so obtained tax scheme corresponds
to the decision rule of a Northern government, which maximizes the utility of
Northern citizens and which does not internalizethefeedback effects of migration
on climate change and on the tax base. We obtain that Europe should invest a
larger share of its tax revenue in immigration costs than North- America (τEU
x =
67.4% compared to τNAM
x = 50.16%), and correspondingly invest less in green
technologies than North America (τEU
  = 32.6% compared to τNAM
  = 49.84%).
An explanation of these ﬁndings is that North-America has a more emission-
intensive production and higher border controls than Europe. Thus compared
to Europe, it would be optimal to invest a larger share of its revenue in green
technologies and less in border controls.
The results of this exercise should obviously - like any calibration exercise
with unknown parameters - be approached with care. The conclusions rest solely
on a per capita utilitarian approach, neglecting any other ethical or political di-
mensions. We used a rather stylized model and did not account for other reasons
to migrate (like wars) which could lead to different policy decisions. However,
our ﬁndings are informative about how a region should choose its optimal tax
revenues when needing to allocate these between green technologies and border
controls (or anything else which affects subjective migration costs).
4.6 Conclusion
In this article we investigate the relationship between climate change and interna-
tional migration. We make use of a two-regions overlapping generations model
similar to Galor (1986) but allow for climate change to affect the productivity in
the South.
Our main ﬁndings are that climate change will most likely increase world mi-
gration and that even small changes in its impact can imply signiﬁcant changes
in the amount of migrants in the long-run. A simple calibration exercise suggests
that thenumberof migrantsincreases by a factorof fourif climatechangereduces
Southern productivity by approximately 5 percent. However, from our empirical
overview in the ﬁrst part of this paper it is very likely that the reduction in South-
ern productivity exceeds 5 percent in the future. Thus, it goes without saying
that migration is expected to re-shape world orders if it is not properly guided by
international policies.
We then analyze what effect a softer immigration policy and investment in
greener technology might have on the long-run number of migrants, on the en-
vironment and North-South inequality. Both policies could be undertaken for
different reasons. Whereas we interpret the softer immigration policy as an after-4.6. CONCLUSION 145
care policy which makes the North take responsibility for the effects of climate
change which it itself imposed upon the South, the investment in greener technol-
ogy may be understood as a precautionary or preventive policy. We show that the
immigration policy clearly increases the number of migrants but worsens climate
change and has an ambiguous effect on North-South inequality. On the contrary,
the investment in greener technology leads to fewer long-run migrants, a better
environment, but again an ambiguous sign for the inequality measure. It is there-
fore clear that any policy undertaken by the North will depend on the importance
which the North places upon displacement of people, climate change or inequal-
ity. Importantly, the qualitative results do not depend on whether the costs of the
policiesare sunkin thefutureorwhetherthepoliciesincurcontinuouscosts. With
a numerical example we show that the US should invest more of its tax revenues
in green technologies than the EU and less in border controls than the EU, a re-
sult which stems from the differences in production technologies and in existing
immigration policies.
There are many extensions which this model could see. Firstly, it should
be interesting to analyze the short-run migration decisions and compare these to
the long-run choices. Since we know that a policy which has positive effects
in the long-run might have signiﬁcant costs in the short-run, it can be important
to compare the costs and beneﬁts of both. Furthermore, though in the long-run
this is clearly unimportant, in the short-run we could see signiﬁcant impacts of
population growth. Including this in this model is however a challenging task.146
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Migration and Human Capital in an
endogenous fertility model
Abstract. How does high- and low-skilled migration affect fertility and human capital in
migrants’ origin countries? This question is analyzed within an overlapping generations
model where parents choose the number of high- and low-skilled children they would
like to have. Individuals migrate with a certain probability and remit to their parents.
It is shown that a brain drain induces parents to have more high and less low educated
children. Under certain conditions fertility may either rise or decline due to a brain drain.
Low-skilled emigration leads to reversed results, while the overall impact on human cap-
ital of either type of migration remains ambiguous. Subsequently, the model is calibrated
on adeveloping economy. It isfound that increased emigration ofthe high-skilled reduces
fertility and fosters human capital accumulation, while low-skilled emigration induces
a rise in population growth and a reduction in the proportion of high educated individuals.
Keywords: Migration, human capital, fertility.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F22, J13, J24.1
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5.1 Introduction
At the world level, the number of international migrants rose from 76 million
in 1960 to 175 million in 2000, but considering population growth the world
share of migrants remained quite stable (2.5% in 1960 to 2.9% in 2000). Nev-
ertheless, by making countries increasingly interdependent, globalization, rising
income inequality, enhanced transportation technology, decreasing transportation
costs, and stronger demographic disparities between developed and developing
countries play in favor of a reinforcement of international migration in the next
decades. Moreover, the fact that developed countries are ever more attractive for
workers from developing regions is documented by the share of international mi-
grants in developed countries that rose from 4% in 1970 to 8% in 2000 (see UN
2003 and IOM 2005). This is even more true for high-skilled emigration (i.e.
emigration of post-secondary educated individuals), which is expected to be in-
creasingly important since immigration policies in migrants’ host countries tend
to be more and more skilled-biased. Docquier & Marfouk (2006) report that be-
tween 1990 and 2000, the augmentation in the number of high-skilled immigrants
in OECD countries was about 64%, while it was only about half as much for low-
skilled immigrants. Moreover, most of these additional migrants originated from
developing countries. The exodus of high-skill workers from developing coun-
tries is however feared to have severe consequences on already poor economies,
since it deprives them from their most talented labor force.
While the early theoretical literature of the 60s pointed out that a brain drain
hasbasicallynoimpactonmigrants’origincountriesandshouldnotbeacausefor
worry (Grubel & Scott, 1966), during the 70s economists, and foremost Bhagwati
& Hamada (1974), stressed that high-skilled emigration induces a negative exter-
nality on sending countries and that “there is a loss to those left behind". In recent
years, economiststook a fresh look at theissue and highlighteda range of positive
side-effects ofhigh-skilledemigration. Onemajorbeneﬁcial externalityof abrain
drain is that it induces greater incentives for individuals to educate because of a
higher expected skill premium. Then, if the newly educated individuals outweigh
the ones leaving the country, human capital at origin is enhanced compared to a
situation without a brain drain (Mountford, 1997b; Stark et al., 1997; Beine et al.,
2001b), which may act as a substitute for educational subsidies (Stark & Wang,
2002).2 However these migration models take population as constant and do not
analyze fertility decisions. In fact, an important literatureshows that the decisions
parents face in terms of fertility and of investment in the education of their chil-
dren are central for a country’s economic development, see for instance Becker &
2In an extensive survey,Docquier (2006)describes the differentpositive externalities linked to
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Barro (1988) as well as de la Croix & Doepke (2003). Since the quality-quantity
trade-off in terms of children inﬂuences human capital formation, it is crucial for
a country’s economic growth and it seems straightforward to study the impact of
emigration within an endogenous fertility model. To our knowledge, only the mi-
gration model of Chen (2006) features endogenous fertility, but restricted to the
brain drain issue. He analyzes the difference between public and private funded
education systems in a model where agents have an average human capital level
and a stochastic probability to emigrate. Our study differs in terms of the aim and
of the framework used.
This paper analyzes how high- and low-skilled emigration shape parents’ fer-
tility choices and thus human capital formation. Contrarily to most endogenous
fertility models, individuals do not decide upon the total number of their children
and their education level (or investment in their education), but directly about
how many low- and high-skilled children they would like to have. This is also
a major contrast to Chen (2006) and allows us to explicitly introduce skill het-
erogeneity among agents in our overlapping generations (OLG) model. Also the
end of their childhood, individuals migrate with a certain probability and remit to
their retired parents. This is another distinct feature from Chen, since remitting
behavior may inﬂuence the expected return of raising and/or educating children
and thus adults’ fertility decisions. It is shown that a brain drain induces parents
to have more high and less low educated children, but may either raise or reduce
fertility (total number of their offspring). A sufﬁcient condition to experience a
rise in fertility due to high-skilled emigration is that the relative cost from raising
a high compared to a low educated child must be lower than its relative expected
gain. In contrast, when the reversed inequality is a necessary condition to have a
reduction in fertility due to a brain drain is i.e. the relative cost of raising a high
educated child is larger than the gain. Low-skilled emigration leads to reversed
results: parents choose to have less high- and more low-skilled children. Finally,
the impact of migration on human capital is ambiguous.
To provide more concrete ﬁndings, the model is calibrated on the Philippines,
which is an economy open to migration and experiencing large inﬂows of remit-
tances. It is found that increased high-skilled emigration reduces fertility and
fosters human capital accumulation, while low-skilled emigration induces higher
population growth and a lower level of education. More precisely, a permanent
increase of 10% in emigration ﬂows is simulated. When the additional emigrants
are high-skilled (low-skilled), the share of high-skilled in the work force changes
from 22.2% to 28.4% (to 21.2%) and the annual population growth from 1.98%
to 1.36% (to 2.1%).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the model and
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Philippines economy is presented in section 5.3. Section 5.4 concludes.
5.2 The Economic Model
We consider an overlapping generation economy where individuals live for 3 pe-
riods: childhood, adulthood and old age. Each individual has one parent, which
creates the connection between generations. Individuals have either a low (su-
perscript l) or a high education level (superscript h). Higher education is costly,
while lower education is offered for free by the society.3. During their childhood,
individuals who attend school do not work, whether they obtain higher education
or not. Also, agents work only in their adulthood and earn a wage that depends
on their education level. High-skilled adults earn a wage wh, while low-skilled
ones a wage wl with wh > wl.
We consider a small open economy where capital is perfectly mobile, which
implies a ﬁxed international interest rate R∗. Also, both high- and low-skilled
wages are exogenous and constant. Both low- and high-skill labor in this small
open economycan emigrateto an advanced economyand earn a highersalary, w∗i
(i = h,l), which is exogenously given with w∗i > wi. Finally, we assume that
emigration is not large enough to affect the economy of the destination country.
5.2.1 Individual behavior
All decisions are made by the individual during her adulthood. Thus at time t,
each adult with education level i cares about her own old age consumption Di
t+1
and abouttheexpectedincomeofherchildren, V i
t+1. It isassumedthatindividuals
consume only when old. Thus there is no arbitrage opportunity for consumption,
which is purchased through savings and remittances. The individual also cares
about the return from her “education investment", that is, the expected income of
her children V i
t+1, which represents the altruistic component in the utility. More-
over, an adult chooses how many low- (ni
t) and high-skilled children (mi
t) she
would like to have.
At the beginning of their adulthood, individuals with education level i can
emigrate with a probability pi, i = h,l to a more advanced economy. Hence the
expected income of a child with education level i = h,l is
w




∗i, i = h,l. (5.1)
3For instance, individuals with a college degree could be considered as high-skilled and indi-
viduals without a college degree as low-skilled. Then educationafter high school would be costly,
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The probability to emigrate pi is exogenous and will serve as a policy variable in
the comparativestatics as well as in the numerical example. A rise in pi can either
beassociatedwithamoreliberalimmigrationpolicyofadestinationcountry,such
as, for example, a reduction of the entry barriers, or with more liberal emigration
policies in the origin country, such as larger exit quotas.
Raising one child takes time fraction φ ∈ (0,1) of an adult’s time and high-
skilledchildren inducean additionalcost fortheireducation x. Therefore savings,
Si













where in the following we normalize the ﬁxed constant interest rate R∗ to 1.
It is assumed that all children care about their parents and remit a proportion
of their (foreign) income to their parents. Therefore for a parent of education i
















which comprisenot onlymoneytransmittedby adultsstayingin thehomecountry
to their parents, T i
t = (1 − pl)θlwlni + (1 − ph)θhwhmi, but also remittances, Z,
deﬁned as Zi
t = plθlw∗lni + phθhw∗hmi. Then θi(> 0) is the propensity to
transfer money to her parents for an individual with education level i (or to remit
for a migrant with education level i).








The utility function of an individual who is an adult with education level i at time




















A part from the fact that we explicitly introduce heterogeneity among the types of
children, the non-linear term in V i
t+1 is similar to Becker & Barro (1988); Barro
& Becker (1989); Doepke (2005), with α ∈ (0,1) measuring the weight given to
low-skilled children and ǫ ∈ (0,1) playing the role of the elasticity of the utility
to any type of children. As mentioned by Barro & Becker (1989), this form of
the altruism term means that, for a given expected income per child wi, “parental
utilityU( ) increases, but at a diminishingrate, withthenumberofchildren" (here
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t+1)}, i = l,h, (5.6)
subject to (5.4) and which consists into the maximization of her lifetime utility by
choosing the number of low- (ni) and high-skilled children (mi).
5.2.2 Solving the individual problem














which states that the net marginal cost of raising a low-skilled child, φwi
t−θlwl
t+1
(cost minus expected transfers), in terms of consumption, should equal the
marginal utility gain from a low-skilled child’s expected income, in terms of the
future value of total children (V ). If this equality does not hold, raising children
is either too costly (it is then optimal to have no children), or not costly enough
(then individuals choose to have more and more children).
Similarly, the ﬁrst order condition of Ui with respect to mi
t shows that
φwi











which reads that the net marginal cost of educating one child in terms of con-
sumption (left hand side) should be equal to the marginal beneﬁt from educating
a child.
The second order conditions of the agents’ maximization problem are satis-
ﬁed. Therefore the solutions from (5.7) and (5.8) are optimal for the household
problem.
It is easy to see that in (5.7) and (5.8), both the right hand sides are positive,
implying that the left hand sides are positive also. These are necessary conditions
for the existenceof interiorsolutions and it is assumed that, in what follows, these
conditions always hold.










t + x > θ
hw
h
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Assumption 1 guarantees that raising children is expensive, otherwise parents
will have as many children as they can; at the same time, educating children is
also costly, otherwise all children will get higher education.
Combining these two equations (see appendix), we obtain explicit solutions
for m and n, which are put forward in the following proposition.























































t represents the ratio of net costs of raising a low to a high educated
child (see (5.7) and (5.8)), while Bt is the ratio of the contribution of a low edu-
cated child to a high educated child in parental utility. Also, if ǫ is the elasticity
of the utility to any type of children, then σi
n,m can be considered as the elasticity
of substitution between high and low educated children in each household.
Given the explicit expression of mi and ni, we can study the change in these
two choice variables with respect to a change in ph. In the appendix we prove the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under assumption 1 the number of high educated children is an
increasing function of the emigration probabilityof high-skilled ph, while number






∂ph < 0, ∀t, i = l,h.
The intuition of this proposition is very clear: a brain drain would lead to a
trade-off between high- and low-skilled children which is in favor of an increase
in the number of the former. However, the impact of a rise in ph on the total
number of children, ni
t + mi
t, is not so clear. Nevertheless, we have the following
results by combining equations (5.28), (5.29), and (5.30) in appendix.
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(i) The effect of ph on fertility, ni
t + mi
t, is ambiguous.
(ii) A sufﬁcient condition for a rise in fertility following a rise in ph, ∂(ni
t +
mi
t)/∂ph > 0, is
(1 − α) wh
α wl >
φwi + x − θhwh





 1−ǫ and the right hand side is increasing in wh.
(iii) Furthermore, the other direction of the above inequality offers a necessary
condition to have a reduction in the total number of children following a
rise in ph.
(iv) Finally, the effect of ph on average fertility and on the fertility differen-
tial between high- and low-skilled parents is ambiguous, even if we impose
condition (5.12).
The above proposition can be commented as follows. A rise in the probability
for high-skilled to emigrate ph leads to an ambiguous effect on the total number
of children since the number of low educated children decreases and the one of
high educated children increases (point (i) in proposition 3).
However, through the sufﬁcient condition (5.12), we get some insights on
the mechanisms that lead parents to have more children as after a brain drain.
Condition (5.12) can be interpreted in the following way. A brain drain induces a
rise in fertility when the relative gain of having a high compared to a low-skilled
child is larger than its relative net cost (up to a term comprising the elasticity of
the utility to any type of child, ǫ). In fact, the left hand side in (5.12) is a parent’s
utility value from a high-skilled child’s expected income, (1−α)wh, to a parent’s
utility from a low-skilled child, αwl. The right hand side comprises a discounted
(by an elasticity term ǫ) ratio of the raising and education costs of a high educated
child (φwi + x) net of expected remittances from this child (θhwh) to the raising
costs of a low educated child net of expected remittances.
The interpretation of the necessary condition in point (iii) is now straight-
forward. If the relative gain from having a high-skilled child is lower than its
relative net cost, then the reduction in the number of low educated children fol-
lowing a brain drain dominates the additional high-skilled children. Thus fertility
decreases after a rise in ph.
The effect of ph on average fertility and on the fertility differential between
high- and low-skilled parents is unclear (point iv of the proposition). Average
fertility may decrease even when condition (5.12) holds, i.e. both types of parents
have more children. This would be the case when many high-skilled individuals5.2. THE ECONOMIC MODEL 155
left the country and raise their children abroad. Furthermore, if condition (5.12)
holds, the effect of a brain drain on the fertility differential between low- and
high-skilled, i.e. the difference between the total number of children from low-
and high-skilled parents divided by the total number of parents, is unclear. Intu-
itively, a rise in ph in period t leads to a decrease in the fertility differential only if
the increase in fertility of high-skilled parents dominates the increase in fertility
of low-skilled parents and the decrease in period t in the share of high-skilled
parents. This is shown in appendix.
Finally, due to the symmetry of the effects of pl and ph on ni and mi, the same
calculations lead us to the following corollary
Corollary 1 Assume Assumption 1 holds. Then mi
t is decreasing and ni
t is in-
creasing in pl, while the effect on the total number of children is ambiguous.
5.2.3 The impact of a brain drain on human capital
In the following analysis, we study the dynamic impact of an increase in ph on
human capital. But let us ﬁrst look at the long-run behavior of the economy. Let
Nh
t and Nl
t be respectively high- and low-skill active labor forces at time t, i.e.
the stock of high-respectively low-skilledindividualsborn at time t−1 from both
low- and high-skilled families and staying in their home country
N
l






































Deﬁnition 1 Along the balanced growth path of our economy, both working pop-
ulations grow at the same rate i.e. gh = gl = g and thus ratio of the high- to
low-skill labor force is constant qt+1 = qt = q.
The following proposition summarizes the behavior of the economy in the long
run
Proposition 4 If parameters and constants check (5.37) then the system globally
converges to its unique steady state q, where q = Nh
Nl = q and gl = gh =
(1 − pl)(nl + nhq).
The proof of this proposition is given in the appendix.
From the previous section, we know that parents choose to have more high-
and less low-skilled children, which acts positively on the formation of human156 5. MIGRATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN AN ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY MODEL
capital. However, a brain drain means also that more high-skilled people leave.
Thus which effect dominates? Human capital at time t, denoted by Ht, can be










t are respectively the high- and low-skill active labor forces at
time t, deﬁned as Thus Nl
t(Nh
t ) are the low- (high-) skill individuals born at time
t − 1 from both low- and high-skilled families and staying in their home country.
Therefore in order to study the effect of a change of ph on human capital, that
is ∂Ht
∂ph, we only need to study the effect of ph on 1





Case I. If ph varies at time t and this change in ph is not anticipated by the






t−1 are independent of a



























As a result, we have
∂Ht
∂ph < 0, (5.16)
which means that if there is no information about a policy change concerning
in ph, then parents are not prepared for it and will not send more children to
obtain higher education following a brain drain. The result is that more high-skill
workers emigrate without inducing any additional formation of human capital.
Case II. There is perfect foresight and parents are prepared for the change in






























We know that both ml and mh (nl and nh) are increasing (decreasing) in terms
of ph. Thus a higher ph will lead to a rise in the denominator and to a reduction5.3. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 157
in the numerator, while Nl
t and Nh
t are decided at time t − 1 and will thus not be
affected by a change in ph happening at time t + 1. Hence we obtain
∂G(n,m)
∂ph < 0.
To conclude, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (5.17) is positive and repre-
sents the ex post loss of human capital due to a brain drain, while the second term
on the RHS stands for the ex ante stimulation of human capital due to a brain
drain. Since these two effects also depend on the population size Nl
t and Nh
t , it
is open to question whether at the end a brain drain results in a brain loss or in a
brain gain within our endogenous fertility model.4 A calibration of our model on
a situation of a typical developing country open to labor mobility may give us a
speciﬁc answer.
5.3 Numerical Analysis
In this section we provide a numerical illustration to analyze the effects of in-
creased emigration on fertility and human capital. Higher migration can be due to
the fact that destination countries adopt more liberal immigration policies. Since
immigration policies tend to be more and more skilled-biased, we ﬁrst focus on
theeffects of higherhigh-skilledemigration. Consecutively,wecompare theﬁnd-
ings with a situationofincreased low-skilled migration. Moreover, we focus upon
the long term impact of changes in ph and pl.
5.3.1 Calibration
Our model is calibrated to depict a typical situation of South-North migration and
as such the parameter of our model are adjusted to match the economy of the
Philippines (to be the migrants’ origin country). This choice seems appropriate
since international migration and large ﬂows of remittances are notorious charac-
teristics of the Philippine economy for several decades now (see the IMF study
of Burgess and Haksar, 2005). The foreign country of the model, is represented
by a combination of OECD countries, where the importance of each of them is
weighted by the share of Filipino emigrants they host (see below). The initial
steady state is assumed to correspond to 2000 data. The values of parameters and
exogenous variables are reported in table 5.1 and chosen as follows.
According to Haveman & Wolfe (1995) parents spend around 15% of their
time raising children, which enables us to set the raising cost parameter φ to 0.15.
4It is also theoretically unclear whether a brain drain will increase or decrease human capital
in the steady state.158 5. MIGRATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN AN ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY MODEL
Table 5.1: Parameter values for the Philippines
φ = 0.15 ǫ = 0.5 wl = 1 wh = 2.54 ph = 0.086 pl = 0.043
α = 0.62 θl = 0.1 w∗l = 4.74 w∗h = 9.29 xl
t = 0.92 R∗ = 1.806
Also, following the wage of a high-skill worker in the Philippines is 2.54 times
larger than the one of a low-skilled.5 Thus if wl is set to 1, wh equals 2.54. Since
one period is considered to be 20 years, the interest factor is set to R∗ = 1.806
which corresponds to an annual interest rate of 3%.
A next step is to choose the probabilities to emigrate, ph and pl, which are
not directly observable. However, Docquier & Marfouk (2006) document that
67% of the Filipinos living in OECD in 2000 are high-skilled (i.e. post-secondary
education), thus we can set ph = 2 pl. Also, since one period lasts 20 years, it
can be considered that the number of migrants in the OECD in 2000 reported by
these authors represents the number of emigrants during one period in our model,
meaning that 1’678’735 Filipinos go abroad. 6. If the number of migrants can be
written as plNl + phNh then taking Nl and Nh from Docquier and Marfouk, we
have that pl = 0.043094295 and ph = 0.08618859.
For the remaining exogenous variables no data are available. To start with, the
parameter ǫ in the “altruistic”argument of the utilityfunction is set to 0.5, but will
be subject to several robustness checks in a later section. Remaining variables are
set in order to match four main characteristics of the Philippine economy. Let us
now describe this procedure. First, we know from Docquier & Marfouk (2006),
which themselves rely on the data of Barro & Lee (2001a), that in 2000 the ratio
of the low-to-high skill labor force, 1/h (= Nl/Nh), amounts to 3.5045. This
value is met by ﬁxing the education costs of a child to xl
t = 0.917045 and by
the plausible assumption that xh = xl. Second, if we consider one period to
be 20 years, then population growth in our model equals g = 1.481, implying
that α = 0.621093. Moreover, we can consider the wage differential between
the Philippines and the OECD to be similar to the per capita GDP differential.
According to the World Development Indicators WDI (2007), average per capita
GDPbetween1999-2004was$3’991inthePhilippinesand$34’268intheOECD
5The data is originally collected by the United Nations, General Industrial Statistics and cor-
responds to the skill premium in the manufacturing sector for the year 2000, see also Zhu (2005).
6This number is not exaggerated, because when considering also temporary residents (42%)
and irregular migrants (21%) together with permanent residents (37%), the number of Filipinos
living and working overseas was estimated to be around 7.58 million in 2002 with an increase of
1 million since 1996. This number is equivalent to almost one quarter of the domestic labor force
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(PPP, constant 2000 international $), thus 7.98 times higher in the OECD.7 If
average domestic wage is deﬁned as   w = (wh + 1/hwl)/(1 + 1/h) and average
foreign wage   w∗ = (w∗h+1/h∗w∗l)/(1+1/h∗), then the average wage difference
ω =   w∗/  w equals 7.98. Relying on the samesources as for thedomesticeconomy
and applying the same weights for the distribution of migrants among OECD
countries as for GDP per capita, the average ratio of low-to-high skill labor force
in the OECD, 1/h∗, was 1.096703272 and the skill premium, w∗h/w∗l, 1.96.8
Then to match the average wage difference, w∗h is required to be 9.2902, while
w∗l = w∗h/1.96. Finally, we need to set the propensities to remit θl and θh.
While high-skilled migrants remit a larger amount than low educated migrants,
recent research claims that their propensity to remit is lower than the one of low-
skilled migrants, see Faini (2007) and Nimii et al. (2008). In our central scenario
it is assumed that the propensity to remit of the high-skilled is 50% as much
as the low-skilled one and thus θh = 0.5 θl. This assumption will be subject
to robustness checks. Based on Fund staff estimates and on the World Bank,
indicate that remittances in percentage of GDP amount to 9.4%. If we deﬁne








t−1) and the total amount of remittances in




t. Then Λt/Yt = 0.094 implies that
θl = 0.103657.9
5.3.2 Results
We analyze the effects of a permanent increase of 10% in emigration ﬂows, which
means that more people leave the Philippines at each period with respect to the
baseline. For instance, in the ﬁrst period of the shock, the additional migrants
amount to 164 thousand. Two scenarios are compared. Under the high-skilled
emigration scenario, additional migrants are all high-skilled and thus ph rises
from 0.086 to 0.109. Conversely, under the low-skilled emigration, additional
migrants are low-skilled and pl changes from 0.043 to 0.05. Moreover, we focus
7According to Docquier and Marfouk, migrants from the Philippines living in the OECD in
2000 were distributed as follows: United States (69.31%), Canada (11.41%), Australia (4.65%),
Japan(4.56%),Italy (2.44%),UnitedKingdom(2.07%),Germany(0.75%),Korea(0.72%),Spain
(0.67%), New Zealand (0.51%), Austria (0.45%), Switzerland (0.43%), Netherlands (0.34%),
Greece (0.29%), France (0.28%), Norway (0.25%), Sweden (0.23%), Ireland (0.21%), Denmark
(0.15%),Belgium (0.13%),Iceland (0.04%), Mexico(0.04%), Finland (0.037%),Czech Republic
(0.0014%), Hungary (0.001%), Slovakia (0.0001%).
8The same data source as for the skill premium in the Philippines is used.
9According to aggregate data on remittances from the International Monetary Fund (IMF
2007) remittances amount to $7876 million in 2003. Moreover a more recent report of the World
Bank (2006) indicates that the remittances share of GDP in the Philippines would even amount to
13.5% (see World Bank, 2006, p.90, Figure 4.1).160 5. MIGRATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN AN ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY MODEL
on the long-run impact of such policies, and therefore tables 5.2 and table 5.3 in
appendix will refer to long-run changes in main variables (period 10).
Figure 5.1: Impact of increased high-skilled emigration




























Values display percentage changes with respect to the baseline.
The long run impact of increased high-skilled emigration is reported in ap-
pendix (table 5.2, column ‘benchmark’), but can be summarized as follows. Both
types of parents choose, as expected from our theoretical results, to ﬁnance higher
education to a larger number of children and to raise less low-skilled children.
While theoretically the effect of ph on total children was ambiguous, low-skilled
parents would prefer to have less children, while high-skilled raise slighty more
children. On average, fertility decreases as shown in ﬁgure 5.1. Moreover, the
fertility differential between low- and high-skilled, i.e. the difference between
the total number of children from low- and high-skilled parents divided by the
total number of parents, is reduced as well. What about human capital? In the
framework of de la Croix & Doepke (2003), a high fertility differential leads to
lower human capital accumulation. One of the reasons is that poor families have
more children than rich families and their children have a lower human capital.
Then for a given initial level of human capital, an economy with a high fertility
differential generates a lower future human capital. In our model, there is no ex-
plicit link, a lower fertility differential is associated with a higher human capital.
The effect of a brain drain on human capital H is (slightly) negative in the short
run (when the policy is adopted). This is because the shock is not anticipated5.3. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 161
Figure 5.2: Impact of increased low-skilled emigration




























Values display percentage changes with respect to the baseline.
and more high-skilled individuals leave the country in period 1. In the meantime,
parents decide to have more high-skilled children. When these additional high-
skilled children, having obtained higher education thanks to the new policy, add
to the high-skill labor force in period 2, they will more than compensate for the
high educated workers that have left. Moreover, we can see that the growth rate of
the population declines slightly in the ﬁrst period, because of the departure of ad-
ditional migrants. In the following period, population growth declines compared
to the baseline, also because of fertility choices. A 10% rise in emigration ﬂows,
where all additional emigrants are highly educated leads, in the long run (period
10), to a 27.80% rise in human capital (i.e. the proportion of high-skilled within a
generation H rises from 22.2% to 28.4%) and to a 8.47% decrease in population
growth rate (which means that the annual population growth rate declines from
1.98% to 1.36%).
Under the low-skilled emigration scenario, all additional migrants have lower
education. From the theoretical analysis, we know that the choices on the number
of high- and low-skilled children are upturned compared to a brain drain (see also
table 5.2, column ‘benchmark’). Such a policy will lead to an increase in average
fertility and in the fertility differential between low- and high-skilled parents (ﬁg-
ure 5.2). Moreover, the impact on fertility, population growth and human capital
is not only reversed, but also of much smaller magnitude than under high-skilled162 5. MIGRATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN AN ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY MODEL
emigration. Increased low-skilled emigration induces, in the long run, a drop of
4.46% in human capital (H goes from 22.2% to 21.2%) and a rise of 7.15% in
population growth (the annual growth rate changes from 1.98 to 2.1%).Finally
the impact of both migration policies on welfare indicators is discussed in the
appendix.
5.3.3 Robustness
Are the above ﬁndings consistent with migrants’ remittances behavior and with
thechoiceofǫ? Figure5.3reportstheimpactofhigh-skilledemigrationonhuman
capital formation and population growth when low-skilled migrants have a higher
propensity to remit (i.e. the ‘benchmark’ case when θh = 0.5θl), when both types
of individuals have equal propensities to remit (θh = θl) and when no remittances
are sent back (Λ = 0).10 The effects on human capital and population growth
are robust under these different scenarios. When high-skilled remit in the same
propensity as low-skilled, more remittances are sent back (see table 5.2, column
‘θh = θl’) and thus the incentives to send more children to get education are
higher. It results that human capital is more improved than in the benchmark.
However, in the absence of remittances, human capital is nevertheless enhanced
(even though less than in the other two scenarios), because parents are altruistic
and prefer having more high-skilled children who are expected to earn a higher
wage. In terms of population growth, the scenario in which both high- and low-
skilled remit in the same way has a less reducing impact than the benchmark. The
reason is that since high-skilled migrants remit more, the number of high-skilled
children is further stimulated and the decrease in population growth is dampened
(see table 5.2). In the absence of remittances, there is no purpose to raise high-
skilled children only to obtain additional remittances and low-skilled children are
then relatively more interesting in the ‘no remittances’ scenario than in the other
two scenarios. Then the decline in the number of low-skilled children is less
important and the effect on population growth reduced.
Figure 5.4 shows the consequences of increased low-skilled emigration. The
scenario with the same remitting behavior for high- and low-skilled leads to an
inferior reduction in human capital than the benchmark. Under the latter scenario
low-skilled remit more than in the case where θh = θl, and thus parents react in
a stronger way to a rise in pl. This also explains the higher increase in popula-
tion growth. The absence of remittances leads to a slight reduction in population
growth, because low-skilled parents do not choose to considerably increase the
10For each alternative scenarios, the different exogenous variables are recalibrated to meet the
characteristics of the Philippine economy in the baseline. Thus, among other features, we always
have that human capital is equal to 22.2% and the annual population growth rate 1.98% in the
baseline.5.3. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 163
Figure 5.3: Impact of high-skilled emigration under alternativebehaviors to remit



















Figure 5.4: Impact of low-skilled emigration under alternative behaviors to remit
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number of low-skilled children, since these ones do not repay them with any re-
mittances. Ultimately, the implications of larger emigration on human capital
formation and population growth are robust to a choice of ǫ (see tables 5.2 and
5.3).
5.4 Conclusion
An endogenous fertility model with overlapping generations is introduced, where
parents choose the number of low- and high-educated children they would like
to raise. We analyze the impact of high- and low-skilled emigration on parents’
fertility choices and on human capital. It is shown that a brain drain induces
parents to support higher education to a larger number of their children and to
raise less low-skilled ones. Moreover, we ﬁnd that a sufﬁcient condition to see
a rise in the total number of children is that the relative cost of raising a high-
compared to a low-skilled child is smaller than its expected gain. Besides, low-
skilled emigration leads to contrary results. However, the impact of either type of
emigration on human capital is ambiguous.
Finally, themodeliscalibrated on thePhilippinestoprovidesomequantitative
results. We examine the consequences of an increase of 10% in emigration ﬂows.
When these additional migrants are high-skilled, human capital is enhanced in
the long run (the share of high-skilled individuals rises from 22.2% to 28.4%)
and population growth experiences a slow down (annual population growth rate
falls from 1.98% to 1.36%). Alternatively, when the additional emigrants are
low-skilled, the impact is reversed and of a lower magnitude: the level of human
capital is exacerbated (the share of high-skilled drops from 22.2% to 21.2%) and
population growth is stimulated (from 1.98% to 2.1%).
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
The explicit solutions for ni and mi are obtained in two steps. We ﬁrst compute
the linear relationship between ni and mi, and ﬁnd the explicit solution mi.
Step 1. The relationship between ni and mi





























































































Similarly, the ﬁrst order condition of Ui with respect to mi
t shows
−φwi











which is the same as
φwi


































































Step 2. Obtaining mi
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t + x − θhwh
t+1.
When substituting (5.22) into the right hand side of (5.23) and after rearrang-









































































n,m + (1 − α)wh
t+1
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
This proof can be established in three steps. In step 1, the effect of ph on the
elasticity of substitution σi
n,m is computed. Step 2 shows that mi is an increasing
function of ph, while step 3 demonstrates that ni is decreasing in ph.
Step 1. Elasticity σi
n,m is decreasing in ph.


























































due to the fact that ǫ
1−ǫ > 0 and
Ai
t
Bt > 0.APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 167
From the deﬁnition of Bt and Ai














































where we use the ﬁrst order condition (or Assumption 1)
φw
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In step 1, we prove that
∂σi
n,m




∂ph = w∗h−wh > 0. Therefore, we only need to study the sign
of Mi.168 5. MIGRATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN AN ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY MODEL

































































∂ph > 0, ∀t, i = l,h. (5.26)
Step 3. ni
t is decreasing in ph

























where the ﬁst term is negative and the second term is positive, therefore we con-
tinue the analysis study to see which term dominates and determines the sign of
∂ni
∂ph.





























































































































(φwi + x)(w∗h − wh)
(φwi + x − θhwh)wh . (5.30)





(φwi + x)(w∗h − wh)(Γi
2 − αǫσi
n,mwl)






























n,m − (1 − α)wh
 
= −(φw
i + x)(1 − ǫ)ασ
i
n,mwl
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and
(1 − ǫ)M

























i + x) − θ
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    
    
> 0, if (1 − ǫ)θhwh > (φwi + x),
= 0, if (1 − ǫ)θhwh = (φwi + x),
< 0, if (1 − ǫ)θhwh < (φwi + x).
(5.32)
However, if Assumption 1 holds (i.e. the ﬁrst order condition), then the ﬁrst
two cases in (5.32) are not possible, and as a result, we have
∂ni
t
∂ph < 0, ∀t, i = l,h. (5.33)
This ﬁnishes the proof.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
Dropping the time subscripts for simplicity, a sufﬁcient condition to have a rise in









φwi − θlwl  <
ǫ(1 − α)wh
αwlσi
n,m + (1 − α)wh, (5.34)
which is equivalent to (5.12). Before proving proposition 3, let us ﬁrst show how
to rewrite (5.34) into (5.12). Using (5.10) and the results in (5.11), condition





















































By the deﬁnitions of Ai and B we obtain condition (5.12). Proving that condtion
(5.12) is sufﬁcient for ∂(ni + mi)/∂ph > 0 is thus equivalent to prove that
condtion (5.12) is sufﬁcient for ∂(ni + mi)/∂ph > 0.
This ﬁnishes the proof.
Proof of case (ii) of Proposition 3







































where, by the deﬁnition of σi



























(φwi + x − θhwh)wh
< 0,












The proof is ﬁnished.
Proof of case (iv) of Proposition 3
In the following we deﬁne average fertility and the fertility differential between
high- and low-skilled parents in terms of our model and look the impact of ph on











































∂ph is unclear. Under condition (5.12) the ﬁrst two terms are positive,
and the sign on
∂qt




t−1. Then ph has a direct negative impact on qt through the additional high-
skilled that emigrate in t but does not affect the choices in terms of children made
by parents at t − 1. Thus the total effect of ph on average fertility is ambiguous
even if we impose condition (5.12).






































The impact of a brain drain on the fertility differential between high- and low-




































Again, even if we impose condition (5.12), then the ﬁrst three terms on the right
hand side of the above equation will have a positive impact on F d
t while the last
term will contribute to decrease F d
t . This ﬁnishes the proof.APPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL INDICATORS, FIGURES AND TABLES 173
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 4
At the steady state, qt+1 = qt = q and thus we have that
q =
Nh
Nl =   p
ml + qmh
nl + qnh
where   p =
1−ph




l −   pm
h)q −   pm
l = 0 (5.36)
There exist two solutions to the above equation
q =
−(nl −   pmh) ±
 
(nl −   pmh)2 + 4  pnhml
2nh
Since the term in the square root is larger than nl −   pmh, there exist one unique
positive solution to equation (5.36), which is the steady-state value of q
q =
−(nl −   pmh) +
 
(nl −   pmh)2 + 4  pnhml
2nh
Deﬁne the function J(q) as







The ﬁrst derivative of this function with respect to q gives
J























Our economy converges to its steady state, if and only if
convergence iﬀ J
′(q) < 1
which is equivalent to
J











After dividing both sides by nh, using mi = ni[(σi
n,m)
1
ǫ]−1 and rearranging, we























The proof is ﬁnished.174 5. MIGRATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN AN ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY MODEL
Appendix E: Additional indicators, ﬁgures and tables
Additional indicators
This section shows the impact of the two migration policies on welfare indica-
tors. Remittances per high- (Zh) and per low-skilled parent/receiver (Zl), total






































Moreover, the ratio of the high-to-low skill utilities (Ξ) or of high-to-low skill
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The differential in the proportion of high educated children between high- and

























The long run impact of the different migration scenarios on all these indicators is
shown in tables 5.2 and 5.3.
Impact on welfare
Figure 5.5: Impact of increased high-skilled emigration on welfare






































































Values display percentage changes with respect to the baseline.
“l" refers to low- and “h" to high-skilled individuals.
Figure 5.5 points at the impact of high-skilled emigration on other economic
indicators, and more speciﬁcally at some welfare indicators. While total remit-
tances and average remittances received rise in the long run (column 2), average
remittances received by each skill group behave differently (column 1). Obvi-
ously in the ﬁrst period average remittances for both skill groups rise when more
individualsleavethecountry. However,inthelongrunremittancesforlow-skilled
individuals are decreased, because the remittances received from their additional
high-skilled children do not compensate for the remittances foregone by raising
less low-skilled children. In contrast, high-skilled parents beneﬁt from higher per176 5. MIGRATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN AN ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY MODEL
capita remittances. In column 3, high-skilled emigration has only a slight impact
on average utility of high-skilled individuals but raises considerably the utility of
low-skilled ones. Then average per capita utility will rise and the welfare of low
compared to high-skilled individuals will improve (column 4).
Figure 5.6: Impact of increased low-skilled emigration on welfare






































































Values display percentage changes with respect to the baseline.
“l" refers to low- and “h" to high-skilled individuals.
These latter results are explained by the “altruistic” component of the utility.
In fact, if we consider welfare to be measured only by the consumption part of
the utility, ln(Di), then average utility per skill group will have only a temporary
impact. The ratio of high-to-low skill utilities from consumption, Πt, will decline
in the ﬁrst period (bottom graph in column 5) because utility from consumption
of a high-skilled individual, ln(Dh), decreases more than the utility from con-
sumption of low-skilled individuals. Finally, average utility from consumption,
Ψt, rises also in the long run because more and more people become high-skilled
and enjoy a higher utility.
Figure 5.6 shows the impact on welfare indicators under increased low-skilled
migration. Similarly to a brain drain, higher low-skilled emigration leads to more
remittances in the short run (column 2) because more people migrate. In the long
run, total remittances decrease, because the number of migrants remitting higher
amounts (i.e. the high-skilled migrants) decrease. The reason is that the low-skill
biased emigration policy leads parents to ﬁnance higher education to a smallerAPPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL INDICATORS, FIGURES AND TABLES 177
number of children leading to fewer high-skilled emigrants. It can also be ob-
served that in contrast to the brain drain scenario, low-skilled parents beneﬁt on
average from higher remittances (bottom graph in column 2). In both scenar-
ios, the utility of low-skilled individuals rises in absolute terms (bottom graph in
column 3) and relatively to high-skilled individuals (bottom graph in column 4).
Table 5.2: Long run impact of an increase in ph under different variants
Impact on household decisions Var Bmk γh = γl Λ = 0 ǫ = 0.25 ǫ = 0.75
HS children of HS parents mh 2.09 3.96 5.36 5.10 1.04
HS children of LS parents ml 6.53 10.60 9.09 10.28 8.54
LS children of HS parents nh -14.65 -14.23 -9.44 -8.07 -28.33
LS children of LS parents nl -12.20 -11.00 -6.23 -7.51 -24.12
TOT children of HS parents mh + nh 0.22 -0.28 -1.77 0.57 0.98
TOT children of LS parents ml + nl -9.95 -8.40 -4.08 -4.77 -20.46
Savings of HS parents sh -0.88 -1.49 0.00 -0.77 -0.82
Savings of LS parents sl 1.61 -1.27 0.00 -1.07 -0.02
Human capital H 27.79 28.98 15.14 17.06 18.68
Population growth rate g -35.62 -28.87 -12.24 -18.81 -23.53
Impact on welfare
Remittances per HS receiver Zh 9.23 11.01 0.00 10.50 8.96
Remittances per LS receiver Zl -3.61 3.59 0.00 2.59 0.06
TOT remittances Λ 26.98 37.22 0.00 18.20 19.49
AVG remittances Z 3.38 14.07 0.00 5.58 4.47
AVG U U 13.26 14.49 9.15 7.90 8.79
Ratio of U (HS/LS) Ξ -3.56 -3.69 -2.71 -2.60 -2.72
AVG U from consumption Ψ 18.31 19.09 9.97 8.42 10.08
Ratio of U from consumption Π 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Values display percentage changes with respect to the baseline.
Var stands for ‘variables’, Bmk is the benchmark case, HS and LS stand for ‘high-skilled’ and ‘low-skilled’, U is ‘utility’,
AVG means ‘average’ and TOT is ‘total’.
Summary of results and robustness
The long run impact of sustained high- and low-skilled migration is summarized
in tables 5.2 and 5.3.178 5. MIGRATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN AN ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY MODEL
Table 5.3: Long run impact of an increase in pl under different variants
Impact on household decisions Var. Bmk γh = γl Λ = 0 ǫ = 0.25 ǫ = 0.75
HS children of HS parents mh -0.07 -0.18 -0.53 -0.24 0.00
HS children of LS parents ml -0.70 -0.78 -0.87 -0.53 -1.39
LS children of HS parents nh 1.62 1.44 0.94 0.89 3.39
LS children of LS parents nl 3.21 1.74 0.60 2.46 5.85
TOT children of HS parents mh + nh 0.12 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.01
TOT children of LS parents ml + nl 2.74 1.44 0.39 2.00 5.04
Savings of HS parents sh 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Savings of LS parents sl -1.11 -0.33 0.00 -0.73 -0.83
Human capital H -4.46 -2.26 -0.78 -2.44 -2.95
Population growth rate g 7.15 2.60 -0.69 4.32 4.95
Impact on welfare
Remittances per HS receiver Zh 0.02 -0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00
Remittances per LS receiver Zl 2.49 0.92 0.00 1.78 2.00
TOT remittances Λ -2.12 -1.45 0.00 -0.84 -1.16
AVG remittances Z 1.43 0.02 0.00 1.26 1.27
AVG U U -1.19 -0.51 0.07 -0.36 -0.55
Ratio of U (HS/LS) Ξ -0.33 -0.41 -0.54 -0.27 -0.28
AVG U from consumption Ψ -2.94 -1.49 -0.51 -1.20 -1.59
Ratio of U from consumption Π 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Values display percentage changes with respect to the baseline.
Var stands for ‘variables’, Bmk is the benchmark case, HS and LS stand for ‘high-skilled’ and ‘low-skilled’, U is ‘utility’,
AVG means ‘average’ and TOT is ‘total’.Bibliography
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